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ABSTRACT	
	
In	areas	of	wildland-urban	interface	(WUI),	especially	residential	developments,	it	 is	very	
common	 to	 see	 liquefied	 petroleum	 gas	 (LPG)	 tanks,	 particularly	 with	 a	 higher	 ratio	 of	
propane,	in	surface	installations	serving	homes.	The	most	common	tanks	are	between	1	and	5	
m3	 of	 capacity,	 but	 smaller	 ones	 of	 less	 than	 1	m3	 are	more	 frequent.	 In	 case	 of	 accident,	
installations	may	be	 subject	 to	 fires	and	explosions,	especially	 in	 those	circumstances	where	
legal	 and	 normative	 requirements	 allow	 very	 close	 exposure	 to	 flames	 from	 vegetable	 fuel	
near	LPG	tanks.	
	
In	this	project,	it	is	intended	to	do	a	comprehensive	diagnosis	of	the	problem,	addressing	
the	 compilation	 of	 information	 on	 real	 risk	 scenarios	 in	 historical	 fires.	 First,	 a	 preliminary	
presentation	of	the	properties	and	characteristics	of	liquefied	petroleum	gas	will	be	exposed.	
Its	 physical	 and	 chemical	 properties,	 production	 methodology,	 pressure	 and	 temperature	
diagrams	and	important	considerations	will	be	defined	when	using	this	type	of	substances	in	a	
storage	tank	of	a	certain	volume.	
	
Next,	a	review	of	the	situation	of	the	existence	of	LPG	tanks	in	the	urban	forest	interfaces	
will	be	exposed.	In	this	case,	the	main	accidents	caused	by	problems	with	the	storage	of	LPG	
will	be	analyzed	taking	into	account	the	relevance	of	BLEVE	events	in	this	type	of	incidents.	To	
do	this,	the	main	scenarios	that	could	take	place	in	the	event	of	a	fire	will	be	presented.		
	
Next,	 the	 existing	 legislation	 on	 the	 storage	 of	 LPG	 in	 these	 environments	 in	 some	
Mediterranean	 countries	will	 be	 studied.	 In	 order	 to	 develop	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis,	 the	
main	 safety	 measures	 and	 distances	 will	 be	 considered,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	
possibility	 of	 vegetation	 material	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 LPG	 storage	 tanks,	 which	 is	 the	 main	
problem	 that	will	 arise	 in	 a	 possible	 BLEVE	 scenario	 in	 case	 of	 fire.	 To	 finalize	 and	 facilitate	
understanding,	 a	 comparative	 table	 will	 be	 included	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 visualizing	 the	 main	
advantages	and	legislative	deficiencies	between	the	different	countries.	
	
Following,	 the	 state	 of	 the	 art	 in	 terms	 of	modelling	 LPG	 accidents	 at	 the	WUI	 will	 be	
reviewed.	Trying	to	simulate	and	predict	this	type	of	scenarios,	it	will	see	the	models	normally	
chosen	to	obtain	the	tolerable	values	selected	and	the	answers	obtained	in	each	case.	
	
Finally,	several	fire	scenarios	will	be	simulated	by	means	of	a	CFD	tool	(FDS,	Fire	Dynamics	
Simulator).	In	these	simulations,	the	wind	velocity	and	the	distance	of	the	combustible	vegetal	
mass	to	the	tank	will	be	controlled	in	a	WUI	fire	in	which	there	is	a	tank	of	fixed	dimensions.	
The	 temperature	 and	 the	 heat	 flow	 in	 each	 of	 the	 scenarios	 will	 be	 obtained,	 and	 the	
differences	among	 the	 location	of	 the	sensors	and	 the	characteristics	of	 the	scenario	will	be	
analyzed.		
	
As	a	conclusion,	 it	has	been	observed	that	 there	 is	a	great	amount	of	variables	 that	are	
not	 contemplated	 by	 the	 regulatory	 organisms	 and	 that	 the	 existing	 legislation	 does	 not	
guarantee	 the	 safety	 of	 the	 population	 in	 this	 type	 of	 environment.	 From	 the	 simulations	
results,	variables	as	temperature	should	be	studied	for	further	characterizations.	
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1. Preface	
	
1.1 Master	Thesis	purpose	
	
The	main	objective	of	this	project	is	to	characterize	the	hazards	involving	LPG	facilities	in	
the	wildland-urban	interface	(WUI)	through	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	problem.	
	
This	work	intends	to	increase	awareness	of	the	risk	that	these	types	of	interfaces	have	in	
our	society	as	well	as	to	make	a	real	and	deep	review	on	the	existing	means	and	knowledge	of	
this	subject.	
	
	
1.2 Scope	and	Purpose	
	
In	this	project,	a	comprehensive	diagnosis	of	the	problem	is	made,	compiling	information	
on	 real	 risk	 scenarios	 in	 historical	 fires.	 A	 study	 of	 current	 technical	 regulations	 and	
identification	of	weaknesses	will	be	done,	followed	by	a	bibliographic	analysis	of	the	state	of	
art	 in	 this	 matter.	 Finally,	 the	 analysis	 of	 fire	 risk	 using	 the	 FDS	 simulation	 tool	 will	 be	
performed	in	order	to	get	quantitative	insights	about	the	LPG	tanks	fire	exposure	at	the	WUI.	
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2. LPG	characterization	
 
LPG	 is	 obtained	 from	 petroleum	 and	 has	 two	 origins:	 approximately	 60%	 is	 recovered	
during	 the	extraction	of	natural	 gas	and	oil	 from	 the	earth,	 and	40%	 is	produced	during	 the	
refining	of	crude	oil	[9].	 	The	composition	of	the	petroleum	is	mainly	of	carbon	(93%	–	97%),	
hydrogen	(10%	-	14%),	nitrogen	(0.1%	-	2%),	oxygen	(0.1%	-	1.5%)	and	sulphur	(0.5%	-	6%)	with	
a	 few	 trace	 metals	 making	 up	 a	 very	 small	 percentage	 of	 the	 petroleum	 composition.	 The	
overall	 properties	 of	 each	 different	 petroleum	 source	 are	 defined	 by	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	
four	main	 hydrocarbons	 found	within	 petroleum	as	 part	 of	 the	 petroleum	 composition.	 The	
percentages	 can	 vary	 greatly,	 giving	 the	 crude	 oil	 a	 quite	 distinct	 compound	 depending	 on	
geographic	region:	paraffin	(15%	-	60%),	napthenes	(30%	-	60%),	aromatics	(3%	to	30%),	with	
asphaltics	making	up	the	remainder	[21].		
	
The	main	composition	of	LPGs	are	hydrocarbons	containing	three	or	 four	carbon	atoms.	
LPG	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 mixture	 of	 butane,	 isobutene,	 propane,	 propylene,	 butylene	 and	 other	
hydrocarbons	of	 low	molecular	weight	 that	 is	 refined	 from	petroleum	and	depending	on	the	
source	of	the	LPG	and	how	it	has	been	produced,	components	other	than	hydrocarbons	may	
also	be	present.	Like	all	fossil	fuels,	LPG	is	a	non-renewable	source	of	energy.	It	is	a	safe,	clean	
burning,	reliable	and	a	high	calorific	value	fuel	[2],	[3].		
	
Liquefied	petroleum	gas	 is	 also	a	gas	used	 in	 industry	as	a	 fuel	 gas	 for	heating	and	 it	 is	
popularly	 known	 by	 its	 abbreviation	 or	 short	 form	 which	 is	 LPG.	 Sometimes	 it	 is	 used	 for	
carburization	 of	 steel,	 flame	 heating,	 flame	 gouging,	 flame	 hardening,	 flame	 cleaning,	 and	
flame	straightening	[22].		
	
The	 production	 of	 LPG	 in	 the	world	 has	 grown	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 3.3%	per	 year	 accumulated	
during	 the	period	 from	1991	 to	2000,	a	year	 in	which	production	grew	by	38%	compared	 to	
1991	[11].	The	domestic	sector	is	one	of	the	most	notorious	applications	of	LPG,	with	almost	
45%	of	world	demand.	However,	transport	is	one	of	the	fastest	growing	sectors,	accounting	for	
almost	9%	and	23.7	million	 tons	of	global	 consumption	 in	2011	 [Hart	et	al.,	2011].	As	 in	 the	
case	of	 LNG	 (Liquefied	Natural	Gas),	world	consumption	has	 increased	significantly	 in	 recent	
years,	the	increase	in	2000	compared	to	1990	was	45%.	
	
Liquid	 petroleum	gases	were	discovered	 in	 1912	when	Dr.	Walter	 Snelling	 realized	 that	
these	 gases	 could	 be	 changed	 into	 liquids	 and	 stored	 under	moderate	 pressure.	 From	 1912	
and	1920,	 LP	 gas	uses	were	developed,	where	 the	 LPG	 industry	began	 shortly	before	World	
War	1.	At	 that	 time,	a	problem	in	the	natural	gas	distribution	process	cropped	up.	Gradually	
facilities	were	built	to	cool	and	compress	natural	gas,	and	to	separate	the	gases	that	could	be	
turned	into	liquids	(including	propane	and	butane)	[22].	Finally,	LPG	was	sold	commercially	by	
1920.	
	
When	gas	is	drawn	from	the	earth,	it	is	a	mixture	of	several	gases	and	liquids.	Commercial	
natural	 gas	 is	mainly	 composed	of	methane.	However,	 it	 also	 contains	 ethane,	 propane	and	
butane	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 specifications	 for	 natural	 gas	 in	 each	 country	 in	 which	 it	 is	
distributed.	 Therefore,	 before	 natural	 gas	 is	 marketed,	 some	 LNGs,	 including	 LPG’s	 are	
separated	out,	depending	on	the	wetness	of	the	gas	produced:	LNGs	represent	1	to	10%	of	the	
unprocessed	gas	stream.	Worldwide,	gas	processing	is	the	source	of	approximately	60%	of	LPG	
produced.	
	
In	 an	 oil	 refinery,	 LPG’s	 are	 produced	 at	 various	 stages:	 atmospheric	 distillation,	
reforming,	 cracking	 and	 others.	 The	 LPG	 produced	 will	 be	 between	 1	 and	 4%	 of	 crude	 oil	
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processed.	This	yield	will	depend	on	the	type	of	crude	oil,	the	degree	of	sophistication	of	the	
oil	 refinery	 and	 the	market	 values	 of	 propane	 and	 butane	 compared	 to	 other	 oils	 products.	
Worldwide,	refining	is	the	source	of	approximately	40%	of	LPG	produced	[8].	
	
Although	 tied	 to	 the	 production	 of	 natural	 gas	 and	 crude	 oil,	 LPG	 has	 its	 own	 distinct	
advantages	and	 can	perform	nearly	every	 fuel	 function	of	 the	primary	 fuels	 from	which	 it	 is	
derived.	The	fact	that	it	can	be	easily	liquefied	makes	LPG	a	highly	versatile	energy	alternative	
and	 thanks	 to	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 packaging	 and	 storage	 options,	 LPG	 has	 numerous	 fuelling	
applications,	as	it	was	mentioned	before.	
	
The	distribution	of	 the	gas	 is	of	great	 importance	when	 it	 comes	 to	obtaining	LPG,	as	 it	
could	be	observed	in	Figure	1.	In	first	place,	the	production	of	field	grade	LPG	is	the	result	of	
the	 treatment	 of	 LNG’s.	 This	 treatment	 is	 necessary	 to	 produce	 oils	 that	 are	 suitable	 for	
transport	 to	 refineries	 and	 natural	 gases	 that	 correspond	 with	 commercial	 specifications.	
While	crude	oil	 is	transported	from	the	production	sites	to	refineries	by	tankers	or	pipelines,	
LPG	is	transported	to	storage	terminals	by	large	LPG	carriers,	pipelines	or	train.	
	
Butane	and	propane	can	also	result	from	the	oil	refining	processes.	LPG	storage	terminals	
store	products	that	are	imported	in	large	quantities.	The	LPG	is	then	delivered	by	train,	road,	
coastal	 tanker	 or	 pipeline	 to	 cylinder	 filling	 plants	 and	 intermediate-size	 storage	 areas.	
Cylinders	 are	 filled	 with	 butane	 and	 propane	 at	 bottling	 plants.	 LPG	 is	 generally	 stored	 in	
pressurized	tanks	(vessels	or	spheres)	in	intermediary	storage	centers.	
	
	
Figure	1.	LPG	distribution	[8]	
LPG	 can	be	 transported	 virtually	 anywhere,	 either	 in	 cylinders	 or	 bulk.	 Trucks	 transport	
butane	 and	 propane	 cylinders	 from	 the	 bottling	 plant	 to	 retailers,	 as	well	 as	 to	 private	 and	
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professional	customers.	Meanwhile,	small	bulk	trucks	distribute	LPG	from	the	storage	centers	
to	various	consumers.	LPG	is	easily	available	to	end	users	through	cylinder	sales	points	such	as	
commercial	 stores	 or	 service	 stations	 close	 to	 their	 locations.	 Customers	 requiring	 larger	
volumes	can	purchase	LPG	in	bulk	[8].	
	
Being	more	specific	with	regard	to	the	properties	of	LPG,	liquefied	petroleum	gas	consists	
of	light	hydrocarbons	with	a	vapor	pressure	exceeding	40	psia	at	37.78°C	and	the	examples		of	
these	 include	 propane,	 propylene,	 butane	 (normal	 or	 isobutane),	 and	 butylene	 (including	
isomers)	 [3].	The	most	common	LPG’s	are	propane	and	butane	and	both	are	commercialized	
applying	the	specifications	established,	in	Spain,	by	BOE	number	303	of	19/12/84	and	number	
227	of	22/09/82	[7]	where	LPG’s	proportions	could	vary	according	de	following	limits	shown	in	
Table	1:	
	
Table	1.	LPG	composition	[7]	
Volume	%	
	 Commercial	Propane	 Commercial	Butane	
Propane	(C3)	 Minimum	of	80%	 Maximum	of	20%	
Butane	(C4)	 Maximum	of	20%	 Minimum	of	80%	
	
As	 it	 was	 explained	 before,	 the	 properties	 of	 propane	 and	 normal	 butane	 (collected	 in	
Table	 2,	 3	 and	 4)	 as	 the	main	 components	 of	 LPGs	 are	 very	 important	 to	 be	 established	 in	
order	to	maintain	in	the	best	storage	conditions	these	flammable	substances.	The	knowledge	
of	these	properties	will	allow	to	obtaining	a	greater	yield:		
	
Table	2.	Properties	of	propane	and	butane	[2],	[3]	
Property	 Propane	 n-Butane	
Specific	gravity	of	gas	
(air=1.0)	 1.5	 2.0	
Vapor	pressure	at	15.56	°C,	
psiaa	 105	 26	
Vapor	pressure	at	15.56	°C,	
psiaa	 190	 52	
Boiling	point,	°C	 -42.22	 -0.56	
Flash	point,	°C	 -104.44	 -60	
Autoignition	temperature,	
°C	 466.11	 405	
LFL	(%)	 2.0	 1.5	
UFL	(%)	 9.5	 9.0	
Gross	BTU/ft	of	gas	at	°F	 2516	 3262	
IDLH	 2000	ppm	
apsia=	pounds	per	square	inch	absolute	
	
LPGs	 are	 commercialized	 applying	 the	 specifications	 established,	 in	 Spain,	 by	 the	
normative	and	legislation,	and	the	characteristic	values	for	commercial	LPG’S	are	summed	up	
on	 Table	 3,	 and	 for	 further	 substances	 characterization,	 CAS	 number	 of	 LPG	 is	 68476-85-7	
while	 its	UN	number	 is	 1075	and	CAS	number	 for	propane	 is	 74-98-6	while	CAS	number	 for	
butane	is	106-97-8:	
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Table	3.	Commercial	LPG	characterization	[12]	
Value	 Commercial	Propane	 Commercial	n-Butane	
Absolute	vapor	pressure		at	
20°C	 8.5	bar	abs.	 2.25	bar	abs.	
Boiling	point	at	atmospheric	
pressure	 -45	°C	 -0.5	°C	
Mass	by	volume	of	the	gas	at	
20°C	and	atmospheric	
pressure	(SEGADIS	values)	
2.095	kg/m3	 2.625	kg/m3	
Gas	density	(Respect	the	air)	 1.62	 2.03	
Mass	by	volume	of	the	liquid	
at	20	°C	 506	kg/m
3	 580	kg/m3	
Liquid	phase	density	(respect	
water)	 0.506	 0.580	
Higher	calorific	value	 12000	kcal/kg	25140	kcal/m3	
13.95	kWh/kg	
29.23	kWh/m3	
11900kcal/kg	
31240	kcal/m3	
13.83	kWh/kg	
36.32	kWh/m3	
Lower	calorific	value	 10900	kcal/kg	22835	kcal/m3	
12.67	kWh/kg	
26.55	kWh/m3	
10820kcal/kg	
28400	kcal/m3	
12.47	kWh/kg	
33.02	kWh/m3	
	
Related	to	 its	safety	 issues,	LPGs	do	not	corrode	steel,	copper	or	their	alloys	and	do	not	
dissolve	synthetic	rubbers.	However,	when	sulfur	compounds	and	other	impurities	are	present	
in	 the	 LPG,	 corrosion	 can	 be	 a	 serious	 problem.	 Liquefied	 petroleum	 gas	 has	 no	 lubricating	
properties,	 and	 this	 fact	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 specifying	 LPG	 handling	 pumps,	
compressors,	 and	 so	 forth.	 Instead	 they	dissolve	 the	 fats	 and	natural	 rubber.	 LPGs	 are	 toxic	
and	 physiological	 disorders	 occur	 when	 the	 gas	 concentration	 in	 the	 air	 is	 high	 and	 as	 a	
consequence	there	is	a	displacement	of	oxygen.	The	LPGs	are	devoid	of	color	and	natural	odor;	
therefore,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 detect	 by	 smell	 any	 leaks	 that	may	 be	 caused,	 a	 peculiar	
odorant	based	on	mercaptane	is	added	before	distribution.	The	odor	is	felt	when	the	mixture	
is	still	in	the	range	below	the	lower	flammability	limit	[10].	
	
As	it	can	be	check	in	Table	2,	at	normal	temperature	and	atmospheric	pressure,	LPG	is	in	a	
gaseous	 state.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 very	 important	 to	 notify	 that	 it	 can	 be	 liquefied	 under	
moderate	pressure	or	by	cooling	to	temperatures	below	its	atmospheric	pressure	boiling	point	
but	will	readily	vaporize	upon	release	to	normal	atmospheric	conditions.	It	is	this	property	that	
permits	 LPG	 to	 be	 transported	 and	 stored	 in	 a	 liquid	 form	 but	 used	 in	 the	 vapor	 form,	
important	fact	that	allows	the	world	population	grows	up	according	energy	necessities,	making	
the	transport	of	LPGs	as	a	key	point	of	worldwide	population	development.		
	
Table	4.	Tank	pressures	for	LPG's	[5]	
Liquid	Temperature	(°C)	
Tank	Pressure	
(Pound	per	square	inch	gauge)	
Propane	 n-Butane	
-0.56	 50	 0	
15.56	 90	 11	
37.78	 175	 37	
54.44	 250	 65	
60.00	 290	 80	
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LPG’s	 in	 the	 liquid	 phase	 dilate	 by	 temperature	more	 than	 the	 containers	 that	 contain	
them.	 Therefore,	 these	must	 not	 be	 fully	 filled	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 absorb	 the	 expansion	
differential	because	otherwise	undesirable	excess	pressure	would	occur.	The	maximum	filling	
level	established	 (UNE-EN	 ISO	60250)	 is	85%	considering	 the	mass	 in	volume	at	20	 °C.	To	be	
able	 to	 establish	 these	 storage	 conditions,	 knowing	 the	 pressure	 and	 temperature	 curves	
(Figure	2),	as	well	as	mass	by	volume	if	LPG	(Figure	3)	will	be	of	crucial	importance.	
	
	
Figure	2.	LPG	pressure	and	temperature	curve	[10]	
	
Figure	3.	Mass	by	volume	of	propane	(kg/m3)	[10]	
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Encompassing	the	properties	seen	so	far,	 it	could	be	pointed	out	that	concentrated	LPG	
vapors	 are	 heavier	 than	 air.	 They	 tend	 to	 stay	 close	 to	 the	 ground,	 collect	 in	 low	 spots	 and	
disperse	 less	readily	than	 lighter-than-air	gases.	Undiluted	propane	vapor	 is	1.5	times	denser	
than	air,	and	normal	butane	vapor	is	twice	as	dense.	However,	once	LPG	is	released,	it	mixes	
with	air	to	form	a	flammable	mixture,	and	the	density	of	the	mixture	becomes	essentially	the	
same	as	air.	Natural	air	currents,	diffusion,	and	dispersion	will	eventually	dilute	the	mixture	to	
below	the	 lower	flammable	 limit	 (LFL).	Other	characteristics	of	LPG	include	that	LPG	exerts	a	
chilling	 effect	 from	vaporization	when	 released	or	 vented	 to	 a	 lower	 pressure.	 This	 effect	 is	
known	 as	 auto-refrigeration;	 the	 liquid	 temperature	 approaches	 its	 boiling	 temperature	 at	
atmospheric	pressure	(see	boiling	point	in	Table	2).	The	density	of	the	liquid	is	approximately	
half	 that	of	water,	and	thus	water	will	 settle	 to	the	bottom	in	LPG.	Small	quantities	of	 liquid	
will	yield	large	quantities	of	vapor.	High	rates	of	vaporization	and	strong	turbulence	will	result	
when	LPG	is	spilled	on	water	or	water	streams	are	added	to	an	LPG	spill	[2],	[3].		
	
Regarding	 its	 reactivity	 profile,	 LPG	 react	 with	 saturated	 aliphatic	 hydrocarbons,	 which	
makes	it	incompatible	with	strong	oxidizing	agents	like	nitric	acid.	Charring	may	occur	followed	
by	 ignition	 of	 unreacted	 hydrocarbon	 and	 other	 nearby	 combustibles.	 The	 mixture	 of	
hydrocarbons	is	not	affected	by	aqueous	solutions	of	acids,	alkalis,	most	oxidizing	agents	and	
most	reducing	agents.	With	air	is	highly	flammable	and	there	is	not	any	reaction	with	water.	
	
For	health,	its	hazard	effect	could	be	measured	in	concentrations	in	air	greater	than	10%	
and	cause	dizziness	in	a	few	minutes.	Concentrations	at	1%	give	the	same	symptom	in	10	min	
and	high	concentrations	cause	asphyxiation.	
	
Both	propane	and	normal	butane	have	low	boiling	points.	Since	the	boiling	point	of	liquid	
propane	 is	 far	 below	 temperatures	 typically	 found	 in	 ambient	 conditions,	 propane	 generally	
does	 not	 form	 a	 liquid	 pool	 when	 spilled.	 However,	 liquid	 normal	 butane	 is	 more	 likely	 to	
remain	liquid	if	accidentally	released	at	low	ambient	or	storage	temperatures,	due	to	its	-0.56	
°C	atmospheric	pressure	boiling	point	[2].	
	
Since	LPG	 is	 stored	under	pressure	and	vaporizes	 readily	when	released,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	
control	 leaks	once	they	occur.	The	vapor	cloud	from	a	 leak	tends	to	stay	close	to	the	ground	
and	 drift	 downwind	 toward	 low	 areas.	 This	 property	 makes	 it	 essential	 that	 leaks	 be	
prevented,	ignition	sources	kept	at	a	safe	distance,	and	vapor	from	leaks	be	dispersed	before	it	
is	ignited.	Wind	significantly	reduces	the	dispersion	distance,	that	is,	the	size	of	the	flammable	
vapor	cloud,	for	any	given	leak	rate.		
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3. LPG	tanks	failure	events	
	
3.1 Introduction	
 
LPG	 storage	 tanks	 contain	 large	 volumes	 of	 a	 mixture	 of	 flammable	 and	 hazardous	
chemical:	 an	 apparently	 small	 accident	 may	 lead	 to	 million-dollar	 property	 loss.	 In	 last	 50	
years,	 trade	 organizations	 and	 engineering	 societies	 such	 as	 American	 Petroleum	 Institute	
(API),	 American	 Institute	 of	 Chemical	 Engineers	 (AICHE),	 American	 Society	 of	 Mechanical	
Engineers	 (ASME),	 and	 National	 Fire	 Protection	 Association	 (NFPA)	 have	 published	 strict	
engineering	guidelines	and	standards	for	the	construction,	material	selection,	design	and	safe	
management	 of	 storage	 tanks	 and	 their	 accessories	 (AICHE,	 1988;	 1993;	 API,	 1988;	 1990;	
ASME,	 2004;	 NFPA,	 1992;	 UL,	 1986;	 1987).	 Most	 companies	 follow	 those	 standards	 and	
guidelines	in	the	design,	construction	and	operation,	but	tank	accidents	still	occur	[23].	
	
When	discussing	the	hazards	of	LPGs	one	must	keep	in	mind	the	reason	for	using	LPG	in	
the	 first	 place.	One	m3	 of	 liquid	 LPG	will	 vaporize	 into	 245	 to	 275	m3	 of	 vapor.	 The	 heating	
value	 of	 LPG	 is	 2.5	 to	 3	 times	 higher	 than	 natural	 gas.	 Therefore,	 there	 is	 a	 relatively	 large	
amount	of	potential	energy	contained	in	a	very	small	volume	of	LPG.	When	LPG	is	transported	
in	114	m3	rail	tank	cars	or	stored	in	containers	up	to	680	m3,	the	amount	of	energy	available	
for	 destruction	 is	 tremendous	 if	 precautions	 are	 not	 taken	 to	 prevent	 the	 release	 of	 the	
material.	
	
Taking	 the	 importance	 of	 using	 LPG	 in	 the	 first	 place	 as	 a	 fuel,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 into	
account	that	LPG	is	usually	stored	out	of	the	house	in	pressurized	cylindrical	tanks	of	medium	
capacity	(1	or	2	m3)	in	WUI.	These	tanks	are	not	protected	by	passive	protection	layer	against	
fire	but	are	prevented	from	excessive	pressure	by	a	relief	valve.	However,	when	such	a	tank	is	
exposed	 to	 external	 fire,	 there	 is	 a	 chance	 that	 the	 tank	 will	 fail	 despite	 the	 action	 of	 the	
pressure	relief	valve.	If	the	failure	mode	is	catastrophic	then	this	could	lead	to	a	boiling	liquid	
expanding	vapor	explosion	(BLEVE).	 	Because	LPG	is	flammable,	a	fireball	 is	possible	with	the	
associated	 hazards	 of	 fire	 engulfment	 and	 thermal	 radiation.	 If	 the	 LPG	 is	 not	 ignited	
immediately,	delayed	ignition	may	lead	to	widespread	fires	or	in	some	cases	explosions	[16].	
	
Determining	whether	a	heated	LPG	tank	will	entail	a	BLEVE	is	not	an	easy	task.	Variables	
as	 the	 liquid	 level	 and	 pressure	 inside	 will	 determine	 the	 rupture	 of	 the	 tank	 and	 the	
predictability	of	these	accidents.		
	
	
3.2 Types	of	incidents	
	
The	potential	hazards	of	a	LPG	leakage	vary	depending	on	several	factors:	the	size	of	the	
spill,	 the	storage	conditions,	 the	environmental	 conditions	and	 the	characteristics	of	 the	site	
where	the	spill	occurs.	
	
One	of	the	most	dangerous	aspects	of	an	LPG	leak	is	the	formation	of	flammable	clouds,	
which	can	produce	an	explosion	and,	simultaneously,	a	fire.	Another	possibility	is	that	after	the		
flames	 return	 to	 the	point	of	origin	of	 the	 leak,	 a	pool	 fire,	 a	 jet	 fire	or	 even	a	BLEVE	 if	 the	
flames	affect	the	tank,	can	occur.	
	
Consequence	 analysis	 in	 these	 type	 of	 situations	 depends	 on	 various	 parameters.	 The	
dominant	 variables	 such	 as	 released	 volume,	 release	 rate,	 release	 direction,	 probability	 of	
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ignition,	 time	 of	 ignition,	 and	 events	 associated	 with	 ignitions	 are	 considered.	 A	 typical	
example	of	accident	scenarios	for	LPG	storage	bullet	catastrophic	failure	and	various	outcomes	
are	analyzed	using	an	event	tree	structure	(Figure	4):	
	
	
Figure	4.	Event-	tree	LPG	tank	fault	[24]	
	
A	scenario	with	a	LPG	failure	mode	could	lead	to	different	consequences	due	to	failure	of	
any	component	in	the	system.	A	catastrophic	rupture	of	vessel	or	pipe	causing	a	totally	failure	
produces	a	massive	release	of	LPG	into	atmosphere	which	results	in	explosion	such	as	BLEVE	if	
it	is	immediately	ignited.	If	the	scenario	results	in	a	leak	with	an	immediate	ignition,	a	jet	fire	
scenario	would	take	place.	If	the	ignition	of	this	leak	is	delayed,	it	will	result	in	a	pool	fire	(if	the	
LPG	 is	 stored	 at	 ambient	 temperature	 and	 at	 a	 pressure	 higher	 than	 the	 atmospheric	
pressure),	flash	fire	(it	finds	an	ignition	point	the	whole	mass	between	the	flammability	limits	
will	be	ignited)	or	a	confined	vapor	cloud	explosion	(the	burning	vapor	causes	a	degree	of	"self	
confinement"	allowing	the	combustion	process	to	proceed	at	a	speed	that	produces	explosive	
overpressures)	because	this	allows	the	formation	of	a	cloud	[19].	When	the	leak	is	not	ignited,	
then	a	safe	dispersion	 is	produced	and	no	unsafe	event	will	happen	 [24].	All	 these	scenarios	
must	be	considered	on	a	LPG	catastrophic	rupture	analysis.	
	
	
3.2.1 Boiling	liquid	expanding	vapor	explosion	(BLEVE)	
	 	
The	definition	of	BLEVE	proposed	by	CCPS	was	defined	as	a	sudden	loss	of	containment	of	
a	pressure-liquefied	gas	existing	above	its	normal	atmospheric	boiling	point	at	the	moment	of	
its	failure,	resulting	in	rapidly	expanding	vapor	and	flashing	liquid.	A	BLEVE	refers	also	a	failure	
of	a	major	container	into	two	or	more	pieces	as	a	mechanical	explosion	[19].		
	
The	 physics	 of	 BLEVE	 in	 a	 LPG	 tank	 is	 as	 following:	 the	 impacting	 heat	 flux	 leads	 to	 an	
increase	of	wall	 temperatures	 and	 therefore	material	weakening.	Heat	 is	 also	 transferred	 to	
the	liquid	phase,	which	increases	the	liquid	temperature	and	the	vapor	pressure.	This	internal	
pressure	increase	leads	to	creep	and	thinning	in	the	hot	wall	area	and	this	may	eventually	lead	
to	formation	of	a	tear	or	fissure	in	the	tank	wall.	If	the	tear	propagates	the	entire	length	of	the	
tank,	 then	 a	 BLEVE	 takes	 place.	 If	 the	 fissure	 stops	 short,	 then	 a	 transient	 jet	 release	 takes	
place	[19].	
	
Determining	 whether	 a	 heated	 LPG	 tank	 will	 entail	 a	 BLEVE	 is	 a	 complex	 task.	 The	
maximum	wall	temperature	occurs	when	the	liquid	level	is	low	in	the	tank,	on	portions	of	the	
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vessel	that	are	not	internally	wetted	by	the	liquid	content.	The	internal	pressure	results	from	
LPG	 boiling,	 fluid	 temperature	 increase	 and	 stratification.	 Rupture	 occurs	 when	 internal	
pressure	exceeds	heated	steel	resistance.		
	
LPG	 containers	 are	 equipped	 with	 pressure	 relief	 devices	 set	 to	 maintain	 sufficient	
pressure	 to	 keep	 the	 LPG	 liquid	 but	 to	 relieve	 any	 pressure	 greater	 than	 the	 container	 is	
designed	to	carry.	At	36	°C,	a	pressure	of	about	1380	kPa	is	needed	to	liquefy	propane.	Butane	
will	 exert	 a	pressure	of	 about	415	kPa	on	 the	 container	 at	38	 °C.	 The	pressure	necessary	 to	
keep	the	gas	a	liquid	is,	therefore,	a	function	of	the	gas	and	the	temperature	of	the	gas.		
	
At	normal	temperatures,	a	container	shell	will	easily	handle	the	pressure	in	the	container.	
If,	however,	the	steel	is	heated	above	about	200°C,	it	begins	to	lose	its	strength	and	at	425	to	
540	°C	will	fail	even	though	the	pressure	in	the	container	is	at	or	below	the	setting	of	the	relief	
device.	A	 container	holding	 LPG	has	portions	of	 the	 container	which	are	 in	 contact	with	 the	
liquid	(wetted	surface)	and	other	portions	which	are	above	the	liquid	level	and	therefore	not	in	
contact	 with	 the	 liquid	 (unwetted	 surface).	 Under	 fire	 exposure,	 the	 temperature	 of	 the	
wetted	portion	will	remain	essentially	the	same	as	the	liquid	due	to	heat	transfer	to	the	liquid.	
The	unwetted	surface	on	the	other	hand	will	 rise	rather	quickly	to	steel	 failure	temperature.	
The	 rupture	 and	 resultant	 explosion	 is	 this	 special	 form	 of	 a	 BLEVE.	When	 the	 pressurized,	
liquefied	gas	is	suddenly	released	into	the	atmosphere,	about	one-third	of	the	gas	(in	the	case	
of	 propane)	 will	 immediately	 vaporize.	 Another	 portion	 of	 the	 liquid	 will	 be	 expelled	 as	
droplets	or	mist.	Due	to	the	violence	of	the	rupture,	the	gas	and	droplets	will	mix	quickly	with	
air	 and	 a	 large	 fireball	 will	 result.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 fireball	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 size	 of	 the	
container,	the	fullness	of	the	container,	the	composition	of	the	gas,	and	the	temperature	and	
pressure	of	 the	gas	 in	 the	container.	Because	a	 sizable	portion	of	 the	 liquid	 is	not	vaporized	
and	 burned	 in	 the	 initial	 fireball,	 an	 intense	 fire	 will	 burn	 for	 a	 number	 of	 minutes	 in	 the	
immediate	 vicinity	 of	 the	 point	 where	 the	 tank	 ruptured	 resulting	 in	 severe	 exposure	 to	
adjacent	tanks.	 In	addition	to	damage	from	the	fireball,	pieces	of	the	ruptured	container	can	
travel	up	 to	2500	m	doing	extensive	damage	 to	 surrounding	property.	The	effects	 to	people	
and	property	from	BLEVEs	have	been	modeled	by	various	organizations	[26].		
	
Several	 notable	 disasters	 have	 occurred	 involving	 BLEVEs	 at	 large	 LPG	 storage	 facilities.	
These	are	the	incidents	at	Port	Newark,	New	Jersey	in	1S51,	Feyzin,	France	in	1966,	Texas	City,	
Texas	in	1978	and	San	Juan	Ixhuatepec,	Mexico	City.	Numerous	BLEVEs	of	rail	and	truck	tank	
vehicles	have	occurred.	
	
	
3.2.2 Vapor	cloud	explosion	(VCE)	
	
3.2.2.1 Unconfined	explosion	
	
At	 times,	 when	 large	 quantities	 of	 flammable	 vapors	 are	 released	 and	 ignited,	 a	
phenomenon	known	as	an	Unconfined	Vapor	Cloud	Explosion	(UVCE)	may	occur.	These	have	
occurred	 in	 varying	 degrees	 of	 severity	 over	 the	 years.	 The	 effects	 have	 ranged	 from	minor	
damage	 to	 structures	 to	 major	 damage	 to	 entire	 chemical	 plants	 and	 refineries.	 The	 exact	
mechanism	 by	 which	 the	 UVCE	 occurs	 is	 still	 being	 debated.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	 turbulence	
created	by	the	burning	vapor	causes	a	degree	of	"self	confinement"	allowing	the	combustion	
process	 to	 proceed	 at	 a	 speed	 that	 produces	 damaging,	 explosive	 overpressures.	 In	 many	
cases,	a	degree	of	"partial	confinement"	was	offered	by	building	walls,	chemical	plant	process	
equipment	or	vegetation	[25],	[26].		
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Certainly,	 the	most	notable	 industrial	 incident	prior	 to	 the	Bhopal	 toxic	gas	 release	was	
the	unconfined	vapor	cloud	explosion	in	Flixborough,	England	in	1974.	Because	of	the	severity	
of	 the	 Flixborough	 disaster,	 the	 incident	 was	 thoroughly	 investigated	 and	 was	 the	 basis	 of	
much	 study	 of	 the	 UVCE	 phenomenon.	 Models	 of	 unconfined	 vapor	 cloud	 dispersion	 and	
explosions	have	been	developed	and	are	in	use	by	various	organizations	throughout	the	world	
[26].	
	
3.2.2.2 Confined	explosions	
	
The	 largest	 losses	 caused	 by	 LPG,	 both	 from	 a	 loss	 of	 life	 and	 property	 damage	
standpoints,	 have	 involved	 BLEVEs	 and	 UVCEs.	 Confined	 explosions	 have	 been	 the	 cause	 of	
numerous	smaller	incidents,	however.	Typical	of	these	is	the	explosion	at	Indianapolis,	Indiana	
in	1963	[26].	
	
	
3.2.3 Fires	
	
Because	 of	 the	 volatility	 of	 LPG,	 most	 notable	 incidents	 involving	 this	 material	 are	
explosions.	 In	the	hydrocarbon	processing	 industry,	 leaks	of	LPG	from	process	piping	flanges,	
pump	seals,	valve	packing’s	and	relief	valves	which	ignite	do	so	soon	after	the	start	of	the	leak	
resulting	in	a	severe	localized	fire	[28].		
	
3.2.3.1 Flash	fire	
	
This	type	of	fire	may	occur	if	the	ignition	does	not	take	place	immediately	after	the	leak.	
This	 allows	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 cloud,	 which	 evolves	 so	 that	 if	 it	 finds	 an	 ignition	 point	 the	
whole	mass	between	the	flammability	limits	will	be	ignited.	
	
In	 contrast,	 in	 the	case	of	 container	 collapse	or	 significant	 rupture,	 flash	evaporation	of	
propane	 will	 occur,	 resulting	 in	 an	 instantaneous	 emission	 of	 the	 material	 into	 the	
atmosphere.	
	
In	the	event	that	the	 leak	 is	produced	by	the	 lower	part,	 it	 is	considered	that	the	entire	
product	 contained	 in	 the	 tank	 is	 emitted.	 The	 liquid	 propane	 inside	 the	 tank	 is	 usually	
considered	to	follow	an	adiabatic	evolution,	so	that	the	product	cools	because	of	evaporation,	
thus	reducing	the	vapor	pressure	and,	therefore	also	reducing	the	leakage	rate	[25],	[26].	
	
3.2.3.2 Pool	fire	
	
If	 the	 liquefied	gas	 is	 stored	at	 ambient	 temperature	and	at	 a	pressure	higher	 than	 the	
atmospheric	pressure,	when	 the	 leakage	occurs	 the	 liquefied	gas	will	 escape	 to	 the	outside,	
producing	a	flash	evaporation	that	will	lead	to	a	biphasic	leakage.	Some	amount	of	liquid	in	the	
form	 of	 drops	will	 be	 drawn	 by	 the	 outflow.	 Some	 of	 these	 drops	 could	 fall	 to	 the	 ground,	
forming	a	puddle	due	to	cooling	and	condensation.	This	fuel,	if	it	encounters	an	ignition	point	
or	is	struck	by	a	flare,	will	result	in	a	fire	[25],	[26].	
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3.2.4 Jet	fire	
	
Jet	 fires	are	associated	 to	very	high	heat	 fluxes	and	 if	 they	 impinge	on	equipment,	 they	
can	originate	a	catastrophic	failure	in	a	very	short	time.	
	
An	 example	 of	 such	 a	 situation	 is	 the	 accident	 that	 occurred	 in	 San	 Juan	 Ixhuatepec,	
Mexico,	 in	 1984:	 an	 initial	 vapor	 cloud	 explosion	 (due	 to	 a	 release	 of	 flammable	 gas	 during	
maintenance	work)	originated	diverse	LPG	jet	fires	and,	after	only	69	seconds,	the	first	boiling	
liquid	 expanding	 vapor	 explosion	 occurred	 and	 a	 very	 short	 exposure	 time	 was	 enough	 to	
cause	 the	 failure	of	 a	pressurized	 vessel	 [26].	 This	 caused	500	people	 killed	and	about	7000	
people	severely	injured.	
	
While	 in	 this	accident	 the	 jet	 fires	 followed	a	previous	explosion,	 in	other	cases	 the	gas	
release	 has	 been	 due	 to	much	 less	 significant	 events.	Once	 the	 jet	 of	 a	 flammable	material	
(usually	a	pressurized	gas	or	a	two-phase	mixture)	is	released,	two	sequences	are	possible:	or	
the	jet	is	quickly	ignited	by	an	electrostatic	spark	or	another	ignition	source,	or	a	vapor	cloud	is	
formed	which	is	a	little	bit	later	ignited,	the	fire	flashes	back	to	the	leak	source	and	a	jet	fire	is	
finally	originated.	Other	cases	could	be	mentioned	 in	the	field	of	 the	transport	of	 flammable	
materials,	 when,	 following	 a	 road	 accident	 originating	 a	 further	 explosion/fireball	 event.	 In	
these	cases,	jet	fires	can	result	eventually	in	important	major	accidents	[27].		
	
3.3 Effects	on	an	LPG	tank	of	a	fire	burning	in	its	vicinity	
	
When	a	tank	is	heated	by	fire,	it	is	important	to	quantify	how	quickly	the	vapor	space	wall	
will	heat	up	and	how	quickly	the	tank	internal	pressure	will	rise.	These	depend	on	many	factors	
including:	
	
a. Fire	size,	surface	emissive	power,	and	geometry	
b. Tank	geometry,	orientation	and	distance	relative	to	the	fire	
c. Initial	temperature	
d. Liquid	fill	level	
e. PRV	set	pressure	and	flow	capacity	
f. Local	winds,	wind	velocity	
 
The	 impact	 of	 a	 heat	 flux	 on	 a	 LPG	 tank	 leads	 to	 an	 increase	of	wall	 temperatures	 and	
therefore	material	weakening.	Heat	is	also	transferred	to	the	liquid	phase,	which	increases	the	
liquid	temperature	and	the	vapor	pressure.	This	internal	pressure	increasing	leads	to	impact	in	
the	hot	wall	area	and	this	could	eventually	lead	to	the	formation	of	a	tear	or	fissure	in	the	tank	
wall.	If	the	tear	propagates	the	entire	length	of	the	tank,	then	a	BLEVE	can	take	place	and	the	
effects	 could	be	 serious,	 as	 it	 can	be	 shown	 in	Table	 5.	 If	 the	 fissure	 stops	 short,	 then	 a	 jet	
release	takes	place.	
Table	5.	Impact	of	thermal	radiation:	effects	[16]	
Thermal	Radiation	(kW/m2)	 Effects	
4.7	 Causes	burns	after	30	s	
7.0	 Maximum	tolerable	value	for	firefighters	completely	covered	by	special	clothes	
10.0	 Certain	polymers	can	ignite	
11.7	 Thin	Steel	can	lose	mechanical	integrity	
12.6	 Wood	can	ignite	after	a	long	exposure	
37.5	 Collapse	of	mechanical	structures	
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Modelling	the	thermo-hydraulic	behavior	of	a	LPG	tank	requires	a	comprehensive	study	of	
the	heat	and	mass	transfer	processes	involved	within	the	tank.	Time	rupture	can	be	modelled	
but	 a	 safety	 margin	 has	 to	 be	 considered	 since	 LPG	 tanks	 can	 be	 old	 and	 can	 present	
weaknesses.	
	
To	 assess	 the	 risk	 of	 these	 scenarios	 (as	 for	 example	 the	 effects	 caused	 by	 a	 specific	
thermal	 radiation	as	Table	5),	 vulnerability	models	are	often	used	 to	establish	a	 relationship	
between	the	magnitude	of	the	impact	and	the	damage	caused.	For	this,	the	most	used	model	
is	the	Probit	function.	
	
In	this	case,	the	response	information	versus	the	delivered	dose	is	correlated	so	that	the	
probability	 is	 taken	 into	 account.	 To	 do	 this,	 in	 case	 of	 quantifying,	 for	 example,	 damages	
caused	by	the	radiation	emitted	by	a	fire,	the	exposure	time	as	well	as	the	radiation	provided	
in	each	case	will	be	taken	into	account	and	these	values	will	be	adjusted	to	a	Probit	equation	
that	predicts	the	probability	to	certain	consequences.	
	
Some	 institutions	 as	 The	American	Petroleum	 Institute	 recommended	 critical	 values	 for	
safety	studies.	The	critical	value	 for	a	LPG	tank	equipped	with	a	pressure	relief	valve	 is	7000	
British	 thermal	 units	 per	 hour	 per	 square	 foot	 (22	 kW/m2).	 A	 vessel	 shell	 surface	 receiving	
more	than	this	value	will	require	cooling	to	prevent	overheating	and	loss	of	strength.	This	is	a	
very	strict	safety	limit	that	should	prevent	BLEVE	for	long	time	of	fire	(more	than	30	min)	[16].		
	
	
Figure	5.	Heat	Flux	limit	recommendations	[3]	
However,	in	case	of	wildfire	it	is	very	unlikely	to	have	such	long	exposure	times:	exposure	
time	of	a	target	submitted	to	a	wildfire	 is	much	more	 less,	so	the	criteria	applied	for	the	API	
could	not	be	very	approached	for	a	short	and	intense	fire	scenario.	In	the	scope	of	this	project,	
the	presence	of	radiative	heat	flux	emitted	by	vegetation	during	a	short	period	of	time	will	be	
the	point	on	the	quantification	of	risk	for	applying	a	risk	assessment.	
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3.4 Historical	accidents	involving	LPG	facilities	
	
In	 Port	 Newark	 (New	 Jersey,	 July	 7,	 1951)	 facility	 had	 one	 hundred	 115	 m3	 horizontal	
tanks	for	receiving	propane	from	ships	and	distributing	by	tank	truck	or	tank	rail	car.	A	leak	of	
unknown	origin	occurred	in	piping	near	one	group	of	tanks.	Ignition	was	immediate	and	about	
three	minutes	 later	 operators	were	 able	 to	 actuate	 an	 emergency	 shut-down	 station	which	
operated	shut-off	valves	on	all	tanks.	In	spite	of	this	action,	shortly	thereafter,	the	first	of	the	
tanks	ruptured.	Over	the	next	hours,	all	70	tanks	in	a	group	ruptured	with	varying	degrees	of	
violence.	Some	tank	pieces	were	thrown	up	to	800	m	doing	damage	and	puncturing	tanks	 in	
neighboring	 plants.	 None	 of	 the	 tanks	 in	 another	 group,	 located	 107	 m	 away,	 ruptured.	
Firefighters	were	able	 to	control	a	number	of	 flange	 leaks	 that	did	occur	at	 those	tanks.	The	
loss	was	$1,050,000	in	1952	dollars.	A	number	of	full	propane	tank	cars	located	on	a	rail	siding	
adjacent	to	and	seriously	exposed	by	the	fire	did	not	rupture	because	of	the	insulating	effect	
of	cork	insulation	material	installed	on	the	tank	cars	[26].	
	
In	 Texas	 (May	 30,	 1978),	 a	 tank	 farm	 used	 to	 store	 propane,	 propylene,	 butane,	 and	
butylene	 in	 conjunction	 with	 a	 refinery	 alkylation	 unit	 was	 located	 directly	 adjacent	 to	 the	
alkylation	unit	and	other	production	units.	The	tank	farm	contained	three	800	m3	(210,000	gal)	
spheres,	five	160	m3	horizontal	"bullets"	and	four	160	m3	vertical	"bullets."	A	sphere	was	being	
filled	 from	a	pipeline	delivery.	Due	 to	 instrument	 failure	and	a	 faulty	 relief	valve,	one	of	 the	
spheres	 was	 overfilled	 and	 overpressured	 to	 the	 point	 of	 rupture.	 The	 huge	 fireball	 and	
ensuing	fire	caused	the	subsequent	rupture,	over	the	next	20	minutes,	of	all	of	the	remaining	
tanks	and	spheres	in	the	tank	farm.	Sphere	and	tank	fragments	went	in	all	directions	causing	
severe	 damage	 to	 other	 operating	 units,	 tankage	 and	 fire	 protection	 facilities.	 One	 major	
portion	of	a	sphere	traveled	230	m.	One	of	the	vertical	"bullets"	traveled	150	m.	A	domed	end	
of	a	horizontal	"bullet"	traveled	60	m	and	went	completely	through	an	empty	atmospheric	oil	
storage	tank.	The	loss	was	in	excess	of	$100	million	[26].	
	
In	San	Juan	Ixhuatepect	(Mexico	City,	November	19,	1984),	there	was	a	facility	for	storing	
propane	and	butane	received	by	pipelines	consisted	of	four	1600	m3	and	two	spheres	and	an	
additional	48	horizontal	"bullet"	storage	tanks	of	varying	size.	The	total	storage	capacity	of	the	
terminal	was	16,000	m3.	The	terminal	was	originally	constructed	in	1962	in	open	country	well	
remote	from	high	population	areas.	Since	that	time,	however,	nearly	4,000	people	had	moved	
into	the	immediate	area.	The	built-up	area	began	just	130	m	from	the	LPG	storage	area.	
	
A	 leak	 occurred	 at	 the	 site	while	 tanks	were	 being	 filled	 from	a	 pipeline.	 The	 leak	may	
have	been	caused	by	overfilling	and	over-pressure	of	one	or	more	 tanks.	A	vapor	 cloud	was	
ignited	 at	 a	 neighboring	 plant	 and	 about	 one	 minute	 later,	 one	 or	 possibly	 two	 spheres	
ruptured.	Burning	and	unburned	gases	entered	houses	setting	fire	to	everything.	Over	the	next	
hour	and	twenty	minutes	nine	major	and	numerous	smaller	explosions	occurred	 from	vessel	
BLEVEs.	Approximately	500	people	were	killed	and	about	7000	people	were	severely	injured	by	
the	fire.	The	majority	of	the	dead	were	found	within	a	distance	of	300	m	of	the	center	of	the	
storage	area	[26],	[27].	
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4. LPG	facilities	in	wildland-urban	interfaces	
	
4.1 Introduction	
	
The	wildland-urban	interface	(WUI)	refers	to	the	zone	of	transition	between	unoccupied	
land	and	human	development.	These	areas	adjacent	to	and	surrounded	by	wildlands	are	at	risk	
of	wildfires.	Traditionally	 it	was	defined	as	 that	 interface	as	 the	occurrence	of	 fire	 spreading	
from	wildland	fuel	(in	this	case	vegetation)	to	urban	fuel	(homes	that	form	the	neighborhood),	
in	 terms	of	 the	wildland	 fire	becoming	 close	enough	 for	 its	 flames	and	 its	 firebrands	 (lofted	
burning	embers)	to	contact	flammable	parts	of	a	home	or	the	home’s	immediate	surroundings.	
The	 main	 question	 is	 related	 with	 the	 estimation	 of	 distances	 between	 fire	 and	 houses	 to	
cause	 any	 dangerous	 situation.	 The	 threat	 to	 homes	 and	 their	 destruction	 during	 wildland	
fires,	with	associated	risks	for	life	safety,	are	significant	problems	for	emergency	managers	and	
land	 managers	 because	 of	 the	 difficulties	 to	 manage	 these	 situations	 under	 unknown	
scenarios.	 In	 the	 past,	 wildfires	 resulting	 in	 residential	 destruction	 occurred	 for	 example	 in	
Australia,	Canada,	several	Mediterranean	countries	and	the	United	States	[16].	
	
The	increase	of	the	occurrence	of	wildfires	combined	with	the	growing	of	the	population	
leads	to	an	increasing	impact	of	wildfires	on	infrastructures.	Inhabitants	can	also	be	exposed	to	
the	high	heat	fluxes	from	the	fire	front.	The	growth	of	the	WUI	implies	that	firefighters	have	to	
protect	more	and	more	property	and	remain	at	a	close	distance	from	the	fire	front.	Habitants	
can	face	the	same	problem	if	they	stay	to	protect	their	homes	or	if	they	cannot	be	evacuated.	
In	several	countries,	the	law	obliges	homeowners	to	clear	the	undergrowth	within	a	distance	
from	 their	 house	 in	order	 to	 stop	 the	 fire	 and	prevent	 it	 from	burning	 the	house.	 The	main	
problem	 is	 the	difference	between	normative	and	 legislations	on	countries	because	 they	are	
not	 the	 same	 requirements	 for	 countries	 as	 Spain,	 France,	 Portugal,	 Italy	 or	 EE.UU.	 The	
problem	of	ornamental	 vegetation	near	a	 LPG	 tank	 is	not	always	collected	 in	 the	 legislation.	
The	danger	of	presence	of	 vegetation	near	 a	 tank	 in	 a	WUI	 is	 real	 and	 it	was	demonstrated	
with	numerous	cases	of	incidents	happened	on	the	past	(Valencia	and	Madeira	fires	in	2016	as	
European	examples	and	Calabasas	Hill	fire,	also	in	2016,	as	American	examples,	Figure	6	and	7)	
[16],	[17].	For	this	reason,	 it	 is	very	 important	to	 investigate	and	quantify	the	vulnerability	of	
these	type	of	WUI	scenarios	and	the	possible	damage	caused	by	a	WUI-LPG	related	fires	with	
certain	characteristics	in	terms	of	weather	and	wind	conditions,	ornamental	vegetation	around	
and	tank	features.	
	
 
Figure	6.	Calabasas	Hill	fire.		(Photo:	KABC-TV	via	AP)	This	still	image	from	video	provided	by	KABC-TV	shows	where	a	
wildfire	has	come	close	to	a	preschool	complex,	burning	outbuildings	and	igniting	a	propane	storage	tank,	as	a	fast-
moving	brush	fire	swept	through	hills	in	Calabasas,	California,	northwest	of	downtown	Los	Angeles	Saturday,	June	4,	
2016.	The	main	structure	was	saved.	
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Figure	7.	LPG	damaged	tank	in	Benitatxell	fire	(Valencia,	2016).	Foto:	David	Caballero	
It	is	known	that	Liquefied	Petroleum	Gas	(LPG)	is	a	common	fuel	used	for	home	heating,	
hot	water	 production	 or	 cooking.	 This	 fuel	 is	 usually	 stored	 out	 of	 the	 house	 in	 pressurized	
cylindrical	 tanks	 of	 medium	 capacity	 (1	 to	 3	 m3)	 [18].	 These	 tanks	 are	 not	 protected	 by	 a	
passive	protection	layer	against	fire	but	are	prevented	from	excessive	pressure	by	a	relief	valve	
and	other	control	devices.	However,	when	such	a	 tank	 is	exposed	 to	external	 fire,	 there	 is	a	
chance	that	the	tank	will	fail	despite	the	action	of	the	pressure	relief	valve.	If	the	failure	mode	
is	 catastrophic	 then	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 boiling	 liquid	 expanding	 vapor	 explosion	 (BLEVE)	
followed	 by	 a	 fire	 ball.	 In	 turn,	with	 non-catastrophic	 failure	 a	 jet	 fire	 lasting	 during	 several	
time	(minutes	to	hours)	can	also	occur.	These	hazards	may	hurt	or	kill	population	and	firemen	
fighting	against	wildfire	in	a	residential	area.		
	
	
4.2 State	of	the	art	on	analysis	of	wildfires	interaction	with	LPG	tanks	
	
Referring	the	LPG	and	wildfire	 investigation,	this	topic	has	not	been	developed	in	a	very	
extensive	 way	 despite	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 problem.	 Current	 research	 has	 focused	 on	
general	 issues	such	as	 the	characterization	of	 the	 impact	of	wildfire	 fronts	on	LPG	tanks,	 the	
effect	of	a	remote	wall	 fire	 in	a	 low	filled	 level	tank	and	the	study	of	the	safety	of	LPG	tanks	
located	in	a	WUI	related	to	the	existence	of	vegetation	near	these	facilities.		
	
	
4.2.1 Impact	of	wildfires	on	a	LPG	tank	[20]	
	
Modelling	 the	 radiative	 heat	 flux	 from	 a	wildland	 fire	 to	 a	 target	 requires	 to	 know	 the	
emitted	radiative	power	of	the	fire	and	to	calculate	the	transmission	of	the	radiative	energy	to	
the	target	by	view	factor	considerations.	The	emitted	power	depends	on	many	variables	such	
as	flame	combustion	kinetics	and	temperatures,	flame	thickness,	emissivity	of	gases	and	soot.	
	
Here,	an	approach	for	the	estimation	of	the	radiation	flux	from	wildland	fires	is	the	use	of	
the	solid	flame	model	(SFM).	In	this	model,	the	visible	flame	is	idealized	as	a	solid	body	with	a	
simple	 geometrical	 shape	 and	 with	 thermal	 radiation	 emitted	 from	 its	 surface.	 The	
contribution	of	non-visible	zones	of	the	fire	plume	to	the	radiant	heat	flux	is	usually	not	taken	
into	account.	The	SFM	model	gives	results	with	experimental	data	and	it	was	used	to	calculate	
safety	distances	preventing	from	BLEVE.	The	radiant	heat	flux	per	unit	area	reaching	a	remote	
target	is	given	by	Eq.	1:	
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																															 ! = 	$	%	&	 	 	 Eq.	1	
	
Where	F	is	the	view	factor,	E	the	surface	emissive	power	(SEP)	of	the	visible	flame,	and	τ	
the	transmittivity	of	the	air	(of	gas)	layer	between	the	flame	and	the	target.	The	atmospheric	
transmittivity	corresponds	to	the	fraction	of	the	thermal	radiation	that	is	transmitted	from	the	
fire	 to	 the	 target	 and	 is	 function	 of	 the	 atmospheric	 humidity,	 the	 concentration	 of	 carbon	
dioxide	 and	 the	distance,	 and	 can	be	 calculated	using	 semi-empirical	 equations.	 The	 surface	
emissive	power	of	the	flame	may	be	calculated	as:	
	
	 	 	 E = 	ε	σ	T+	 	 	 Eq.	2	
	
Where	ε	 is	the	effective	emissivity	of	the	flame,	T	 is	the	flame	temperature	and	σ	 is	the	
Stefan-Boltzmann	constant.	The	amount	of	time	during	which	an	LPG	tank	will	be	affected	by	
the	radiative	heat	flux	emitted	from	a	wildfire	depends	on	many	considerations	such	as	wind	
velocity,	spreading	rate,	geometric	considerations	and	humidity.	The	view	factor	F	is	defined	as	
the	fraction	of	the	radiation	leaving	a	surface	A	that	is	intercepted	by	a	surface	B.	
	
The	 view	 factor	 F	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 fraction	 of	 the	 radiation	 leaving	 a	 surface	 A	 that	 is	
intercepted	 by	 a	 surface	 B.	Oriented	 elemental	 areas	 dA	 and	 dB	 are	 connected	 by	 a	 line	 of	
length	R,	which	forms	the	polar	angles	θA	and	θB,	respectively,	with	the	surface	normal	vectors	
nA	and	nA.	The	values	of	R,	θA	and	θB	vary	with	the	position	of	the	elemental	areas	on	A	and	B.	
Assuming	 that	 both	 surfaces	 emits	 and	 reflects	 diffusely,	 and	 that	 the	 radiation	 heat	 is	
uniform,	the	view	factor	can	be	defined	as:	
	
	 	 	 % = 	 ,- ./012 ./0134567- 898:	 	 Eq.3	
	
The	solving	of	the	previous	equation	is	achieved	by	meshing	the	A	surface	into	i	cells	(dAi)	
and	the	B	surface	into	j	cells	(dBj).	The	equation	can	be	written	as:	
	
	 	 	 % = 	 ,- ./012; ./0 13;456;<= 89>8:>		 	 Eq.4	
	
In	 this	 study,	 the	 first	 aim	 was	 to	 check	 the	 validity	 of	 F	 modeling	 through	 the	
investigation	of	height	and	length	of	the	firewall	as	well	as	the	distance	between	the	fire	and	
the	tank,	obtaining	good	results	[20],	[22].	Then,	all	values	were	compared	in	order	to	extract	
the	highest	value	of	temperature	impacting	the	tank	and	this	value	was	always	located	in	the	
upper	part	of	the	tank.		
	
According	the	criteria	fixed	by	API	standard	with	a	value	of	22	kW/m2	fixed	for	being	in	a	
safety	zone,	the	height	of	the	fire	was	calculated	in	order	to	apply	these	criteria	and	obtain	a	
safety	distance	correlation	according	each	scenario	(showed	by	Figure	8).	
	
Risk	analysis	of	LPG	tanks	at	the	wildland-urban	interface	
	
Page	24	
	
	
Figure	8.	Safety	distance	f	(firewall	height	and	length)	[20]	
In	order	to	verify	the	safety	distances	required	by	law	in	different	countries,	some	values	
were	checked,	resulting	that	the	FE	model	studied	on	this	 investigation	confirm	that	a	safety	
distance	of	50	m	prevents	 from	BLEVE,	even	with	 large	crown	fires	 (height	40	m,	 length	100	
m).		
	
Results	 showed	 that	 a	 mandatory	 safety	 distance	 of	 50	 m	 is	 enough	 to	 prevent	 from	
BLEVE	in	any	case	of	wildfire	fronts,	taking	the	criteria	of	a	22	kW/m2	heat	flux	fire	giving	by	
the	API.	Safety	distances	of	30	and	25	m	should	prevent	from	BLEVE	in	most	cases	of	wildfire.		
	
4.2.2 Study	made	for	the	impact	of	a	distant	wildfire	on	a	LPG	tank	[18]	
	
In	this	case,	authors	were	focused	on	the	description	of	the	behavior	of	a	cylindrical	tank	
filled	with	LPG	under	the	effect	of	an	experimental	radiative	heat	flux.		
	
Here,	 the	 maximum	 wall	 temperature	 reached	 in	 the	 tank	 and	 the	 change	 in	 internal	
pressure	are	the	key	factors.	These	depends	on	the	radiative	heat	flux	impacting	it,	the	internal	
and	external	convection	with	fluids	in	contact	with	the	wall,	the	radiative	heat	flux	emitted	by	
the	steel	and	the	conductive	heat	transfer	in	it.	The	hottest	point	of	steel	is	always	located	on	
unwetted	steel.	 In	this	case,	 the	maximum	radiative	heat	 flux	on	the	tank	and	the	total	heat	
flux	impacting	the	tank	were	considered.	
	
A	 medium	 scale	 fire	 set-up	 was	 designed	 to	 simulate	 a	 crown	 fire.	 The	 firewall	 was	
achieved	 by	 a	 burning	 wall	 of	 natural	 gas	 burners.	 Therefore,	 the	 experimental	 fire	 height	
could	 not	 exceed	 4m,	 because	 of	 practical	 considerations.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 firewall,	 and	 the	
distance	between	the	fire	and	the	tank	required	rigorous	analysis	of	the	scaling	effects.	
	
Figure	9.	Configuration	of	the	thermal	system	[18]	
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The	 configuration	 analyzed	 is	 drawn	 in	 Figure	 9:	 the	 wildland	 fire	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	
represented	by	a	 rectangular	 solid	 firewall	 (black	body)	and	 faces	a	horizontal	2m3	LPG	 tank	
where	the	firewall	and	LPG	tank	were	parallel	to	each	other.	The	average	SEP	(Surface	Emissive	
Power)	 is	assumed	to	be	90	kW/m2	and	 it	 is	used	to	calculate	the	maximum	heat	 flux	 (MHF)	
and	total	heat	 flux	 (THF)	 that	would	 impact	a	2m3	LPG	tank	 if	exposed	to	a	 large	crown	fire.	
The	maximum	size	of	 fire	would	be	a	 total	 flame	height	of	40	m	and	a	 length	of	100	m.	The	
distance	between	the	fire	and	the	tank	wall	was	defined	as	50	m.		
	
During	 the	 experiments,	 a	 2m3	 tank	 was	 filled	 at	 15%	 with	 commercial	 LPG.	 The	 gas	
burner	system	was	designed	with	horizontal	tubes	pierced	with	two	rows	of	holes.		
	
Before	 putting	 the	 tanks	 in	 front	 of	 the	 fire	 for	 the	 real	 test,	 several	 experiments	with	
radiative	heat	 flux	meters	were	performed	 to	check	 the	best	distance	 (3.8	m).	The	 tank	was	
also	 equipped	with	 external	wall	 thermocouples	 and	 8	 of	 them	were	 arranged	on	 a	 vertical	
pole	to	measure	fluid	temperatures	and	3	convective	heat	flux	sensor	were	glued	on	the	wall	
covered	with	a	thin	nickel	polished	surface.	Then,	the	internal	pressure	was	measured	with	a	
pressure	gauge,	and	convective	heat	 flux	 transferred	was	measured	by	 the	sensors.	The	 test	
was	performed	during	20	minutes.	The	results	obtained	were	the	following:	
	
Figure	10.	Radiative	heat	flux	on	the	LPG	tank	[18]	
	
Figure	11.	Convective	heat	flux	on	the	LPG	tank	[18]	
Both	curves	(Figure	10	and	11)	show	that	the	fire	was	symmetrical.	The	heat	flux	was	not	
very	 constant	 because	 of	 the	 fluctuation	 of	 NG	 pressure	 and	 the	 maximum	 heat	 flux	 was	
recorded	at	the	beginning	of	the	trial.	The	average	value	of	the	heat	flux	was	calculated	to	be	
26	 kW/m2	 during	 the	 experiment.	 Referring	 Figure	 11,	 the	 convective	 heat	 flux	 is	 at	 its	
maximum	at	the	beginning,	when	the	tank	wall	is	cold	and	the	hot	gases	of	the	flames	transfer	
heat	to	the	wall.		A	maximum	value	of	10	kW/m2	was	recorded.		
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For	the	authors,	the	experiment	confirms	that	an	LPG	tank	will	not	BLEVE	if	it	is	impacted	
by	a	24	kW/m2	radiant	heat	flux,	and	confirms	the	criteria	of	the	American	Petroleum	Institute,	
which	 state	 that	 if	 a	 tank	 with	 a	 pressure	 relief	 valve	 is	 impacted	 by	 a	 heat	 flux	 below	 22	
kW/m2,	it	should	remain	safe.	The	scenario	reported	is	very	dangerous	and	the	safety	distance	
for	an	LPG	is	obtained	from	the	parametric	study	developed	in	Figure	12	with	a	safety	value	for	
MHP	of	24	kW/m2:	
	
	
Figure	12.	Parametric	study	for	LPG	safety	distance	[18]	
Definitely,	it	is	important	to	notify	that	for	close	fires	the	height	of	the	fire	does	not	play	a	
strong	role	in	the	MHF.	A	fire	located	very	high	on	a	burning	tree	does	not	radiate	strongly	on	
a	 tank	 located	 at	 the	 base	 of	 the	 fire.	 However,	 at	 such	 a	 short	 distance,	 heat	 transfer	 by	
convection	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 and	 it	 can	 add	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 heat	 to	 the	
tank.	
	
	
4.2.3 Effect	of	a	distant	fire	in	a	LPG	tank	with	a	low	percentage	of	liquid	[17]	
	
This	 investigation	 consists	 on	 the	 description	 of	 an	 experimental	 study	with	 a	 pressure	
vessel	of	2300	L	exposed	to	remote	fire	heating	by	a	natural	gas	fuelled	wall	fire	simulator.	In	
this	 case,	 the	 tank	 is	 filled	 to	 15%	 capacity	 with	 commercial	 liquid	 propane	 and	 the	 flame	
intensity	and	the	distance	are	varied	to	study	the	effect	of	different	heating	levels	on	the	tank	
and	its	lading.	
	
The	fire	simulator	is	first	characterized	using	fire	thermocouples,	radiative	flux	meters	and	
thermal	 imaging.	Then,	three	tests	are	conducted	with	the	tank	positioned	at	three	different	
distances	resulting	 in	a	measured	average	heat	 flux	at	 the	tank	surfaces	ranging	between	24	
and	43	kW/m2.		
	
The	fire	heat	transfer	to	the	tank	was	modified	by	varying	the	distance	between	the	fire	
and	 the	 tank.	 The	 tank	 was	 equipped	 with	 23	 thermocouples	 and	 configured	 as	 in	 other	
studies.	 The	 fire	was	designed	as	 a	 rectangular	 radiating	wall	 and	a	 thermal	 imaging	 system	
was	 used	 to	 view	 the	 fire	 at	 a	 distance	 of	 25	 m.	 In	 Figure	 13,	 the	 main	 zone	 (zone	 1)	
corresponds	to	the	area	where	the	metal	panels	between	the	pipes	increase	and	homogenize	
the	emitted	heat	flux.	A	second	zone	corresponds	to	the	free	flames	area	without	panels;	the	
emitted	heat	flux	remains	high	but	significantly	lower	than	in	zone	1.	The	zone	3	corresponds	
to	hot	gases	with	a	lower	temperature	and	low	emissivity	(<350	°C).	
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Figure	13.	Thermal	image	of	fire	in	test	[17]	
In	the	tests,	the	fire	thickness	could	vary	depending	on	the	wind	and	natural	gas	pressure	
variations	so	it	would	affect	the	fire	emissive	power.	Another	effect	of	fire	thickness	variation	
is	 that	 the	 separation	 distance	 between	 tank	 and	 fire	 could	 have	 been	 different	 and	 this	 of	
course	would	affect	the	view	factor	between	the	tank	and	fire.	
	
The	different	experiments	developed	shows	that	the	fire	exposure	itself	was	probably	not	
sufficient	to	cause	a	thermal	rupture	of	the	tank.	However,	the	heating	was	sufficient	to	cause	
the	release	of	propane	because	the	failure	of	the	fittings	on	the	vessel.		
	
The	following	figure	(Figure	14)	shows	the	measured	tank	wall	temperatures	from	a	test.	
As	 can	be	 seen	 from	 the	 figure,	 the	main	 fire	was	extinguished	at	11	min.	However,	 leaking	
propane	continued	 to	burn	as	a	 jet	 impinging	 the	 top	of	 the	 tank	 resulting	 in	 very	high	wall	
temperatures.	 At	 20	min,	 the	 highest	 wall	 temperature	measurement	 changed	 dramatically	
suggesting	the	thermocouples	detached	from	the	tank.		
 
Figure	14.	Measured	wall	temperatures	in	test	[17]	
To	 sum	 up,	 this	 work	 has	 shown	 that	 incident	 radiative	 heat	 flux	 from	 a	 remote	 fire	
depends	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 fire	 and	 distance	 to	 the	 target.	 The	 intensity	 of	 incident	 flux	 is	
usually	lower	than	in	scenarios	as	jetting	fire	or	pool	fire,	but	may	remain	high	enough	to	cause	
serious	damage	to	the	target.	Very	significant	rises	in	wall	temperature	and	tank	pressure	can	
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be	expected	and	can	lead	to	the	activation	of	pressure	relief	devices.	Fire	heating	that	may	not	
be	 sufficient	 to	 cause	 rupture	 of	 the	 tank	 may	 be	 sufficient	 to	 cause	 the	 failure	 of	 certain	
fittings	and	this	could	lead	to	a	leak	of	propane	that	could	be	ignited.		
	
4.2.4 Study	about	LPG	tank	response	under	a	WUI	fire	with	a	specific	impacting	
heat	flux	[16]	
	
As	in	previous	investigations,	the	modelling	approach	considered	the	fire	as	a	solid	flame.	
In	 this	 case,	 the	 target	 is	 cylindrical	 and	 cannot	 be	 represented	 by	 a	 flat	 rectangle.	 A	 finite	
elements	modeling	was	therefore	developed	in	order	to	compute	the	impacting	heat	fluxes	on	
the	 tank.	 Here,	 it	will	 be	 considered	 long	 fire	 scenarios	 and	 selected	 a	medium	 value	 of	 90	
kW/m²	to	be	realistic.	
	
Radiant	heat	impacting	the	tank	was	calculated	in	different	scenarios	giving	a	map	of	heat	
fluxes	 on	 the	 tank,	 depending	 on	 the	 position	 relative	 to	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 fire.	 The	
maximum	heat	flux	is	observed	in	areas	were	the	surface	faces	the	fire.		Modelling	accurately	
the	 behavior	 of	 a	 LPG	 tank	 requires	 many	 parameters,	 such	 as	 thermodynamic	 properties,	
convection	coefficients,	 surface	radiative	properties,	 temperature	stratification,	etc.	To	avoid	
uncertainties	about	modelling,	it	was	preferred	to	perform	real	size	experiments	to	study	the	
response	of	a	LPG	tank	when	submitted	to	high	radiative	fluxes.	
	
The	experiments	were	performed	with	2	m3	tanks	filled	at	15%	with	commercial	LPG	and	
the	LPG	tank	was	equipped	with	standard	equipment	maintained	the	same	set	up	as	in	other	
experiments.	Then,	 the	modelling	was	compared	with	a	case	test	 from	 literature,	 to	validate	
the	finite	elements	modelling	and	it	was	used	to	calculate	heat	fluxes	impacting	a	LPG	tank	by	
considering	fire	scenarios	from	literature.		
	
Modelling	results	revealed	that	in	severe	cases	the	LPG	tank	exposed	to	a	wildfire	can	be	
impacted	 with	 high	 exceeding	 the	 safety	 criteria	 of	 API.	 Three	 experiments	 were	 therefore	
performed	to	investigate	the	behavior	of	the	tank	in	a	scenario	that	exceeds	that	safety	value.	
The	worst	experimental	 scenario	performed	 in	 this	work	 impacted	 the	 tank	with	an	average	
peak	heat	flux	of	43	kW/m2	and	 it	has	to	be	noted	that	the	fire	was	not	constant	due	to	gas	
supply	pressure	variations.	The	other	tests	were	less	severe	with	an	average	peak	heat	flux	of	
26	and	24	kW/m2.	
	
A	BLEVE	or	a	loss	of	containment	were	not	observed	during	the	tests	and	until	10	minutes	
and	the	pressure	relief	valve	remained	closed.	The	next	figure	(Figure	15)	shows	the	peak	wall	
temperature	 for	 all	 three	 tests	 and	 to	 evaluate	 them,	 the	 American	 Petroleum	 Institute	
considers	that	the	wall	remains	safe	if	its	temperature	remains	below	427°C.	
	
 
Figure	15.	Experimental	results	[16]	
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These	results	indicate	that	a	tank	should	remain	safe	for	short	exposure	duration	such	as	
ten	minutes.	However,	all	tests	were	continued	after	ten	minutes	and	the	pressure	relief	valve	
opened	several	times	two	minutes	later.	This	point	is	dangerous	for	a	tank	and	could	entail	a	
domino	effect.	
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5. Legislation	and	regulations	
	
5.1 Background	
	
In	this	section,	a	comparative	review	of	the	regulations,	codes	and	standards	relevant	to	
the	safety	of	Liquefied	Petroleum	Gas	 (LPG)	 facilities	 is	done	with	an	emphasis	on	substance	
volumes	 between	 1	 to	 5	 m3	 storage	 tanks	 which	 are	 the	 most	 common	 in	 wildland-urban	
interfaces.		
	
The	analysis	of	 legislation	and	regulations	stablishes	a	comparison	country-by-country	of	
the	overall	system	of	control	of	LPG	facilities	related	with	design,	construction	and	operation	
of	LPG	facilities.	Countries	as	Spain,	Portugal,	Italy	and	France	are	going	to	be	analyzed	in	order	
to	 stand	 the	 problems	 and	 solutions	 purposed	 by	 their	 administrations	 to	 face	 the	 problem	
existing	in	WUI	with	not	controlled	fires	which	put	in	contact	with	vegetation	near	tanks.	
	
5.2 Spain	
	
5.2.1 Introduction	
	
UNE	60250:2008	has	 the	objective	 to	 establish	 the	 criteria	 for	 the	design,	 construction,	
mounting	 and	 exploitation	 of	 LPG	 installations	 by	 fixed	 deposits	 with	 a	 geometry	 capacity	
equal	 or	 less	 than	 2000	m3.	 The	 scope	 of	 this	 regulation	 goes	 since	 the	 installation	 and	 the	
equipment	between	charging	port	and	end	valves	(including	these	ones).	
	
The	whole	 of	 the	 installation	 and	 equipment	 comprises	 the	 charging	 port,	 tank	 and	 its	
accessories,	 piping	 between	 the	 charging	 port	 and	 the	 outlet	 valves,	 transfer	 equipment,	
vaporization,	regulation	and	control	devices.	
	
In	 this	 regulation	 the	 pressure	 is	 related	 to	 atmosphere	 pressure	 (gauge	 pressure).	 The	
installations	used	for	the	bulk	distributions	of	LPG	are	excluded	of	this	regulation.	
	
5.2.2 Terms	and	definitions	
	
An	 LPG	 installation	 is	 a	 surface	 projected	 in	 a	 limited	 plant	 for	 the	 security	 distances	
reflected	on	the	Table	6:	 	 	
Table	6.	Safety	distances	[7]	
Aerial	tanks	(A)	(m)	 Buried	tanks	(E)	(m)	
	 D01	 Dp2	 	 D0	
A-1	 1.5	 1.0	 E-1	 0.75	
A-5	 3.0	 2.0	 E-5	 1.5	
A-13	 5.0	 3.0	 E-13	 3.0	
A-35	 7.5	 5.0	 E-60	 4.0	
A-60	 8.5	 6.5	 E-120	 5.0	
A-120	 10.0	 7.5	 E-500	 10.0	
A-500	 15.0	 10.0	 D0	=	distance	to	orifice	
A-2000	 30.0	 20.0	 Dp	=	distance	to	walls	
	
The	maximum	level	of	liquid	is	considered	to	be	the	indicated	by	the	tank’s	manufacturer	
in	the	design	conditions	or,	in	their	absence,	the	85%	of	the	geometric	capacity	of	the	tank	at	
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20°C.	 The	 maximum	 work	 pressure	 will	 be	 the	 declared	 by	 the	 equipment’s	 manufacturer	
according	their	characteristics.	
	
5.2.3 Classification	
	
The	storage	of	LPG	in	fixed	deposits	could	be	only	done	in	aerial	or	mounded	tanks.	The	
storage	tanks	are	considered	aerial	when	the	surface	is	in	contact	with	air	and	its	lower	part	is	
higher	than	surrounding	floor.		
	
The	LPG	storage	tanks	could	be	classified	as	it	is	shown:	
	
a. Aerial	storage	tanks	
1. A-1:		Volume	≤	1m3	
2. A-5:			1	m3	<	Volume	≤	5	m3	
3. A-13:	5	m3	<	Volume	≤	13	m3	
4. A-35:	13	m3<	Volume	≤	35	m3	
5. A-60:	35	m3<	Volume	≤	60	m3	
6. A-120:	60	m3<	Volume	≤	120	m3	
7. A-500:	120	m3<	Volume	≤	500	m3	
8. A-2000:	500	m3<	Volume	≤	2000m3	
b. Buried	storage	tanks	
1. E-1:	Volume	≤	1m3	
2. E-5:	1	m3	<	Volume	≤	5	m3	
3. E-13:	5	m3	<	Volume	≤	13	m3	
4. E-60:	35	m3<	Volume	≤	60	m3	
5. E-120:	60	m3<	Volume	≤	120	m3	
6. E-500:	120	m3<	Volume	≤	500	m3	
	
The	interest	in	this	work	will	be	focus	on	A-1	and	A-5	storage	tanks.	
	
5.2.4 Implementation	of	LPG	installation	
	
The	distances	are	measured	to	the	orifices	or	walls	as	it	is	indicated	in	the	following	Figure	
16:	
	
Figure	16.	Distances	between	walls	and	orifices	[7]	
A	hole	or	orifice	is	any	opening	that	is	not	closed	by	means	of	threaded	plugs,	flanges	or	
cut-off	keys	that	ensure	leak	tightness,	such	as	the	loading	port	or	safety	valves.	The	discharge	
of	the	safety	valve	may	be	conducted	within	the	LPG	station,	the	free	end	of	the	conduit	being	
the	orifice	D0	for	distances.	
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For	 reference	 4	 (Table	 7),	 the	 following	 method	 is	 applied	 (see	 Figure	 17):	 from	 the	
projection	 of	 the	 holes	 (safety	 valve	 or	 loading	 mouth),	 the	 distances	 D0	 are	 taken	 in	
orthogonal	projections	on	the	ground	the	distance	chart	and,	by	joining	the	perimeter	of	the	
circle	formed	with	a	point	2	m	above	the	hole	in	question,	a	volume	V	is	obtained.	Then,	from	
the	projections	of	the	walls,	also	in	orthogonal	projection	onto	the	ground,	the	figure	formed	
by	 taking	 distances	 Dp	 indicated	 in	 the	 distance	 chart	 and	 joining	 its	 perimeter	 with	 a	
hypothetical	envelope	located	1	m	from	the	walls,	obtaining	another	volume	(V1).		
	
	
Figure	17.	Distances	LPG	tanks	[7]	
 
Table	7.	Safety	distances	LPG	tanks	[7]	
	 Aerial	Tanks	
	 A-1	(Volume	≤	1m3)	 A-5	(1	m3	<	Volume	≤	5	m3)	
	 D0	 Dp	 D0	 Dp	
Reference	1	 	 0.3	 	 0.6	
Reference	2	 	 0.65	 	 1.25	
Reference	3	 	 0.3	 	 0.6	
Reference	4	 1.5	 1	 3	 2	
Reference	6	 3	
	
Where:	
	
• Reference	1:	Free	space	around	the	projection	on	the	ground	of	the	walls	
• Reference	2:	Distance	to	the	enclosure	
• Reference	3:	Distance	to	walls	or	blind	walls	(RF-120)	
• Reference	4:	Distances	to	property	 limits,	property	openings,	fixed	ignition	pockets,	fixed	
explosion	 engines,	 public	 roads,	 railways	 or	 rivers,	 projection	 of	 overhead	 lines,	
basements,	sewers	or	drains	
• Reference	6:	Distances	from	the	loading	port	to	the	transfer	tank	
	
The	 use	 of	 walls,	 blind	 walls	 or	 screens	 can	 reduce	 the	 distances	 corresponding	 to	
reference	4	(except	distances	to	projection	of	high	voltage	overhead	lines	in	surface	tanks)	up	
to	50%	according	to	the	following	criteria:	the	wall,	the	blind	walls	or	screens	must	be	straight,	
without	any	opening	and	be	constructed	 in	such	a	way	that	the	fire	resistance	 is	at	 least	RF-
120.	
	
• The	use	of	more	than	one	wall,	blind	wall	or	screen	per	point	to	protect,	or	more	than	
two	walls	per	installation	is	not	allowed.	
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• The	 use	 of	 a	 wall,	 blind	 wall	 or	 screen	 should	 in	 no	 case	 imply	 the	 reduction	 of	
distances	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 references	 in	 the	 table	 of	 distances	 in	 the	 annex.	 (For	
example	in	the	case	of	distance	to	fencing,	see	Figure	18)	
• The	minimum	height	of	the	wall,	blind	wall	or	screen	is	determined	by	the	hypotenuse	
of	the	right	triangle	formed	by	joining	points	A,	B	and	C.	(With	a	minimum	of	1.5	m)	
• The	length	of	the	wall	(Figure	19),	blind	wall	or	screen	must	be	such	that	the	horizontal	
path	of	a	possible	gas	 leak	 is	not	 shorter	 than	 the	distance	 indicated	 in	 the	distance	
table	(d1	+	d2	+	d3	≥ 	Do).	
	
Figure	18.	Height	determination	[7]	
	
Figure	19.	Wall's	longitude	determination	[7]	
	
For	installations	with	a	geometric	capacity	of	less	than	or	equal	to	1	m3,	the	distances	of	
category	A-5	in	the	previous	Table	7	may	be	reduced	to	50%.	
	
The	installation	of	LPG	cannot	be	located	inside	or	under	the	buildings,	nor	in	the	patios	
that	 do	 not	 fulfill	 the	 conditions	 that	 are	 indicated	 now.	 Only	 LPG	 supply	 facilities	 may	 be	
located	in	yards	where	they	have	a	direct	access	for	maintenance	personnel	and	meet	at	least	
one	of	the	following	two	sets	of	conditions:		
	
• Be	fully	open	to	permanently	ventilated	streets	or	outdoor	areas	and	to	a	level	of	
floor	at	 least	one-sixth	of	 the	perimeter	of	 the	yard,	 ideally	considered	closed	by	
the	lines	connecting	the	inside	corners	of	the	open	parts.		
• The	 average	 height	 of	 the	 buildings,	 obtained	 by	 weighting	 the	 height	 of	 each	
building	with	its	facade	length	to	the	yard,	cannot	exceed:	H	<7	+	0.7	x	V	for	aerial	
deposits;	 And	 H	 <8	 +	 0.3	 x	 V	 for	 buried	 deposits	 where	 H	 is	 the	 height	 of	 the	
building,	in	meters	(m);	V	is	the	volume	of	the	supply	facility,	in	cubic	meters	(m3).	
	
	 And	free	surface	of	the	yard	cannot	be	less	than:		
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S	≥	96	+	50	x	V	for	aerial	tanks;	
	
where	 S	 is	 the	 free	 surface	 of	 the	 yard,	 in	 square	meters	 (m2);	 V	 is	 the	 volume	 of	 the	
supply	facility,	 in	cubic	meters	(m3).	The	use	of	walls,	blind	walls	or	screens	 is	not	allowed	to	
reduce	 the	 distances	 indicated	 in	 the	 distance	 chart.	 The	 LPG	 station	must,	 in	 any	 case,	 be	
discovered	and	cannot	have	a	total	geometric	capacity	greater	than	20	m3.	
	
5.2.5 Equipment	characteristics	
	
Storage	tanks	and	their	accessories	for	the	storage	of	LPG	must	be	designed	in	accordance	
with	current	 legislation.	They	must	be	provided	for	at	 least	a	double-closing	filling	device,	an	
indicator	of	continuous	measurement	level,	an	indicator	of	maximum	level	of	filling,	pressure	
gauge,	 over	 pressure	 safety	 valve	 connected	 to	 the	 gas	 phase	 of	 the	 deposit,	 two	 devices	
destined	to	the	output	of	LPG	and	an	earth	terminal.	 	
	
Changes	have	been	made	in	the	devices	that	carry	the	reservoirs	themselves,	being	able	
to	put	a	blind	plug	 in	 the	 lower	drainage	hole,	and	using	another	drainage	device	 through	a	
diver	tube	on	the	top.	Said	change	will	allow	the	non-mandatory	to	maintain	the	distance	of	
less	than	50	cm	or	80	cm	depending	on	the	case,	if	a	blind	plug	is	provided	in	the	lower	purge,	
so	 it	 would	 not	 be	 necessary	 to	 provide	 benches	 for	 the	 location	 of	 the	 tank.	 The	 design	
pressure	of	the	reservoir	is	but	for	tanks	less	than	7	m3,	20	bar	is	enough.	
	
5.2.6 Construction	and	mounting	
	
Vessels	 must	 be	 installed	 horizontally	 or	 vertically	 according	 to	 their	 design.	 At	 the	
location	of	the	tanks	and	equipment,	there	must	be	a	minimum	2	m	high	enclosure	that	can	be	
of	metallic	mesh	or	any	other	similar	system	of	class	M1,	which	allows	 	good	ventilation	and	
prevents	 the	access	of	people	outside	 the	building.	 If	 this	enclosure	 is	 fitted	with	a	base,	 its	
height	should	not	exceed	30	cm.	The	doors	of	the	enclosures	must	open	to	the	outside,	they	
must	also	be	of	class	M1,	and	the	fastenings	must	be	of	quick	drive	from	the	interior	without	
needing	to	use	keys.	The	use	of	walls,	blind	walls	or	screens	regulated	in	previous	section	can	
be	considered	as	enclosure,	supplemented,	 if	necessary,	with	wire	mesh	or	similar	system	to	
reach	the	height	of	2	m.	These	enclosures	must	be	placed	at	the	distances	of	the	tanks	marked	
in	 the	 distance	 chart,	 reference	 2.	 When	 there	 are	 transfer,	 vaporization,	 regulation	 or	
measurement	equipment	in	an	installation,	they	must	be	inside	the	enclosure.		
	
The	enclosure	can	be	dispensed	with	when	the	LPG	installation	is	located	inside	industrial	
plants	that	already	have	a	closed	and	controlled	enclosure.	Installations	A-5	can	dispense	with	
the	enclosure	if	the	cargo	ports,	keys,	regulating	equipment	and	tank	accessories	are	enclosed	
in	a	casing	or	canopy	of	materials	M1	according	to	The	Norm	UNE	23727,	provided	with	a	lock	
or	padlock,	and	in	addition	one	of	the	following	conditions	is	fulfilled:	
	
• The	LPG	station	is	located	on	a	single-family	dwelling	with	enclosure.	
• The	LPG	station	is	 located	in	a	public	building	(hotels,	restaurants,	barracks,	etc.)	and	
in	 an	 area	 of	 restricted	 access	 only	 to	 its	 own	 personnel,	 and	 access	 to	 the	 general	
public	is	not	allowed.	
	
On	the	case	of	aerial	tanks,	they	must	be	installed	so	that	their	longitudinal	axis	does	not	
interfere	with	any	other	LPG	tank.	In	tanks	that	have	drainage	in	the	generatrix	or	bottom	wall	
of	the	same,	the	placement	on	the	supports	must	be	made	in	such	a	way	that	the	hole	in	the	
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tank	for	the	drainage	is	placed	at	a	minimum	distance	of	50	cm	to	the	ground	in	the	tanks	of	
up	 to	20	m3	and	of	80	 in	 the	majors.	This	point	will	allow	us	 to	place	 the	 reservoirs	without	
maintaining	this	 lower	distance,	 if	we	provide	the	reservoirs	with	a	blind	stopper	 in	 its	purge	
hole.	As	a	substitute	of	supports,	a	rubber	base	will	be	placed	on	the	supports.	The	distance	
between	tanks	should	never	be	 less	than	the	half-height	of	their	radii	and	at	 least	1	m.	They	
must	be	grounded	with	a	resistance	less	than	80	ohms.	
	
The	valves	of	the	tank	and	accessories	must	be	protected	by	a	casing	with	a	registration	
cover	and	when	vehicles	 can	move	on	 it,	 it	must	be	protected	with	 the	necessary	means	 to	
avoid	 it.	 The	 valves	 should	be	perfectly	 accessible	 from	 the	outside,	 and	 control	 accessories	
easily	readable.	
	
5.2.7 Security	against	fire	
	
Fire	 protection	 facilities	must	 comply	with	 current	 legislation	 (The	 current	 legislation	 at	
the	time	of	this	standard	is	Royal	Decree	1942/1993	of	5	November).	
	
Table	8.	Extinguish	method	according	deposit	[7]	
Volume	(m3)	 V≤1	 1<V≤5	
Aerial	 Not	necessary	
Extinguish	material	
or	water	at	a	
distances	less	than	
15	m	
	
Fire	extinguishers	 (Table	8)	used	must	be	dry	chemical	dust,	portable	or	on	wheels.	The	
quantities	of	fire	extinguishing	material	must	be	at	least	as	follows:	LPG	installations	classified	
A-5	must	have	at	least	two	fire	extinguishers	with	a	minimum	unit	efficiency	of	21A-113B-C.	
	
In	addition,	the	area	of	pumps	and	compressors	of	LPG	must	be	equipped	with	2.5	kg	of	
powder	dry	chemical	per	cubic	meter	per	hour	of	transfer	capacity,	with	a	minimum	of	50	kg	
distributed	in	at	 least	two	extinguishers.	 If	the	transfer	equipment	is	 located	in	a	shed,	these	
extinguishers	must	be	placed	on	the	outside	of	 the	same.	The	vaporizer	booths,	 if	any,	must	
have	 at	 least	 one	 minimum	 efficiency	 34A-183B-C,	 as	 supplementary	 to	 the	 established	
previously.	
	
Installations	 that	 do	 not	 have	 an	 external	water	 supply	must	 be	 provided	with	 storage	
tanks	and	pumping	means	that	allow	the	mains	operation	for	1	h	30	min	at	the	set	pressure	
and	flow	rates.	The	water	hoses	and	their	coupling	fittings	must	be	adjusted	to	UNE	Standards	
23091	and	UNE	23400,	respectively.		
	
5.3 Italy	
	
5.3.1 Introduction	
	
The	‘’Approvazione	della	regola	tecnica	di	prevenzione	incendi	per	l'installazione	e	l'eser-
cizio	dei	depositi	di	gas	di	petrolio	liquefatto	con	capacità	complessiva	non	superiore	a	13	m3	
(2014)’’	 decree	 is	 stipulated	 to	 order	 the	 subject	 of	 fire	 prevention	 for	 the	 installation	 and	
operation	of	LPG	deposits	in	fixed	tanks	with	a	total	geometric	capacity	not	exceeding	13	m3,	
intended	 for	 fuel	 distribution	 systems	 for	 civil,	 industrial,	 artisanal	 and	 agricultural	 use.		
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The	provisions	of	this	decree	apply	to	the	installation	of	new	reservoirs.	The	same	applies	
to	 deposits	 existing	 at	 the	 date	 of	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 this	 measure	 in	 case	 of	 substantial	
changes	 or	 extensions.	 The	 deposits	 in	 possession	 of	 a	 provisional	 permit,	 of	 the	 Law	
December	7,	1984,	n.	818	(Official	Gazette	No.	338	of	10	December	1984)	are	adapted	to	the	
provisions	contained	in	the	Technical	Annex	no	later	than	three	years	from	the	date	of	entry	
into	force	of	this	decree.		
	
5.3.2 Objective	
	
This	decree	is	established	for	the	purposes	of	fire	prevention	and	safety	for	the	protection	
of	people	and	the	protection	of	property	against	fire	risks,	the	LPG	deposits	with	total	capacity	
up	 to	13	m3	are	 installed	and	managed	 in	order	 to	ensure	 the	achievement	of	 the	 following	
objectives:	
	
a. minimize	the	causes	of	LPG	accidental	release,	fire	and	explosion	
b. limit,	in	case	of	accidental	event,	injury	to	persons	
c. limit,	 in	 case	of	accidental	event,	damage	 to	buildings	and/or	adjacent	 spaces	 to	
the	system	
d. to	enable	rescuers	to	operate	in	safe	conditions	
	
According	 to	 the	 law,	 a	 fixed	 tank	 is	 a	 pressure	 vessel	 intended	 to	 contain	 liquefied	
petroleum	gas,	stably	installed	in	the	ground	and	stably	connected	to	the	distribution	system.	
A	 tank	 for	 underground	 use	 (or	 underground	 tank):	 fixed	 tank	 intended	 specifically	 for	
underground	installation.	It	is	completely	placed	below	the	surface	of	the	floor.	
	
The	 pressure	 equipment	 and/or	 the	 constituent	 sets	 the	 deposit	 are	 specifically	
constructed	and	prepared	for	the	intended	installation,	above	or	below	ground,	in	accordance	
with	the	applicable	European	and	national	regulations.	
	
5.3.3 Related	normative	
	
For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 technical	 rule	 shows	 an	 indicative	 and	 not	 exhaustive	
enumeration,	technical	standards	pertaining	to	the	sector	of	fixed	LPG	tanks	with	capacity	of	
up	to	13	m³.	
	
• UNI	 EN	 12542-	 equipment	 and	 accessories	 for	 LPG	 -	 Cylindrical	 stationary	 tanks	 of	
welded	steel,	for	liquefied	petroleum	gas	(LPG),	produced	in	series,	geometric	capacity	
of	up	to	13	m³	-	Design	and	manufacture.	
• UNI	 EN-14570	 LPG	 equipment	 and	 accessories	 -	 Equipment	 for	 LPG	 tanks,	 above	
ground	and	underground.	
• UNI	EN	12817-equipment	and	accessories	 for	 LPG	 -	 Inspection	and	 requalification	of	
tanks	for	liquefied	petroleum	gas	(LPG)	of	smaller	geometric	capacity	than	or	equal	to	
13	m³.	
	
5.3.4 Installation	
	
The	maximum	total	capacity	of	the	tank	is	fixed	in	13	m3	and	can	be	obtained	with	one	or	
more	tanks	of	any	capacity.	For	the	purposes	of	determining	the	overall	capacity	of	the	deposit	
referred	 to	 previously,	 two	 or	 more	 tanks,	 at	 the	 same	 catchment	 service,	 are	 considered	
distinct	deposits	when	both	of	the	following	conditions	are	verified:	
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a.	The	distance	between	the	perimeter	of	 the	nearest	 tanks	of	 individual	deposits	 is	not	 less	
than	15	m,	can	be	reduced	to	half	by	burial	of	tanks	or	interposition	of	the	wall.	
b.	The	deposit	does	not	have	 in	common	with	other	deposits	 the	 filling	point	and	vaporizers	
and	first-stage	pressure	reducer.	
	
1. The	 containers	 shall	 only	 be	 installed	 in	 areas	 with	 clear	 sky.	 It	 is	 forbidden	 to	
install	on	terraces	and	in	any	case	the	overlying	areas	of	enclosed	spaces.	
	
2. Installation	in	backyards	may	be	allowed	provided	that:	
a) the	tanks	are	of	a	buried	type	
b) has	 the	 courtyard	 area	 not	 less	 than	 1,000	 m2	 and	 has	 at	 least	 a	
quarter	 of	 the	 free	 perimeter	 of	 the	 buildings;	 for	 the	 remaining	
three	 quarters	 of	 said	 perimeter	 they	 are	 not	 allowed	 buildings	
intended	 to	 crowding	 of	 people	 or	 to	 civil	 room	 against	 fire	 with	
height	greater	than	12	m	
c) the	access	has	a	width	and	a	height	not	less	than	4	m	
	
3. The	 installation	 of	 tanks	 on	 sloping	 ground	 is	 permitted.	 In	 this	 case	 the	 safety	
distances	must	be	measured	in	horizontal	projection.	When	the	slope	of	the	land	is	
greater	 than	5%,	do	not	apply	 the	reductions	of	 safety	distances	provided	to	 the	
next	 step.	 The	 pitches	 of	 installation	 of	 the	 tanks	 must	 be	 flat	 and	 adequate	
surface	to	allow	the	outer	edge	of	the	same	DISTI	not	 less	than	1	m	0.60	m	from	
the	perimeter	of	the	tanks.	
4. The	installation	of	tanks	ramps	is	not	allowed.	
	
	
When	the	tanks	are	installed	in	less	than	3	m	from	trafficable	areas	by	vehicles,	it	must	be	
realized	a	suitable	defense	fixing	adapted	to	prevent	accidental	 impact	against	above	ground	
tanks,	or	transit	of	vehicles	on	the	area	of	underground	tanks.	This	protection	must	be	placed	
at	 a	 distance	 of	 at	 least	 1	 m	 from	 the	 perimeter	 in	 plan	 view	 of	 the	 tank.	 In	 the	 case	 the	
defense	is	simply	constituted	by	a	curb,	even	discontinuous,	this	must	have	a	minimum	height	
of	0.2	m	and	minimum	distance	from	the	reservoir	not	less	than	1.5	m.	
	
5.3.5 Dangerous	elements	and	safety	distances	
	
They	 are	 considered	 dangerous	 elements	 of	 the	 deposit,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
determination	of	safety	distances,	the	tank,	the	filling	point,	the	multivalve	group	and	all	the	
shut-off	 and	 control	 bodies,	 with	 a	 working	 pressure	 exceeding	 1.5	 bar.	 Compared	 to	 the	
dangerous	elements	of	 the	deposit,	 the	 safety	distances	must	be	observed	 indicated	 in	next	
point	and	the	protective	distances	indicated	also.	
	
• Compared	 to	 the	 dangerous	 elements	 of	 the	 deposit	 referred	 to,	 the	 following	
minimum	safety	distances	must	be	observed:	
	
a) manufactured,	 sewer	 openings,	 closed	 tunnels,	 any	 sources	 of	 ignition,	
openings	to	the	laying	surface	of	the	tanks	and	communicating	with	premises	
located	 below	 ground	 level,	 deposits	 of	 combustible	materials	 or	 flammable	
not	 included	 among	 the	 assets	 subject	 to	 the	 fire	 prevention	 inspections	 in	
Annex	I	to	Presidential	Decree	August	1,	2011,	no.	151:	
-	2.5	m,	capacity	for	deposits	up	to	0.3	m3	
-	5	m,	for	deposits	of	greater	capacity	of	0.3	m³	and	up	to	3	m3	
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-	7.5	m,	capacity	for	deposits	over	3	m3	to	5	m3	
-	15	m,	for	deposits	over	5	m3	to	13	m3	
b) buildings	 or	 premises	 also	 in	 part	 to	 public	 exercises,	 in	 communities,	 in	
gathering	 places	 of	 detention	 or	 public	 spectacle,	 deposits	 of	 combustible	
materials	 or	 flammable	 element	 activities	 subject	 to	 fire	 prevention	
inspections	in	Annex	I	to	the	DPR	August	1,	2011,	no.	151:	
-	5	m,	capacity	for	deposits	up	to	0.3	m3	
-	10	m,	for	deposits	of	greater	capacity	of	0.3	m³	and	up	to	3	m3	
-	15	m,	capacity	for	deposits	over	3	m3	to	5	m3	
-	22	m,	for	deposits	over	5	m3	to	13	m3	
c) railway	and	tram	lines:	
-	15	m,	subject	in	each	case	the	application	of	specific	provisions	issued	
in	this	
d) vertical	projection	of	high	voltage	power	lines:	
-	15	m	
e) fixed	tanks	G.P.L.	to	benefit	other	properties:	
	
1) at	least	6	m	reciprocal,	if	within	15	m	measured	from	the	perimeter	of	the	tanks	that	
are	 to	 be	 installed,	 there	 are	 deposits	 whose	 total	 capacity,	 added	 to	 that	 of	 the	
deposit	that	is	to	be	installed,	is	shown	as	greater	than	5	m3.	
2) at	least	15	m	if	the	aggregate	capacity	of	all	existing	deposits	and	install,	obtained	with	
the	verifications	referred	to	is	greater	than	5	m3.	
	
• The	 safety	distances	 referred	 to	 in	 the	previous	paragraph	1,	 letters	 a),	 b),	 c),	 d)	
and	e),	can	be	reduced	until	the	second	half	as	indicated	below:	
	
-	 distances	 referred	 to	 in	 points	 a),	 c)	 and	 e),	 by	 burial	 of	 tanks	 or,	 alternatively,	 the	
interposition	of	the	walls	between	the	dangerous	elements	of	the	deposit	and	the	elements	to	
be	protected	so	that	the	horizontal	path	of	a	possible	release	of	gas,	have	a	development	not	
less	 than	 the	 safety	 distance.	 The	 walls	 must	 rise	 by	 at	 least	 0.5	 m	 above	 the	 highest	
dangerous	element	to	be	shielded.	
	
-	distances	referred	to	 in	point	b),	 limited	to	buildings	and	/	or	premises	served	by	the	filing,	
also	 intended	 in	part	to	public	exercises,	 in	communities,	 in	places	of	assembly,	detention	or	
public	entertainment,	for	capacity	stores	up	to	5	m³,	exclusively	by	burial	of	tanks.	
	
-	distances	referred	to	in	point	d),	exclusively	by	burial	of	tanks.	
	
• The	 horizontal	 distance	 between	 two	 of	 the	 same	 storage	 tanks,	 both	 above	
ground	which	underground,	must	be	at	 least	equal	to	the	diameter	of	the	largest	
of	tanks,	with	a	minimum	of	0.8	m.	
	
• Among	the	perimeter	of	the	tanker	and	the	perimeter	of	the	tank	or	tanks	must	be	
kept	at	a	minimum	distance	of	3	m.	
	
• Between	the	perimeter	of	the	tanker	and	the	perimeter	of	manufactured	must	be	
kept	at	a	minimum	distance	of	5	m.	
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5.3.6 Protection	distances	
	
Compared	 to	 the	 dangerous	 elements	 of	 the	 deposit	 referred	 to	 in	 point	 5.3.5,	 the	
following	minimum	safety	distances	must	be	observed:	
	
• capacity	for	deposits	up	to	0.3	m3:	1.5	m	
• for	deposits	of	greater	capacity	of	0.3	m³	and	up	to	5	m³:	3	m	
• Capacitance	deposits	over	5	m3	to	13	m3:	6	m	
	
The	above-mentioned	distances	can	be	reduced	by	up	to	half	in	accordance	with	the	
previous	point.	In	case	of	interposition	of	the	wall,	the	latter	may	coincide	with	the	wall	of	
the	property	boundary.	
	
5.3.7 Fence	
	
The	dangerous	elements	of	the	deposit	must	be	placed	in	a	special	area	bounded	by	wire	
mesh	fence	at	 least	1.8	m	high	and	provided	with	an	openable	door	to	the	outside,	 lockable	
with	a	lock	or	padlock;	part	of	the	fence	may	coincide	with	the	fence	of	the	ground	where	the	
activity	takes	place	served	by	the	LPG	tank	although	in	masonry,	provided	that	the	installation	
area	of	the	deposit	itself	proves	well	ventilated	and	the	distances	are	respected	referred	to	in	
point	 5,	 6	 and	 8.	 Among	 the	 dangerous	 elements	 of	 the	 deposit	 and	 the	 fence	 must	 be	
observed	a	minimum	distance	of	1	m.	
	
The	 protection	 shall	 be	 deemed	 equivalent	 if	 it	 consists	 of	 a	 structure	 that	 meets	 the	
following	requirements:	is	non-combustible,	encloses	the	cockpit	with	all	dangerous	elements	
of	the	deposit	and	both	ventilated	and	lockable	with	padlock.	
	 	
For	 deposits	 of	 residential	 complexes	 service,	 at	 most	 four	 families,	 the	 fence	 is	 not	
necessary	provided	that	the	tanks	are	installed	on	private	property,	not	accessible	to	strangers	
and	equipped	with	 its	own	fence.	 In	this	case	the	dimensions	of	underground	tanks	must	be	
reported	by	means	of	special	stakes	while	the	above-ground	tanks	must	be	equipped	with	lid,	
fitted	 with	 a	 lock	 or	 padlock,	 enclosing	 the	 multivalve	 group,	 the	 filling	 connection,	 the	
pressure	gauge	and	the	device	for	control	the	maximum	liquid	level.	
	
In	 cases	where	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 install	 on	 the	 tanks	 of	 the	 filling	 point,	 this	 can	 be	
located	 in	 another	 position,	 devoid	 of	 fence,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 distances	 referred	
previously.	 The	 reservoir	 coated	 can	 be	 protected,	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 fence,	 using	 a	
special	structure	in	concrete,	even	prefabricated,	whose	attractive	superior	walls	of	at	least	0.5	
m	from	the	tank	walls.	
	
5.3.8 Fire	extinguisher	systems	
	
Referred	to	fire	extinguisher:	
	
a. At	least	two	portable	fire	extinguishers	shall	be	kept	in	the	vicinity	of	the	tank	outside	
the	enclosure	adjacent	 to	 the	manufactured	buildings,	which	must	have	at	 least	 two	
portable	 fire	 extinguishers	with	 a	minimum	 charge	 of	 4	 kg	 and	 capacity	 up	 to	 5	m³	
extinguishing	agent	not	less	than	13A	89B-C,	while	for	deposits	above	5	m³	must	have	
a	minimum	charge	of	6	kg	and	extinguishing	capacity	of	not	less	than	21A	113B-C.	For	
deposits	up	to	0.3	m³,	only	one	fire	extinguisher	with	a	minimum	charge	of	4	kg	and	an	
extinguishing	capacity	of	not	less	than	13	°	89B-C	shall	be	kept.	
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b. Aerial	tanks	with	a	capacity	of	more	than	5	m³	shall	be	protected	with	at	least	one	DN	
25	 horn,	 made	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNI	 regulations	 in	 force	 and	 powered	 by	
aqueducts	or	by	a	suitable	water	reserve,	capable	of	ensuring	the	following	hydraulic	
performance:	Less	than	60	l	/	min;	Residual	pressure	at	least	2	bar;	Autonomy	at	least	
30	minutes	early.	
	
5.4 France	
	
5.4.1 Introduction		
	
In	 France,	 the	 main	 law	 is	 the	 Decree	 of	 30	 July	 1979	 on	 the	 technical	 and	 safety	
standards	applicable	 to	 the	storage	of	 fixed	 liquefied	hydrocarbons	not	 subject	 to	 legislation	
on	classified	installations	or	publicly-owned	buildings.	
	
Without	 prejudice	 to	 the	 application	 of	 other	 regulations,	 in	 particular	 the	 special	
provisions	by	the	Decree	of	18	January	1943,	as	amended,	regulating	gas	pressure	appliances,	
the	fixed	rules	for	hydrocarbons	shall	be	subject	to	the	provisions	of	the	rules	annexed	to	this	
Decree	Liquefied	compounds	consisting	of	tanks	or	containers.	Distributors	for	the	purposes	of	
this	 Order	 shall	 be	 regarded	 as	 distributors	 of	 commercial	 butane,	 commercial	 propane	 or	
special	fuel	mixture.	
	
These	 rules	 shall	 apply	 to	 storages	of	 liquefied	hydrocarbons	 consisting	of	 one	or	more	
fixed	tanks	or	containers	connected	to	a	use	facility,	the	nominal	storage	capacity	of	which	is	
less	than	or	equal	to	the	classification	threshold	for	installations	classified	for	protection	of	the	
environment	and	that	are	located	outside	the	right	of	way	of	the	buildings	receiving	the	public.	
	
The	storage	of	liquefied	hydrocarbons	in	fixed	tanks	can	be	aerial	or	buried.	It	is	said	to	be	
aerial	when	the	tank	is	placed	in	open	air,	under	a	shelter	or	in	an	open	space.	It	is	said	to	be	
buried	when	the	tank	is	placed	below	the	surrounding	soil	wholly	or	partly	(semi-buried	tank)	
under	the	conditions	laid	down	in	Article	3	of	these	rules.		
	
5.4.2 Storage	implementation	
	
Aerial	storage	must	be	placed	in	the	open	air	or	under	a	simple	shelter	(awning	or	awning)	
or,	if	necessary,	in	an	open	space	with	a	light	and	ventilated	roof	(the	solid	parts	of	the	walls	
must	not	exceed	75	per	cent	of	the	total	lateral	surface	area).	
	
If	 the	storage	 is	on	sloping	ground,	 it	must	not	be	embedded	 in	 the	surrounding	soil	on	
more	than	75%	of	its	perimeter.	If	the	storage	is	located	on	a	deck,	it	must	be	watertight	and	
fire-rated	degree	two	hours.	
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Figure	20.	Security	distances	in	aerial	tanks	[13]	
	
Arrangements	shall	be	made	to	ensure	that	the	supply	vehicle	cannot	approach	within	3	
meters	 (As	 it	can	be	seen	 in	Figure	20)	of	 the	shells	of	 the	 tanks	and	may	 interfere	with	 the	
access	and	clearance	of	collective	buildings.	Except	in	the	case	of	public	roads,	the	floor	of	the	
parking	area	of	the	refueling	vehicle	shall	be	made	incombustible.	The	tanks	shall	rest	stably	by	
means	of	cradles,	legs	or	supports	constructed	of	non-combustible	materials.	The	foundations,	
if	necessary,	are	calculated	to	support	the	weight	of	the	tank	supposed	to	be	filled	with	water.	
	
A	clearance	of	at	 least	0.60	meters	must	be	reserved	around	the	overhead	tanks	and	at	
least	0.10	meters	below.	Two	air	tanks	must	be	at	least	0.20	meters	apart.	Air	tanks	must	be	
moored	if	they	are	in	a	floodable	location.	Underground	tanks	must	always	be	moored.	Tanks	
containing	liquefied	hydrocarbons	shall	be	subject	to	the	regulation	of	pressure	vessels.	
	
5.4.3 Distances	
	
Related	to	air	tanks:	
	
• The	filler	and	the	open	vent	of	the	tank	safety	valve	must	be	positioned	with	respect	
to:	
o Any	bay	in	an	inhabited	or	occupied	space	
o Any	opening	of	rooms	containing	fireplaces	or	other	bare	fires	
o Any	opening	of	premises	below	
o Any	sewer	outlet	not	protected	by	a	siphon	
o Any	deposition	of	combustible	materials	
	
• The	ownership	 limit	and	 the	public	 road,	at	a	distance	"d"	which	varies	according	 to	
the	 quantities	 stored.	When	 the	 stored	 quantity	 is	 at	most	 3500	 kg,	 the	 distance	 d	
must	be	at	 least	3	meters.	When	this	quantity	 is	greater	 than	3500	kg	and	not	more	
than	3500	kg,	the	distance	d	is	increased	to	5	meters.	
	
• With	respect	to	the	walls	of	liquid	or	liquefied	hydrocarbon	distribution	apparatus,	this	
distance	is	increased	by	1	meter.	
Risk	analysis	of	LPG	tanks	at	the	wildland-urban	interface	
	
Page	42	
	
	
Particular	dispositions:	
	
• Distance	d	may	be	 reduced	 to	1.50	meters	provided	 that	 the	open	vent	of	 the	valve	
and	that	of	the	filler	are	isolated	from	the	above	locations	by	a	solid	wall	constructed	
Fire-resistant	material	 of	 two-hour	 degree,	 the	 height	 of	 which	 exceeds	 that	 of	 the	
filling	mouth	and	 the	orifice	of	 the	 valve	by	0.50	meters,	 and	 the	 length	of	which	 is	
such	 that	 the	 horizontal	 projection	 of	 the	 actual	 path	 of	 the	 vapors	 Between	 the	
aforementioned	 orifices	 and	 the	 above-mentioned	 locations	 (except	 distribution	
points),	i.e.	at	least	3	meters,	if	the	stored	quantity	is	at	most	3500	kg	and	4	meters	if	it	
is	greater.	 	
	 	
These	 lengths	 are	 increased	by	 1	meter	 respectively	 for	 liquid	or	 liquefied	hydrocarbon	
distributors.	 In	all	cases,	a	clearance	of	at	 least	0.60	meters	must	be	 left	 laterally	around	the	
tank.	
	
• When	the	 filling	mouth	 is	offset	more	 than	 four	meters	 from	the	wall	of	 the	 tank,	 it	
may	be	2	meters	from	the	locations	listed.	It	may,	however,	be	installed	on	the	side	of	
the	public	thoroughfare	if	it	is	enclosed	in	an	incombustible	and	locked	box.		
	
Tanks	must	be	effectively	protected	from	external	corrosion	and	paint,	if	outdoor	propane	
tanks,	must	have	low	absorbency.	Faucets	and	fittings	must	be	protected	by	a	ventilated	grill	
or	cover	and	locked	if	the	tank	is	accessible	to	the	public.	
	
5.4.4 Equipment	
	
The	 tanks	 shall	 comprise:	 a	 double	 filling	 valve	 (or	 any	other	 device	offering	 equivalent	
safety),	a	 continuous	 level	gauge	and	a	device	 for	checking	 the	maximum	 level	of	 filling,	 the	
value	of	which	is	determined	by	the	distributing	company	(possibly	a	purge	device,	which	must	
be	offset	for	underground	tanks	or	with	a	dip	tube).	
	
The	exhaust	ports	of	the	valves	of	the	tanks	shall	be	equipped	with	an	ejectable	cap	(or	
equivalent	 device),	 the	 exhaust	 line	 of	 the	 valves	 shall	 be	 carried	 out	 from	 the	 bottom	
upwards,	without	encountering	any	obstacle,	and	in	particular	of	roof	protrusion.	
	
The	outlet	ports	for	use	in	liquid	and	gaseous	phases	must	be	equipped	with	an	automatic	
safety	device,	for	example	a	flow	restrictor,	placed	either	inside	the	tank	or	downstream	and	
as	close	as	possible	to	the	shut-off	valve;	The	latter	having	to	be	itself	located	in	the	immediate	
vicinity	of	the	reservoir.	If	a	remote	filling	terminal	is	used,	it	shall	have	at	its	inlet	a	double	flap	
or	other	device	offering	equivalent	safety.	
	
The	 constituent	 materials	 of	 the	 storage-dependent	 pipes,	 their	 dimensions	 and	 their	
method	of	assembly	must	be	chosen	so	as	to	ensure,	with	a	sufficient	safety	factor,	resistance	
to	 the	 mechanical,	 physical	 and	 chemical	 actions	 due	 to	 the	 products	 conveyed.	 The	
mechanical	 resistance	 and	 the	 tightness	 of	 all	 the	 piping	 systems	 must	 be	 tested,	 after	
assembly,	under	pressure.	
	
5.4.5 Fight	against	fire	
	
The	following	means	of	control	must	be	provided:	
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• A	 portable	 fire	 extinguisher	 approved	 N.	 F.	 MIH	 55	 B	 minimum	 4	 kg	 if	 the	 stored	
quantity	is	not	more	than	3500	kg	
• Two	fire	extinguishers	of	the	same	type	if	the	stored	quantity	is	greater	than	3500	kg	
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 overhead	 storage,	 fire	 extinguishers	 can	 be	 replaced	 by	 a	 water	 station	
(with	 hose	 and	 lance)	 with	 an	 easy	 access	 control	 valve.	 These	 provisions	 do	 not	 apply	 to	
depots	serving	residential	premises	or	their	dependencies	which	are	located	in	urbanized	areas	
equipped	with	a	public	fire	system.	
	
5.5 Portugal	
	
5.5.1 Related	Normative	and	Legislation	
	
Licensing	of	tanks	is	required	if	the	capacity	exceeds	1,200	liters	for	aerial	tanks	and	3,000	
liters	 for	buried	tanks.	 If	 the	 installation	capacity	 is	 less	 than	5,000	 liters,	 it	does	not	 require	
licensing,	 but	 it	 must	 always	 comply	 with	 the	 safety	 standards	 -	 Class	 B1.	 The	 safety	
regulations	are	as	follows:	
	
1. Decree	No.	36	270,	of	May	9,	1947	[30]	
2. Ordinance	nº	131/2002,	of	February	9	[31].		
	
In	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 license,	 the	 following	 is	 required:	 project	 elaboration,	 project	
approval,	installation	surveys	and	issuance	of	the	license	by	the	DGE	/	City	Hall.		
	
5.5.2 Product	classification	
	
The	Decree	No	36	270	exposes	that	regulated	products	can	be	classified	according	to	the	
safety	point	of	view	of	the	respective	installations	in	the	following	categories:	
	
• 1st	 category.	 Products	 whose	 gases	 or	 vapors	 form	 with	 air	 at	 ordinary	
temperature	 explosive	 mixtures:	 All	 petroleum	 products	 and	 the	 like	 having	 a	
flash	 point	 below	 25	 °C;	 Such	 as:	 crude	 oils,	 gases,	 gas,	 gasoline	 certain	
components	of	fuel	mixtures	when	they	have	a	flash	point	below	25	°C.	
• 2nd	category.	Flammable	products:	All	petroleum	derivatives	and	the	like	having	a	
flash	point	between	25	°C	and	65	°C.		
• 3rd	category.	Combustible	products:	All	petroleum	products	and	the	like	having	a	
flash	point	above	65	°C.	
	
According	to	their	visibility	(and	consequently	the	greater	their	vulnerability)	they	will	be	
classified	in:	
	
1. Superficial:	when	 they	are	 located	 sore	 the	 surface	of	 the	ground	and	 therefore	 can	
only	become	invisible	by	artifice	of	dissimulation.	
2. Underground:	when	placed	in	natural	or	artificial	cavities	and	hidden	by	their	situation	
to	aerial	observation.	
	
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 applying	 this	 regulation,	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 total	 capacity	 of	
installations	 containing	 products	 of	more	 than	 one	 category	 shall	 be	 carried	 out	 taking	 into	
account	the	following	values	for	storage	tanks:	
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1. Products	of	1st	category:	100%	of	its	useful	capacity.	
2. Products	of	2nd	category:	50%	of	its	useful	capacity.	
3. Products	of	3rd	category:	25%	of	its	useful	capacity.	
	
The	capacity	of	a	 tank	 is	defined	as	 the	actual	 capacity	of	 the	 tank	 reduced	by	2%.	The	
capacity	of	the	liquefied	petroleum	gas	reservoirs	and	warehouses	is	calculated	by	arbitrating	
200%	of	their	useful	and	maximum	capacity,	respectively.	
	
5.5.3 General	conditions	for	safety	
	
The	construction	and	operation	of	oil	storage	and	handling	facilities	and	their	derivatives	
is	not	permitted	when	the	following	locations	occur:	warehouse	or	inconvenient	dependencies	
in	relation	to	habitable	houses,	public	buildings,	etc;	in	areas	of	tourism	or	scientific,	historical	
or	 military	 interest;	 in	 bridges	 normally	 flooded	 in	 times	 of	 rain	 or	 winter	 or	 where	 the	
wastewater	 can	 come	 into	 contact	 with	 sea	 water,	 rivers,	 sources,	 etc;	 and	 on	 geological	
faults.	
	
Storage	or	handling	facilities	must	be	located	within	private	enclosures	with	a	separation	
of	 at	 least	 2.50	 m	 minimum	 height,	 counted	 from	 the	 level	 of	 the	 exterior	 terrain.	 This	
separation	shall	be	constructed	of	non-combustible	material	and	with	a	structure	that	ensures	
sufficient	protection	against	the	entry	of	foreign	persons	into	the	service	of	the	installation.	
	
When	 there	 are	 parts	 of	 separation	 that	 are	 in	 direct	 contact	 with	 public	 or	
communication	ways,	open	sea	or	waterways	and	canals,	military	 installations,	etc.	This	wall	
must	be	constructed	 in	such	a	way	as	 to	prevent	any	eventual	discharge	 into	 the	exterior	of	
the	liquids	existing	in	the	installation	and	in	case	of	explosion,	fire	or	breakage,	the	number	of	
doors	in	that	installation	will	be	absolutely	essential.	
	
The	installations	whose	total	capacity	of	the	deposits,	referring	to	products	of	1st	category,	
is	superior	to	1.5m3	must	have	in	all	its	periphery	an	access	way	and	that	allows	its	immediate	
defense	and	vigilance	 in	case	of	accident.	For	the	purposes	of	classification	of	precautions	 in	
regard	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 fire	 or	 explosion	 in	 facilities,	 the	 following	 areas	 of	 interest	 are	
distinguished:	
	
1. Areas	of	immediate	explosion	or	fire	hazard:	storage	rooms	or	handling	of	category	1	
and	 2.	 The	 immediate	 vicinity	 of	 the	 deposits	 up	 to	 a	 distance	 of	 10	 m	 from	 its	
periphery	for	products	of	1st	category.	All	the	space	around	the	exit	holes	of	the	gases	
or	vapors	of	the	products	of	1st	category	up	to	a	distance	of	10	m.	
2. Non-hazardous	areas.	
3. Protection	zones.	
	
5.5.4 Safety	distances	
	
Safety	distances	are	the	minimum	distances	at	which	the	various	parts	of	hazardous	areas	
of	the	 installations	must	be	between	them.	This	will	 take	 into	account	the	constructions,	the	
walls	of	limitation,	ways	of	communication,	etc.	
	
The	protection	distances	to	be	taken	into	account	are	as	follows:	
	
• The	distance	between	 two	 tanks	contained	within	 the	 same	 installation	 shall	
be	equal	to	or	greater	than	the	following	values:	for	products	of	1st	category,	
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half	of	the	largest	of	the	diameters	of	the	tanks	considered	contiguous	in	the	
installation.	The	minimum	distance	in	any	case	will	be	4	m.	
• The	 minimum	 distance	 between	 an	 installation	 and	 various	 constructions	
within	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 installation	 shall	 be	 20	 m	 for	 products	 of	 the	 first	
category.	 When	 the	 installation	 has	 a	 capacity	 of	 less	 than	 200	 m3,	 these	
distances	need	not	be	maintained,	and	 it	 is	very	necessary	that	 the	buildings	
are	located	outside	the	very	dangerous	areas.	
• The	minimum	distance	between	buildings	intended	for	operations	other	than	
the	installation	must	be	at	least	8	m	for	products	of	the	first	category.	
• The	sources	of	ignition	shall	be	at	least	25	meters	from	the	surface	tanks	and	
from	all	 inlets	or	outlets	of	 the	1st	 category	products,	 this	 being	a	measured	
distance	 on	 the	 line	 defining	 the	 shortest	 path.	When	 the	 installation	 has	 a	
capacity	of	less	than	25	m3,	these	distances	need	not	be	maintained,	and	it	is	
very	 necessary	 that	 the	 buildings	 are	 located	 outside	 the	 very	 dangerous	
areas.	
	
Garages	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 local	where	 fires	 can	 be	 produced,	 and	may	 be	 installed	
next	 to	 storage	 tanks	when	 they	have	a	capacity	of	 less	 than	25m3,	provided	all	appropriate	
safety	measures	are	taken.		
	
5.5.5 Construction	and	mounting	for	aerial	tanks	
	
For	an	aerial	tank,	the	characteristics	(schematized	in	Figure	21)	it	has	to	have	are:	
	
• The	plates	used	in	the	construction	of	the	tanks	must	be	of	the	appropriate	quality.		
• The	maximum	stress	in	these	plates	will	be	calculated	assuming	that	the	tank	is	full	of	
water	and	should	not	exceed	one-third	of	the	metal	breaking	limit	used.	
• The	design	shall	 take	 into	account	an	overload	of	at	 least	50	kg	per	m2,	according	to	
the	pressure	or	depression	to	which	they	are	subjected	in	their	operating	mode.	
• The	roofs	of	the	tanks	shall	be	constructed	less	resistant	than	the	other	parts	in	order	
to	be	the	first	to	give	in	case	of	explosion.	
• All	 entrance	 doors	 and	 holes	 in	 the	 tanks	 shall	 be	 closed	 by	 safety	 devices	 with	 a	
perfect	seal,	constructed	of	steel	or	bronze.	
• All	 holes	 in	 tanks	 shall	 be	 protected	 by	 appropriate	 devices	 preventing	 flame	
propagation.	
• All	tanks	of	products	of	1st	category	must	be	provided	by	the	accessories	required	for	
their	 safety	 conditions	 and	must	 work	 under	 pressure,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 those	
with	a	capacity	of	less	than	25m3.	
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Figure	21.	Aerial	tanks	distances	[15]	
	 The	main	recommendations	collected	by	the	regulation	related	to	aerial	tanks	are:	
	
• The	 reservoir,	 if	 constructed	of	plastic	material,	 should	not	be	under	direct	 light	or	near	
heat	sources.	
• The	tank	must	be	earthed.	
• Preferably,	there	must	be	a	ground	terminal	where	the	tank	car	can	be	switched	on	during	
the	filling	operation.	
• The	 reservoir	must	have	a	ventilation	 line	 (vent),	which	must	have	a	minimum	height	of	
4m,	counted	from	the	ground	level,	and	must	terminate	in	a	free	and	unimpeded	zone.	
• Where	necessary,	there	may	be	a	remote	supply,	so	that	the	tank	can	be	supplied	to	the	
tank	without	having	to	move	to	the	tank.	
• At	 the	 location	 of	 the	 tank,	 the	 boiler	 and	 the	 ventilation	 piping,	 there	must	 be:	 a	 dry	
chemical	powder	extinguisher	of	6	kg	for	fire	type	ABC	and	a	bucket	with	dry	sand.	
	
5.5.6 LPG	tank	installations	
	
This	 particular	 chapter	 applies	 to	 all	 storage	 and	 handling	 facilities	 for	 petroleum,	 by-
products	and	related	waste	having	a	vapor	pressure	of	more	than	1.5	kg	/cm2	at	25	°C.	
	
The	minimum	distance	between	two	LPG	tanks	will	be	of	4m	for	installations	of	less	than	
100	m3	of	capacity.	On	the	case	of	tanks	with	different	volume,	the	distances	comprised	will	be	
for	the	highest	volume	tank.	Valve	bodies	shall	be	made	of	steel	or	brass	and	the	joints	shall	be	
of	stainless	steel	or	brass.	
	
For	products	whose	boiling	points	are	above	10	°C,	they	shall	have	a	containment	wall	of	
40	 cm	maximum,	 forming	 a	 safety	 raft	which	may	 contain	 25%	 of	 their	 capacity.	 The	 tanks	
must	be	positioned	in	such	a	way	as	to	ensure	thermal	expansion.	These	shall	be	constructed	
of	non-combustible	materials	and	shall	be	fully	protected	at	10	and	17	hours	of	summer.	
	
The	 storage	 conditions	 shall	 always	 be	 estimated	 for	 a	 pressure	 never	 lower	 than	 the	
pressure	of	the	vapors	of	the	products	contained	at	the	following	temperatures:	
	
• Surface,	heat-insulated	or	sheltered:	45	°C	
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• Supercritical,	non-heat-emitting:	60	°C	
• Painted	aluminum	or	white:	50	°C	
	
For	any	of	the	calculations	the	pressure	cannot	be	less	than	7kg/cm2	for	the	aerial	tanks.		
	
5.5.7 Fight	against	fire	
	
In	the	extinction	of	fires	in	facilities	for	storage	or	manipulation	of	petroleum	products	will	
be	considered	mandatory:	
	
1. Water.	 The	water	distribution	network	used	will	be	 independent	of	 the	utility	water	
distribution	network.	The	numbers	of	valves	and	fire	hydrants	considered	suitable	for	
the	protection	of	the	installation	and	adjacent	buildings	will	be	introduced.		
2. Foam.	They	will	be	fixed	or	mobile,	using	an	emulsifier	that	acts	with	water,	releasing	
anhydrous	carbonic	or	other	non-combustible	product.	 In	 fixed	 installations	 it	will	be	
better	to	use	a	chemical	foam	extinguishing	system,	reserving	those	that	require	water	
as	a	portable	measure.	The	capacity	to	generate	a	foam	should	be	such	as	to	cover	the	
surface	 of	 the	 largest	 diameter	 reservoir	 exist	 with	 a	 foam	 height	 of	 0.40	m	with	 a	
response	time	of	10	minutes.	
3. Fire	 extinguishers.	 There	 must	 be	 for	 every	 100m2	 of	 surface	 a	 portable	 fire	
extinguisher	with	a	capacity	of	at	least	9	liters	(extinguisher	that	works	with	inert	gas).	
In	 non-hazardous	 areas	 of	 the	 installation	 the	 number	 of	 extinguishers	 may	 be	
reduced	by	half.	Where	there	are	electronic	devices,	there	must	be	at	least	two	non-
conducting	fluid	extinguishers.	
4. Sand.	 There	must	 be	 sand	 sites	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 1	m3	 of	 sand	 per	 2500m2	 of	 uncovered	
surface,	and	there	must	be	enough	sand	buckets	inside	the	buildings	where	flammable	
or	combustible	products	are	stored.	
	
5.6 Comparative	Table	
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Table	9.	Comparative	legislation	table	I	[2],	[3],	[7],	[12],	[14],	[28],	[29]	
	 Spain	 Portugal	 France	 Italy	
Normative	
&Regulations	
• Real	Decree	919/2006,	
of	28	July	
• IT-ICG	03	
• AENOR	60250:2008	
	
• Decree	No.	36	270,	of	May	
9,	1947	
• Ordinance	nº	131/2002,	of	
February	9	
	
• Decree	of	30	July	1979	
• Decree	of	18	January	1943	
• Approval	of	the	technical	regulation	of	
fire	prevention	for	the	installation	and	
operation	of	liquefied	petroleum	gas	
deposits	with	a	total	capacity	not	
exceeding	13	m3	(2014)	
Purpose	
‘’Establish	the	criteria	for	
the	design,	construction,	
mounting	and	exploitation	
of	LPG	installations	by	fixed	
deposits	with	a	geometry	
capacity	equal	or	less	than	
2000	m3.’’	
‘’Establish	the	safety	conditions	
to	be	met	by	the	construction	
and	operation	of	filling	stations	
for	gasoline,	diesel	and	LPG	for	
the	supply	of	road	vehicles,	
vessels	or	aircraft	and	supply	
stations	for	own,	public	and	
cooperative	consumption.’’	
‘’These	rules	shall	apply	to	storages	of	
liquefied	hydrocarbons	consisting	of	one	or	
more	fixed	tanks	or	containers	connected	to	
a	use	facility,	the	nominal	storage	capacity	of	
which	is	less	than	or	equal	to	the	
classification	threshold	for	installations	
classified	for	protection	of	the	environment	
and	that	are	located	outside	the	right	of	way	
of	the	buildings	receiving	the	public.’’	
‘’Establish	the	purposes	of	fire	
prevention	and	safety	for	the	protection	of	
people	and	the	protection	of	property	
against	fire	risks,	the	G.P.L.	deposits	with	
total	capacity	up	to	13	m3	are	installed	and	
managed	in	order	to	ensure	the	
achievement	of	objectives.’’	
 
Definition	of	aerial	
tank	
‘’Tank	where	the	surface	is	
in	contact	with	air	and	its	
lower	part	is	higher	than	
surrounding	floor.’’	
‘’A	tank	located	sore	the	surface	
of	the	ground	and	therefore	can	
only	become	invisible	by	artifice	
of	dissimulation.’’	
	
‘’It	is	said	to	be	aerial	when	the	tank	is	placed	
in	open	air,	under	a	shelter	or	in	an	open	
space’’.	
	
Not	included	specifically	(considered	
opposite	definition	of	a	buried	tank):	‘’A	
Fixed	tank	is	a	pressure	vessel	intended	to	
contain	liquefied	petroleum	gas,	stably	
installed	in	the	ground	and	stably	
connected	to	the	distribution	system’’.	
Main	parts	
of	the	installation	
• Charging	port	
• Tank	and	its	accessories	
• Piping	between	the	
charging	port	and	the	
outlet	valves	
• Transfer	equipment,	
vaporization,	regulation	
and	control	devices	
	
Same	as	Spain	
	
• A	double	filling	valve	
• A	continuous	level	gauge	
• A	device	for	checking	the	maximum	level	
of	filling	
	
Same	as	Spain	and	Portugal	
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Table	10.	Comparative	legislation	table	II	[2],	[3],	[7],	[12],	[14],	[28],	[29]	
	 Spain	 Portugal	 France	 Italy	
Safety	
distances	
A-1:	 1,5m	 (D0),	
1,0m	(Dp)	
A-5:	 3,0m	 (D0),	
2,0m	(Dp	)	
	
+	TABLE	8	
The	minimum	distances	 between	 the	 LPG	 supply	
unit	and	any	buildings,	reservoirs,	equipment	and	
the	 limit	 of	 the	 property	 on	 which	 the	 filling	
station	is	situated	shall	be	equal	to	or	greater	than	
the	following:	
	
A. An	integrated	building:	5	m.	
B. At	the	property	limit:	7	m.	
C. To	a	building	occupied	or	inhabited:	10	m.	
D. To	a	building	that	receives	public:	17	m.	
E. To	sensitive	areas:	40	m.	
F. To	the	wall	of	a	surface	oil	tank:	4	m;	
G. To	 the	 wall	 of	 a	 buried	 tank	 of	 gasoline	 or	
diesel	fuel:	3	m.	
H. To	the	filling	nozzle	of	surface	oil	 reservoir:	5	
m.	
I. To	the	filling	nozzle	for	gasoline	or	diesel	oil:	4	
m.	
 
+5.5.4	+	Figure	17	
The	 ownership	 limit	 and	 the	 public	 road,	 at	 a	 distance	 which	
varies	according	to	the	quantities	stored:	
• Stored	quantity	is	at	most	3500	kg,	the	distance	d	must	be	at	
least	3m.	
• When	 this	 quantity	 is	 greater	 than	 3500	 kg	 the	 distance	 is	
increased	to	5m.	
	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 walls	 of	 liquid	 or	 liquefied	 hydrocarbon	
distribution	apparatus,	this	distance	is	increased	by	1	meter.	
	
• Distance	d	may	be	reduced	to	1.50	meters	provided	that	the	
open	vent	of	the	valve	and	that	of	the	filler	are	isolated	from	
the	above	locations	by	a	fire	resistant	wall.	
 
These	lengths	are	increased	by	1	meter	respectively	for	 liquid	or	
liquefied	hydrocarbon	distributors.	
	
In	 all	 cases,	 a	 clearance	 of	 at	 least	 0.60	 meters	 must	 be	 left	
laterally	around	the	tank.	
	
• When	the	filling	mouth	is	offset	more	than	four	meters	from	
the	wall	 of	 the	 tank,	 it	may	be	2	meters	 from	 the	 locations	
listed.	It	may,	however,	be	installed	on	the	side	of	the	public	
thoroughfare	if	it	is	enclosed	in	an	incombustible	and	locked	
box.	
Figure	24	
	
For	 more	 specified	 values,	
4.3.5:	
	
1) Capacity	 for	 deposits	 up	
to	0.3	m3:	1.5	m.	
2) For	 deposits	 of	 greater	
capacity	of	0.3	m³	and	up	
to	5	m³:	3	m.	
3) Capacitance	 deposits	
over	5	m3	to	13	m3:	6	m.	
	
The	distances	can	be	reduced	
by	 up	 to	 half	 in	 accordance	
with	 the	 previous	 point.	 In	
case	 of	 interposition	 of	 the	
wall,	 the	 latter	may	 coincide	
with	the	wall	of	the	property	
boundary.	
	
5.3.5	+	5.3.6	
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Table	11.	Comparative	table	legislation	III	[2],	[3],	[7],	[12],	[14],	[28],	[29]	
	 Spain	 Portugal	 France	 Italy	
Operation	conditions	
Maximum	 level	 of	 liquid	 is:	 85%	 of	 the	
geometric	capacity	of	the	tank	at	20°C.	
	
Volume	 less	 than	 7m3:	 20	 bar	 pressure	
design.	
The	 storage	 conditions	
shall	always	be	estimated	for	a	
pressure	never	lower	than	the	
pressure	 of	 the	 vapors	 of	 the	
products	contained:	
• Surface,	 heat-insulated	 or	
sheltered:	45°C	
• Supercritical,	 non-heat-
emitting:	60°C	
• Painted	 aluminum	 or	
white:	50°C	
The	 pressure	 cannot	 be	
less	 than	 7kg/cm2	 for	 the	
aerial	tanks.	
Maximum	 level	of	 liquid	 is	 85%	
of	the	geometric	capacity	of	the	
tank	at	20°C	
	
Maximum	 level	of	 liquid	 is	85%	of	 the	geometric	
capacity	of	the	tank	at	20°C	
Key	points	related	
with	vegetation	
No	 reference	 to	 any	 vegetables	 or	
plants	 and	 trees	 around	 the	 LPG	
installation.	
	
Specific	 reference	 to	
vegetable	 and	 combustible	
substances.	 No	 combustible	
materials	 could	 be	 inside	 the	
limits	of	the	installation	
Specific	 reference	 to	 vegetable	
and	 combustible	 substances.	 A	
distance	of	3	m	above	 the	 tank	
must	 be	 applied	 in	 order	 to	
achieve	 the	 Normative	
requirements.	
Specific	 reference	 the	 vegetable	 walls:	 the	
protection	 shall	 be	 deemed	 equivalent	 if	 it	
consists	of	a	 structure	 that	 is	a	non-combustible	
enclose.	
 
The	 aerial	 tanks	must	 be	 surrounded	 by	 an	
area,	 having	 amplitude	 not	 less	 than	 5m,	
completely	clear	and	devoid	of	vegetation.	 If	 this	
distance	 cannot	 be	 met,	 the	 base	 of	 the	 wire	
mesh,	it	will	be	constituted	by	a	high	wall	at	least	
0.5	 m.	 For	 the	 underground	 tanks	 is	 prohibited	
the	presence	of	tall	trees	for	a	radius	of	5	m	from	
the	boundary	of	the	reservoir.	
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Table	12.	Comparative	legislation	IV	[2],	[3],	[7],	[12],	[14],	[28],	[29]	
	 Spain	 Portugal	 France	 Italy	
Safety	against	fire	
V≤	1	m3:	not	necessary	
1<V≤	 5	m3:	 Extinguish	material	 or	
water	at	a	distances	less	than	15	m	
	
Fire	 extinguishers	 must	 be	
dry	 chemical	 dust,	 portable	 or	 on	
wheels.	A-5	must	have	at	least	two	
fire	 extinguishers	 and	 2.5	 kg	 of	
powder	 dry	 chemical	 per	 cubic	
meter	 per	 hour	 of	 transfer	
capacity.	
	
Installations	 that	do	not	have	
an	 external	 water	 supply	 must	 be	
provided	 with	 storage	 tanks	 and	
pumping	 means	 that	 allow	 the	
mains	operation	 for	1	h	30	min	at	
the	set	pressure	and	flow	rates.	
	
• Water.	
• Foam.	 The	 capacity	 to	 generate	 a	
foam	 should	 be	 such	 as	 to	 cover	
the	surface	of	the	largest	diameter	
reservoir	 exist	 with	 a	 foam	 height	
of	0.40	m	with	a	 response	 time	of	
10	minutes.	
• Fire	 extinguishers:	 for	 every	
100m2	 of	 surface	 a	 portable	
extinguisher	 with	 a	 capacity	 of	 at	
least	 9	 liters.	 In	 non-hazardous	
areas	 may	 be	 reduced	 by	 half.	
Where	 there	 are	 electronic	
devices,	there	must	be	at	least	two	
non-conducting	fluid	extinguishers.	
• Sand.	 There	must	be	 sand	 sites	 at	
a	rate	of	1	m3	of	sand	per	2500m2	
of	uncovered	surface.	
The	 following	 means	 of	 control	
must	be	provided:	
	
• A	 portable	 fire	 extinguisher	
minimum	 4	 kg	 if	 the	 stored	
quantity	is	not	more	than	3500	kg	
• Two	fire	extinguishers	of	the	same	
type	 if	 the	 stored	 quantity	 is	
greater	than	3500	kg	
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 overhead	 storage,	
fire	extinguishers	can	be	replaced	by	a	
water	 station	 (with	 hose	 and	 lance)	
with	an	easy	access	control	valve.	
	
	
At	 least	two	portable	fire	extinguishers	
shall	 be	 kept	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 the	 tank	
with	 a	 minimum	 charge	 of	 4	 kg	 and	
capacity	up	to	5	m³.		
	
Deposits	 above	 5	 m³	 must	 have	 a	
minimum	 charge	 of	 6	 kg	 and	
extinguishing	 capacity	 of	 not	 less	 than	
21A	 113B-C.	 For	 deposits	 up	 to	 0.3	m³,	
only	 one	 fire	 extinguisher	 with	 a	
minimum	 charge	 of	 4	 kg	 and	 an	
extinguishing	 capacity	 of	 not	 less	 than	
13	°	89B-C	shall	be	kept.	
	
Aerial	 tanks	 with	 a	 capacity	 of	 more	
than	 5	 m³	 shall	 be	 protected	 with	 at	
least	 one	 DN	 25	 horn	 and	 powered	 by	
aqueducts	 or	 by	 a	 suitable	 water	
reserve,	 capable	 of	 ensuring	 the	
following	 hydraulic	 performance:	 Less	
than	 60	 l	 /	 min;	 Residual	 pressure	 at	
least	 2	 bar;	 Autonomy	 at	 least	 30	
minutes	early.	
	
	
	
	
Risk	analysis	of	LPG	tanks	at	the	wildland-urban	interface	
	
Page	52	
	
Wall	specifications	
	
	
At	 the	 location	 of	 the	 tanks	
and	 equipment	 there	 must	 be	 a	
minimum	2	m	high	 enclosure	 that	
can	 be	 of	 metallic	 mesh	 or	 any	
other	 similar	 system	 of	 class	 M1,	
which	 allows	 good	 ventilation	 and	
prevents	 the	 access	 of	 people	
outside	 the	 building.	 If	 this	
enclosure	 is	 fitted	with	 a	 base,	 its	
height	 should	 not	 exceed	 30	 cm.	
The	 doors	 of	 the	 enclosures	 must	
open	 to	 the	 outside,	 they	 must	
also	 be	 of	 class	 M1,	 and	 the	
fastenings	 must	 be	 of	 quick	 drive	
from	 the	 interior	 without	 needing	
to	use	keys.		
	
The	 use	 of	 walls,	 blind	 walls	 or	
screens	 regulated	 can	 be	
considered	 as	 enclosure,	
supplemented	 with	 wire	 mesh	 or	
similar	 system	 to	 reach	 the	height	
of	2	m.		
Storage	or	handling	facilities	must	
be	 located	 within	 private	 enclosures	
with	 a	 separation	 of	 at	 least	 2.50	 m	
minimum	 height,	 counted	 from	 the	
level	 of	 the	 exterior	 terrain.	 This	
separation	shall	be	constructed	of	non-
combustible	material.	
	
• This	 wall	 must	 be	 constructed	 in	
such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 prevent	 any	
eventual	 discharge	 into	 the	
exterior	 of	 the	 liquids	 existing	 in	
the	 installation	 and	 in	 case	 of	
explosion,	 fire	 or	 breakage,	 the	
number	 of	 doors	 in	 that	
installation	 will	 be	 absolutely	
essential	
It	must	be	a	solid	wall	constructed	
with	 a	 fire-resistant	 material	 of	 two-
hour	 degree.	 The	 height	 of	 which	
exceeds	 that	 of	 the	 filling	 mouth	 and	
the	orifice	of	the	valve	by	0.50	meters,	
and	the	length	of	which	is	such	that	the	
horizontal	projection	of	the	actual	path	
of	 the	 vapors	 between	 the	
aforementioned	orifices.	
Specific	paragraph	for	fences.	
	
Between	the	dangerous	elements	of	the	
deposit	and	the	fence	must	be	observed	
a	minimum	distance	of	1	m.	
	
For	 deposits	 of	 residential	
complexes	service,	at	most	four	families,	
the	fence	is	not	necessary	provided	that	
the	 tanks	 are	 installed	 on	 private	
property.	
	
In	cases	where	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	
install	 on	 the	 tanks	 of	 the	 filling	 point,	
this	 can	be	 located	 in	 another	position,	
devoid	of	 fence,	 in	accordance	with	the	
distances	referred	previously.	
	
The	 reservoir	 coated	 can	 be	
protected,	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	
fence,	 using	 a	 special	 structure	 in	
concrete,	 even	 prefabricated,	 whose	
attractive	 superior	 walls	 of	 at	 least	 0.5	
m	from	the	tank	walls.	
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6. Study	case	
 
6.1 Introduction		
	
Once	 the	 situation	 relative	 to	 the	 existing	 problem	 with	 WUI	 fire	 in	 contact	 with	 LPG	
facilities	is	exposed,	different	scenarios	will	be	generated	according	to	several	variables.	To	do	
this,	 it	 is	going	to	be	studied	the	 influence	of	variables	such	as	the	direction	of	the	wind	and	
the	distance	of	this	vegetation	to	the	tank	itself.		
	
For	 the	 development	 of	 the	 simulation	 scenarios,	 the	 vegetation	 mass,	 as	 an	 existing	
problem	for	safety	in	LPG	facilities,	will	be	the	generator	of	the	fire	and	it	will	be	represented	
by	finite	and	solid	elements	with	a	fixed	fire	curve.	The	main	objective	of	this	study	is,	with	a	
fixed	tank	of	designed	dimension,	relate	the	influence	in	its	performance	with	the	variables	of	
study	(wind	velocity	and	separation	between	the	shrubs	as	a	flammable	element	to	the	tank).	
Parameters	as	the	radiative	heat	flux	emitted	by	the	fire,	the	temperature	in	the	surface,	the	
temperature	 inside	the	wall	and	the	temperature	 inside	the	tank	will	be	exposed	 in	order	to	
characterize	the	scenarios.		
	
Using	FDS	(Fire	Dynamics	Simulator)	CFD	simulation	tool,	temperature	and	radiation	heat	
emitted	 by	 the	 fire	 on	 the	 surface	 of	 the	 tank	will	 be	 investigated	 during	 a	 40	 seconds	 fire	
(residence	time	of	typical	ornamental	vegetation).	
	
Taking	 into	 account	 the	 scenarios	 set-up	 and	 the	 results	 obtained,	 safety	 criteria	 and	
dangerousness	of	these	situations	will	be	discussed.	
	
	
6.2 Fire	Dynamic	Simulator	(FDS)	
	
6.2.1 Introduction	
	
Fire	Dynamics	Simulator	(FDS)	is	a	computational	fluid	dynamics	(CFD)	simulation	of	fire-
driven	fluid	flow	developed	by	NIST	(National	Institute	of	Standards	and	Technology)	[33].	CFD	
typically	divides	the	space	of	 interest	 into	a	 large	number	of	discreet	3D	control	volumes	for	
which	the	fundamental	equations	governing	the	conservation	of	mass,	species,	 temperature,	
velocity	and	density	are	solved.	The	FDS	model	numerically	solves	a	form	of	the	Navies-Stokes	
equations	appropriate	 for	 low-speed,	 thermally-driven	 flow	with	an	emphasis	on	 smoke	and	
heat	 transport	 from	 fires.	 the	 default	 computational	 mode	 uses	 the	 Smagorinsky	 form	 of	
Large-Eddy	 Simulation	 (LES)	 technique	 to	 solve	 large	 scale	 hydrodynamic	 turbulence,	 a	
condition	that	typically	occurs	in	fires.	The	current	version	of	FDS	is	6.5.3	released	on	2017.	
	
FDS	requires	an	 input	file	 for	each	fire	scenario	 in	a	simple	text	 format	to	represent	the	
building	 geometry,	 materials	 specification,	 computational	 scope,	 grid	 resolution,	 boundary	
conditions,	 design	 fire	 and	 energy	 source	 parameters,	 and	 specifications	 of	 fire	 safety	 and	
mechanical	systems,	as	well	as	the	simulation	output	types	[30].	
	
The	FDS	computational	domain	is	user	defined	and	usually	represents	the	overall	physical	
bounding	box	enclosing	a	building	or	zone	of	interest.	The	computational	domain	is	made	up	
of	 one	 or	 more	 rectangular	 meshes,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 3D	 rectilinear	 grid	 system.	 The	
resolution	of	the	grid	is	also	user	specified	in	the	input	file,	but	the	grid	dimensions	must	meet	
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the	criteria	for	the	Poisson	solver.	All	solid	obstructions	and	voids	are	forced	to	conform	to	the	
numerical	grids	[30].	
	
As	 it	was	mentioned,	 creating	 the	 input	 geometry	 for	 FDS	 simulations	 is	 a	 complicated,	
laborious	and	time-consuming	process	especially	for	complex	models	with	several	complicated	
components.	Nowadays,	several	advanced	graphical	user	interfaces	(GUI)	are	available.		
	
On	this	case,	PyroSim	 is	a	GUI	developed	by	Thunderhead	Engineering	Consultants,	 Inc.,	
USA	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 preparation	 of	 inputs	 for	 FDS	 simulations.	 The	 main	 functions	 of	
PyroSim	cover	an	interactive	creation	of	complex	models	(the	use	of	ground	plans,	creation	of	
multiple	repetitious	objects,	curved	walls,	etc.),	import	of	existing	input	FDS	files,	PyroSim	files	
and	CAD	files.	PyroSim	enables	importing	a	ground	plan,	saving	it	as	a	background	image	and	
displaying	 it	 in	 its	 2D	 or	 3D	 view	 modes.	 The	 background	 image	 scale	 can	 be	 modified	 to	
correspond	 to	 the	 computational	 mesh	 chosen	 for	 intended	 FDS	 simulation.	 This	 feature	
greatly	facilitates	the	creation	of	geometry	of	complicated	models.	In	the	2D	view	mode,	there	
are	 several	 useful	 tools	 for	 creating	 the	 basic	 elements	 and	 their	 combinations,	 which	
represent	the	input	FDS	geometry	of	objects	appearing	in	buildings	[31].	The	current	PyroSim	
version	includes	FDS	and	allows	to	run	FDS	simulations.	
 
6.2.2 FDS	inputs	
 
The	 creation	 of	 the	 FDS	 input	 file	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 fire	 modelling	 process	 and	 requires	
varying	 degrees	 of	 manual	 input	 and	 editing	 particularly	 when	 considering	 multiple	 fire	
scenarios.	Generally,	the	most	time	consuming	part	of	the	input	data	creation	is	the	transfer	of	
SOLID	 geometry	 information	 from	 paper	 or	 CAD	 drawings	 to	 the	 format	 required	 by	 FDS.	
However,	these	tools	require	the	reconstruction	of	the	building	in	one	form	or	another,	using	
information	derived	from	printed	plans	or	CAD	files.	
	
It	 can	 also	 incorporate	 a	 set	 of	 pre-defined	 FDS	 input	 parameters	 such	 as	 the	
computational	domain	and	grid	sizes,	selected	surface	materials,	prescribed	fire	source,	etc.	To	
assist	with	the	construction	of	the	3D	building	model	similar	to	the	obstruction	blocks	in	FDS,	a	
2D	 image	of	 the	 building	 plan	 can	be	overlaid	 on	 the	 graphics	 editor	 screen	 to	 allow	 three-
dimensional	wall	elements	to	be	manually	positioned	by	tracing	over	the	lines	[30].	
	
6.2.3 FDS	outputs	
 
The	 simulation	 outputs	 from	 FDS	 can	 be	 visualized	 graphically	 in	 an	 interactive	 3D	
environment	 using	 an	 application	 called	 SmokeView.	 FDS	 can	 produce	 graphical	 output	 files	
containing	the	3D	model	geometry,	animated	quantities	per	unit	time,	as	well	as	static	pictures	
of	the	flow	field	in	Plot3D	format	which	can	be	accessed	and	visualized	using	SmokeView.	The	
type	 of	 output	 quantities	 includes	 also	 space	 and	 boundary	 conditions	 such	 as	 the	
temperature	profile,	heat	flux	and	mass	flow	rate,	the	history	of	heat	release	rates,	the	levels	
of	oxygen,	carbon	dioxide	and	carbon	monoxide,	and	other	combustion	products	as	variables	
to	be	studied,	including	its	variation	during	the	scenario	resolution	(Excel	output	files).		
	
6.3 Design	of	experiments	
 
An	LPG	 storage	 tank	 impacted	by	 flames	 from	ornamental	 vegetation	will	 be	 studied	 in	
different	conditions,	according	to	differences	 in	wind	and	separation	distances.	The	variables	
under	study	will	be	the	temperatures	reached	by	the	system	and	heat	flow	on	the	surface	of	
the	tank.	
Risk	analysis	of	LPG	tanks	at	the	wildland-urban	interface	
	
Page	55	
	
	
To	do	so,	using	a	series	of	assumptions,	a	base	and	simplified	scenario	will	be	simulated	in	
which	a	LPG	tank	filled	to	30%	(simplified	and	simulated	as	a	solid	block	part	of	the	tank)	of	its	
capacity	will	be	subjected	to	thermal	radiation	coming	from	a	front	of	burning	shrubs	located	
in	its	vicinity.	The	dimensions	of	the	tank	are	1.0	m	diameter	x	1.9	m	long,	with	a	total	volume	
of	 1.50	 m3.	 (Figure	 22)	 Concerning	 the	 components	 of	 the	 system,	 the	 steel,	 which	 it	 can	
support	 strong	 efforts,	 is	 the	 main	 component	 of	 the	 tank	 and	 the	 one	 considered	 in	 the	
design.	
	
 
Figure	22.	Tank	modelling	
For	 the	 generation	of	 the	different	 scenarios,	 a	 specific	 fire	 curve	has	been	 introduced.	
For	the	measurement	of	the	various	heat	flows	and	temperatures,	several	meters	have	been	
installed	in	the	tank	at	3	different	heights	and	at	different	thicknesses	of	the	tank:	one	on	the	
outside,	another	in	the	middle	of	the	tank	wall,	and	another	one	on	the	inner	wall.	The	main	
variables	to	analyze	in	all	cases	will	be	the	temperatures	and	the	heat	flux	in	the	LPG	tank.	
	
For	 the	 simulation	 of	 the	 burning	 vegetation,	 22	 rectangular	 elements	 with	 fixed	
dimensions	will	be	used	at	a	distance	of	0.8	m	(Figure	23).		
	
 
Figure	23.	Scenario	Construction	
 
For	 this,	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 enormous	 variability	 of	 conditions	 that	 could	 be	
assumed,	 tank	dimensions	and	height	of	 shrubs	will	 be	 fixed,	 so	 that	 the	different	 scenarios	
are	comparable	to	each	other.	One	of	the	main	variables	to	be	set	will	be	the	wind	profile.	The	
three	 main	 scenarios	 will	 be	 presented	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 considerations	 indicated	
previously	 and	 attending	 to	 the	 computational	 speed	 of	 the	 simulator,	 generating	 three	
different	responses	according	the	wind	velocities:	
	
• Scenario	1	(FS1):	0	m/s	wind	
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• Scenario	2	(FS2):	1	m/s	wind	
• Scenario	3	(FS3):	3	m/s	wind	
	
Once	the	profiles	and	data	obtained	from	these	three	scenarios	are	analyzed,	 the	worst	
scenario	 will	 be	 selected	 according	 to	 the	 temperatures	 and	 two	 new	 scenarios	 will	 be	
simulated	 considering	 two	 different	 distances	 between	 the	 shrub	 and	 the	 LPG	 tank.	 These	
distances	 will	 be	 those	 proposed	 by	 the	 legislation	 for	 those	 mentioned	 countries	 that	
contemplate	the	permissibility	of	a	shrub	or	vegetal	mass	next	to	a	LPG	tank:	
	
• Scenario	4	(FS4):	0.75	m	shrub	from	LPG	tank	
• Scenario	5	(FS5):	1.5	m	shrub	from	LPG	tank	
	
	In	 this	way,	 it	will	be	possible	 to	compare	the	effects	 that	 the	 fire	can	cause	and	try	 to	
conclude	whether	these	distances	are	adequate	or	if	other	considerations	should	be	taken	into	
account	in	a	wildland-urban	interfaces	fire.	
	
FDS	codes	for	each	of	the	scenarios	can	be	consulted	in	the	Annex.	
	
6.4 FDS	settings	
	
The	volume	modelled	was	divided	in	five	different	meshes	(according	next	Figure	24)	with	
different	cell	sizes	according	to	FDS	specifications.		
	
 
Figure	24.	Mesh	scenario	
• Mesh	1	
 
Table	13.	Mesh	1	definition	
Mesh	
Boundary:	
Min	X:	0.87	m	 Min	Y:	-2.0	m	 Min	Z:	0.0	m	 	
Max	X:	1.02	m	 Max	Y:	1.4	m	 Max	Z:	2.2	m	 	
X	Cells:	15	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1	 	 	 	
Y	Cells:	68	 Cell	Size	ratio:	5	 Cell	size	(m):	 0.01x	0.05x	0.01	 	
Z	Cells:	220	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1	 Number	of	cells	for	mesh:	 224,400	
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Figure	25.	Mesh	1	
• Mesh	2:	
Table	14.	Mesh	2	definition	
Mesh	
Boundary:	
Min	X:	0.00	m	 Min	Y:	-2.0	m	 Min	Z:	0.0	m	 	
Max	X:	0.51	m	 Max	Y:	1.4	m	 Max	Z:	1.08	m	 	
X	Cells:	85	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1	 	 	 	
Y	Cells:	34	 Cell	Size	ratio:	16.67	 Cell	size	(m):	 0.006x	0.1x	0.010	 	
Z	Cells:	108	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1.67	 Number	of	cells	for	mesh:	 312,120	
 
 
Figure	26.	Mesh	2	
• Mesh	3:	
Table	15.	Mesh	3	definition	
Mesh	
Boundary:	
Min	X:	-0.57	m	 Min	Y:	-2.0	m	 Min	Z:	0.0	m	 	
Max	X:	0.00	m	 Max	Y:	1.4	m	 Max	Z:	1.08	m	 	
X	Cells:	57	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1.0	 	 	 	
Y	Cells:	34	 Cell	Size	ratio:	10.0	 Cell	size	(m):	 0.01x	0.1x	0.01	 	
Z	Cells:	108	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1.0	 Number	of	cells	for	mesh:	 209,304	
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Figure	27.	Mesh	3	
• Mesh	4:	
Table	16.	Mesh	4	definition	
Mesh	
Boundary:	
Min	X:	-0.57	m	 Min	Y:	-2.0	m	 Min	Z:	0.0	m	 	
Max	X:	0.00	m	 Max	Y:	1.4	m	 Max	Z:	1.08	m	 	
X	Cells:	57	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1.0	 	 	 	
Y	Cells:	34	 Cell	Size	ratio:	10.0	 Cell	size	(m):	 0.01x	0.1x	0.01	 	
Z	Cells:	108	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1.0	 Number	of	cells	for	mesh:	 209,304	
 
 
Figure	28.	Mesh	4	
• Mesh	5:	
Table	17.	Mesh	5	definition	
Mesh	
Boundary:	
Min	X:	-0.57	m	 Min	Y:	-2.0	m	 Min	Z:	1.08	m	 	
Max	X:	0.51	m	 Max	Y:	1.4	m	 Max	Z:	2.2	m	 	
X	Cells:	36	 Cell	Size	ratio:	3.0	 	 	 	
Y	Cells:	34	 Cell	Size	ratio:	10.0	 Cell	size	(m):	 0.03x	0.1x	0.01	 	
Z	Cells:	112	 Cell	Size	ratio:	1.0	 Number	of	cells	for	mesh:	 137,088	
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Figure	29.	Mesh	5	
The	 solid	 phase	was	modelled	by	 using	 the	 simple	 pyrolysis	model	while	 the	 gas	 phase	
combustion	was	described	by	employing	the	single	chemistry	mixing-controlled	approach.	This	
combustion	method	assumes	an	infinitely	fast	reaction	of	fuel	and	oxygen	and	only	allows	one	
single	 gaseous	 fuel	 resulting	 from	 the	 combustion	 process.	 For	 simplification,	 polyethylene	
(PE)	was	selected	as	the	main	fuel	of	the	reaction	of	combustion	(Table	18). 
 
Table	18.	Reaction	characteristics	[36]	
Parameter	 Polyethylene	
Formula	 C2H4	
CO	yield	(kg/kg)	 0.042	
Soot	yield	(kg/kg)	 0.198	
Heat	of	combustion	(kJ/kg)	 38,400	
Critical	Flame	Temperature	(°C)	 1327,0	
	
First	 of	 all,	 various	 measurement	 points,	 by	 which	 we	 obtained	 the	 punctual	 time	
evolution	of	 the	 three	selected	variables,	were	 located	at	different	heights	over	 the	stepped	
surface	 (as	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 on	 the	 Figure	 30	 and	 Table	 19).	 Finally,	 the	 temperatures	 (wall	
temperature	tanks	surface,	wall	temperature	inside	tanks	surface	and	temperature	inside	the	
tank),	the	thermal	flux	at	the	tank	surface	were	quantified.	Then,	diverse	slice	files,	which	are	
able	 to	 graphically	 represent	 the	 time	 evolution	 of	 the	 variables	 of	 interest	 in	 a	 particular	
plane,	were	horizontally	located	at	the	heights	stated	before.		
	
Figure	30.	Measurement	device	
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Table	19.	Measurement	Devices	List	
Measurement	Device	name	 Height	(m)	Y	Plane	 Out/	Middle/	In	
WT_360_Up	 0.85	 Out	
WT_354cm_Up	 0.85	 Middle	
T_342cm_Up	 0.85	 In	
Qnet_360cm_Up	 0.85	 Out	
Qnet_354cm_Up	 0.85	 Middle	
Qrad_360cm_Up	 0.85	 Out	
Qrad_354cm_Up	 0.85	 Middle	
WT_498cm_Middle	 0.50	 Out	
WT_492cm_Middle	 0.50	 Middle	
T_480cm_	Middle	 0.50	 In	
Qnet_498cm_	Middle	 0.50	 Out	
Qnet_492cm_	Middle	 0.50	 Middle	
Qrad_498cm_	Middle	 0.50	 Out	
Qnet_492cm_	Middle	 0.50	 Middle	
WT_360cm_Down	 0.15	 Out	
WT_354cm_	Down	 0.15	 Middle	
T_342cm_	Down	 0.15	 In	
Qnet_360cm_	Down	 0.15	 Out	
Qnet_354cm_	Down	 0.15	 Middle	
Qrad_360cm_	Down	 0.15	 Out	
Qnet_354cm_	Down	 0.15	 Middle	
P_Up	 0.85	 In	
P_Middle	 0.6	 In	
P_Down	 0.35	 In	
 
 
The	fire	origin,	which	was	located	on	the	shrubs	represented	by	the	rectangular	forms	as	
it	 could	 be	observed	 in	Figure	 31,	was	 simulated	by	using	 the	 simple	pyrolysis	model	which	
requires	the	HRR.	To	take	into	account	the	heat	 losses	and	its	 influence	on	fire	behavior,	the	
tank	material’s	thermal	properties	were	defined	according	to	data	given	by	FDS:	
	
Table	20.	Steel	properties	FDS	simulator	
Parameter	 Steel	
Specific	heat	(kJ/kg·K)	 0.46	
Conductivity	(W/m·K)	 45.8	
Density	(kg/m3)	 7,850	
Emissivity	 0.95	
Heat	Release	Rate	per	Area	(HRRPUA)	(kW/m2)	 1000,0	
Wall	thickness	(m)	 0.062	
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Figure	31.	Fire	vegetable	front,	represented	by	finite	elements	in	red	
 
The	definition	of	the	shrubs	represented	as	22	polygons	was	made	as	follows:	
	
Table	21.	Vegetable	mass	dimensions	
Bounding	Box	 	 	
Min	X:	0,9	m	 Min	Y:	-1.9	m	 Min	Z:	0.0	m	
Max	X:	0,954	m	 Max	Y:	1.3	m	 Max	Z:	2.0	m	
Volume:	0,05m	x	0,05mx	2m	 Separation	between	them:	 0.10m	
	
For	 the	 generation	 of	 fire	 scenarios,	 the	 fire	 profile	 ramp	 was	 defined	 as	 an	 input	
following	the	next	parameters	included	on	Table	22	and	Figure	32.		
	
Table	22.	Fire	profile	input	
t1:	0	seconds	 F	(fire	efficiency):	0	
MLRPUA:	0,1633	
t2:	10	seconds	 F	(fire	efficiency):	1	
t3:	15	seconds	 F	(fire	efficiency):	0,5	
t4:	20	seconds	 F	(fire	efficiency):	0,12	
t5:	40	seconds	 F	(fire	efficiency):	0	
	
 
Figure	32.	MLRPUA	Variation	
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Where,	MLRPUA	(Mass	Loss	Rate	Per	Unit	Area)	is:	
	 !"#$%& = ()*+,-./01	3*)4	/5.-∗7-890.:;+/8-/	5/-5 	 	 	 Eq.	5	
	
At	the	time	of	analyzing	the	scenarios,	these	were	run	during	different	times	due	to	the	
high	computational	load:	
	
• Scenario	1:	31.44	seconds	
• Scenario	2:	30.60	seconds	
• Scenario	3:	17.96	seconds	
• Scenario	4:	40.00	seconds	
• Scenario	5:	40.00	seconds	
 
6.5 Results	
 
6.5.1 Scenario	1	
 
Supposing	 a	 0	 m/s	 wind	 situation,	 the	 different	 profiles	 of	 temperature	 are	 obtained.	
Firstly,	 it	 is	 going	 to	 be	 shown	 the	 different	 temperatures	 outside	 the	 wall	 surface	 for	 the	
different	 measurement	 devices	 height	 (0.15	 m,	 0.5	 m	 and	 0.85	 m	 in	 Y	 plane)	 which	 name	
corresponds	to	its	position	in	X	plane:	
	
 
Figure	33.	Wall	surface	temperature	profile	3	different	heights	0	m/s	wind	
As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	33,	the	maximum	profile	temperature	is	reached	on	the	middle	
part	of	the	tank	(0.5	m),	followed	by	the	upper	part,	achieving	a	temperature	near	70	°C	in	30	
seconds.	The	temperature	at	 the	 lowest	part	of	 the	tank	could	be	considered	constant	at	20	
seconds	after	ignition	with	a	final	wall	temperature	of	37	°C.	
	
Then,	the	same	is	done	for	the	wall	temperature	interface	(the	space	in	the	middle	of	the	
wall,	between	the	outside	and	the	inside	of	the	tank):	
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Figure	34.	Wall	temperature	interface	profile	3	different	heights	0	m/s	wind	
As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	34,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
part	 of	 the	 tank,	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 70	 °C	 in	 30	 seconds,	 as	 it	 happens	 on	 the	
outside	wall	temperature.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	and	highest	part	of	the	tank	is	the	
same	 and	 it	 could	 be	 considered	 constant	 at	 20	 seconds	 until	 the	 end	 in	 an	 outside	 wall	
temperature	of	20	°C	(both	curves	are	superposed).	As	it	can	be	shown	in	the	Figure	34,	when	
we	 are	 nearer	 to	 inside	 tank,	 the	 temperatures	 are	 increasing	 continuously	 on	 it	 and	 the	
medium	height	is	the	most	affected	part	and.	
	
Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 system	and	 compare	with	 the	 literature	 values,	 the	
curve	of	thermal	flux	heat	transfer	to	the	wall	outside	is	also	obtained	(0.15	m,	0.5	m	and	0.85	
m	in	Y	plane):	
	
 
Figure	35.	Thermal	Flux	on	the	Tank	Surface	0	m/s	wind	
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As	 it	happens	with	 temperature,	 the	 thermal	heat	 flux	 (Figure	35)	 reaches	 its	maximum	
value	on	the	middle	and	up	part,	giving	a	value	near	72	kW/m2,	so	far	from	the	giving	value	of	
22	kW/m2	mentioned	on	literature.		
	
In	 addition,	 the	 Smoke	 View	 Simulator	 gives	 a	 visualization	 of	 the	 simulation	 in	 a	 plan	
view,	 giving	 the	 image	 at	 the	 highest	 peak	 of	 thermal	 flux	 (10	 seconds	 to	 20	 seconds)	with	
temperature	values	between	20	°	C	(blue	profile)	and	980	°C	(red	profile):	
	
 
Figure	36.	10	seconds	simulation	results	0	m/s	wind	
	
 
Figure	37.	15	seconds	fire	simulation	0	m/s	wind	
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Figure	38.	20	seconds	fire	simulation	0	m/s	wind	
 
	
6.5.2 Scenario	2	
	
As	 in	Scenario	1,	supposing	a	1	m/s	wind	situation,	the	different	profiles	of	temperature	
are	 obtained.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 going	 to	 be	 shown	 the	 different	 temperatures	 outside	 the	 wall	
surface	for	the	different	measurement	devices	height	(0.15	m,	0.5	m	and	0.85	m	in	Y	plane):	
	
 
Figure	39.	Wall	surface	temperature	profile	3	different	heights	1	m/s	wind	
As	we	 can	 see	 (Figure	39),	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	 the	up	and	
middle	part	of	the	tank,	reaching	the	same	values,	achieving	a	temperature	near	210	°C	in	18	
seconds	(the	curves	of	both	parts	are	superposed).	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	part	of	the	
tank	has	reached	a	final	value	of	80	°C	in	15	seconds.	
	
Then,	the	same	is	done	for	the	wall	temperature	interface:	
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Figure	40.	Wall	temperature	interface	profile	3	different	heights	1	m/s	wind	
As	we	 can	 see,	 the	maximum	profile	 (Figure	 40)	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	 the	middle	
part	of	the	tank,	achieving	a	temperature	near	205-210	°C	in	15-20	seconds,	as	it	happens	on	
the	 outside	 wall	 temperature,	 but	 reaching	 a	 final	 temperature	 lightly	 smaller	 than	 the	
external	part.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	and	highest	part	of	the	tank	could	be	considered	
constant	 until	 the	 end	 in	 an	 outside	 wall	 temperature	 of	 20	 °C	 and	 these	 values	 are	
superposed.		
	
Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 system	and	 compare	with	 the	 literature	 values,	 the	
curve	of	thermal	flux	heat	transfer	to	the	wall	outside	is	also	obtained:	
	
 
Figure	41.	Thermal	Flux	on	the	Tank	Surface	1	m/s	wind	
As	it	happens	with	temperature,	the	thermal	heat	flux	reaches	its	maximum	value	on	the	
middle	part,	giving	a	value	near	350	kW/m2,	much	bigger	 than	the	giving	value	of	22	kW/m2	
mentioned	on	literature.		
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In	 addition,	 the	 Smoke	 View	 Simulator	 gives	 a	 visualization	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	
temperature	 during	 the	 simulation	 in	 a	 plan	 view.	 The	 figures	 show	 the	 interval	 of	 highest	
temperature	 values	 with	 parts	 in	 blue	 (temperatures	 near	 20	 °C)	 to	 red	 (temperature	 near	
1500	°C):	
	
 
Figure	42.	10	seconds	fire	simulation	1	m/s	wind	
 
 
Figure	43.	15	seconds	fire	simulation	1	m/s	wind	
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Figure	44.	20	seconds	fire	simulation	1	m/s	wind	
6.5.3 Scenario	3	
	
Supposing	 a	 3	 m/s	 wind	 situation,	 the	 different	 profiles	 of	 temperature	 are	 obtained.	
Firstly,	 it	 is	 going	 to	 be	 shown	 the	 different	 temperatures	 outside	 the	 wall	 surface	 for	 the	
different	measurement	devices	height	(0.15	m,	0.5	m	and	0.85	m	on	Y	plane):	
	
 
Figure	45.	Wall	surface	temperature	profile	3	different	heights	3	m/s	wind	
As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	45,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
part	 of	 the	 tank,	 followed	 by	 the	 upper	 part,	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 165	 °C	 in	 16	
seconds.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	part	of	the	tank	could	be	considered	constant	at	15	
seconds	until	the	end	in	an	outside	wall	temperature	of	80	°C.	
	
Then,	the	same	is	done	for	the	wall	temperature	interface:	
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Figure	46.	Wall	temperature	interface	profile	3	different	heights	3	m/s	wind	
As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	46,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
and	 upper	 part	 of	 the	 tank	 (same	 response),	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 155	 °C	 in	 16	
seconds,	as	it	happens	on	the	outside	wall	temperature.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	part	
of	the	tank	could	be	considered	constant	until	the	end	in	an	outside	wall	temperature	of	20	°C.	
	
Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 system	and	 compare	with	 the	 literature	 values,	 the	
curve	of	thermal	flux	heat	transfer	to	the	wall	outside	is	also	obtained:	
	
 
Figure	47.	Thermal	Flux	on	the	Tank	Surface	3	m/s	wind	
As	 it	happens	with	 temperature,	 the	 thermal	heat	 flux	 (Figure	47)	 reaches	 its	maximum	
value	on	 the	middle	part,	 giving	a	value	near	360	kW/m2,	 so	 far	 from	 the	giving	value	of	22	
kW/m2	mentioned	on	literature.	There	are	also	some	peaks	observed	in	the	lowest	part	of	the	
tank	with	values	near	500	kW/m2.	
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In	 addition,	 the	 Smoke	 View	 Simulator	 gives	 a	 visualization	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	
temperature	 during	 the	 simulation	 in	 a	 plan	 view.	 The	 figures	 show	 the	 interval	 of	 highest	
temperature	values	with	parts	in	blue	(temperatures	near	20	°C)	to	red	(temperature	near	920	
°C):	
	
 
Figure	48.	5	seconds	simulation	results	3	m/s	wind	
	
 
Figure	49.8,5	seconds	fire	simulation	3	m/s	wind	
 
6.5.4 Scenario	4	
 
Taking	into	account	the	results	analyzed	in	section	6.6.1,	the	scenario	2	will	be	studied	as	
the	one	selected	 to	see	 the	affectation	 in	 the	system	taking	 into	account	 the	variable	of	 the	
distance	between	the	tank	and	the	burning	vegetation.	Thus,	scenario	4	will	simulate	a	fire	of	
ornamental	 vegetation	 with	 wind	 meteorological	 conditions	 with	 a	 velocity	 of	 1m/s	 that	 is	
located	0.75	m	from	the	LPG	tank.	
	
Firstly,	it	is	going	to	be	shown	the	different	temperatures	outside	the	wall	surface	for	the	
different	measurement	devices	height	(0.15	m,	0.5	m	and	0.85	m	in	Y	plane):	
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Figure	50.	Wall	surface	temperature	profile	3	different	heights	1	m/s	wind	and	0.75	m	separation	
As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	50,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
part	 of	 the	 tank,	 followed	 by	 the	 upper	 part,	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 245	 °C	 in	 20	
seconds.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	part	of	the	tank	could	be	considered	constant	at	15	
seconds	 until	 the	 end	 in	 an	 outside	wall	 temperature	 of	 115	 °C,	 as	 it	 happens	with	 up	 and	
middle	temperatures.	
	
Then,	the	same	is	done	for	the	wall	temperature	interface:	
	
	
Figure	51.	Wall	temperature	interface	profile	3	different	heights	1	m/s	wind	and	0.75	m	separation	
As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	51,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
part	 of	 the	 tank,	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 240	 °C	 in	 16	 seconds,	 as	 it	 happens	 on	 the	
outside	wall	temperature.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	and	middle	part	(superposed)	of	the	
tank	could	be	considered	constant	until	the	end	in	an	outside	wall	temperature	of	20	°C.	
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As	it	can	be	shown	in	the	Figure	52	and	Figure	53,	when	we	are	nearer	to	inside	tank,	the	
temperatures	are	increasing	continuously	on	it.		
	
Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 system	and	 compare	with	 the	 literature	 values,	 the	
curve	of	thermal	flux	heat	transfer	to	the	wall	outside	is	also	obtained:	
	
 
Figure	52.	Thermal	Flux	on	the	Tank	Surface	1	m/s	wind	and	0.75	m	separation	
The	thermal	heat	flux	(Figure	52)	reaches	its	maximum	value	on	the	middle	part,	giving	a	
value	near	420	kW/m2,	so	far	from	the	giving	value	of	22	kW/m2	mentioned	on	literature	and	
followed	by	the	upper	part.	At	20	seconds,	it	decreases	considerably	to	values	near	zero.	
	
6.5.5 Scenario	5	
 
Taking	into	account	the	results	analyzed	in	section	6.6.1,	scenario	5	will	simulate	a	fire	of	
a	plant	mass	with	wind	meteorological	conditions	with	a	velocity	of	1m/s	that	is	located	1.5	m	
from	the	LPG	tank.	Firstly,	it	is	going	to	be	shown	the	different	temperatures	outside	the	wall	
surface	for	the	different	measurement	devices	height	(0.15	m,	0.5	m	and	0.85	m):	
	
 
Figure	53.	Wall	surface	temperature	profile	3	different	heights	1	m/s	wind	and	1.5	m	separation	
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As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	53,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
part	 of	 the	 tank,	 followed	 by	 the	 upper	 part,	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 160	 °C	 in	 30	
seconds.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	part	of	the	tank	could	be	considered	constant	at	15	
seconds	 until	 the	 end	 in	 an	 outside	 wall	 temperature	 of	 55	 °C,	 as	 it	 happens	 with	 up	 and	
middle	temperatures.	
	
Then,	the	same	is	done	for	the	wall	temperature	interface:	
	
	
Figure	54.	Wall	temperature	temperature	profile	3	different	heights	1	m/s	wind	and	1.5	m	separation	
As	we	can	see	 in	Figure	54,	 the	maximum	profile	 temperature	 is	 reached	on	the	middle	
part	 of	 the	 tank,	 achieving	 a	 temperature	 near	 160	 °C	 in	 25	 seconds,	 as	 it	 happens	 on	 the	
outside	wall	temperature.	The	temperature	on	the	lowest	and	middle	part	of	the	tank	could	be	
considered	constant	until	the	end	in	an	outside	wall	temperature	of	20	°C.	
	
Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 system	and	 compare	with	 the	 literature	 values,	 the	
curve	of	thermal	flux	heat	transfer	to	the	wall	outside	is	also	obtained:	
	
 
Figure	55.	Thermal	Flux	on	the	Tank	Surface	1	m/s	wind	and	1.5	m	separation	
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The	thermal	heat	flux	reaches	its	maximum	value	on	the	middle	part,	giving	a	value	near	
270	kW/m2,	so	far	from	the	giving	value	of	22	kW/m2	mentioned	on	literature.	At	20	seconds,	
it	decreases	considerably	to	values	near	zero.	
	
6.6 Discussion	
 
6.6.1 Scenario	1,	2	and	3	
 
 
In	the	case	of	scenario	1,	a	fire	situation	has	been	simulated	in	which	there	is	no	wind.	In	
this	 case,	 the	 flames	 coming	 from	 the	 shrubs	 will	 not	 be	 favored	 in	 any	 direction,	 so	 the	
biggest	 contribution	 the	 tank	 will	 receive	 will	 be	 the	 one	 that	 is	 transmitted	 by	 means	 of	
convection	and	radiation	mechanisms	of	the	fire	itself	and	which	in	turn	will	be	determined	by	
the	distance	from	the	bushes	to	the	tank.	Taking	into	account	this	factor	and	knowing	that	the	
part	most	exposed	to	 this	plant	 front	will	be	 the	middle	of	 the	 tank,	a	 temperature	 increase	
will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 outer	 zone	 of	 the	 wall	 up	 to	 a	 maximum	 value	 of	 70	 °C	 in	 the	 time	
contemplated	 during	 the	 simulation,	 which	will	 be	 followed	with	 close	 values	 by	 the	 upper	
part	of	the	tank.	The	bottom	of	the	tank	will	only	reach	values	around	40	°C.	
	
Due	to	the	thickness	of	 the	wall,	 the	temperature	measured	 inside	the	wall	will	be	very	
similar	to	that	provided	by	the	external	result,	with	values	close	to	70°C,	while	the	lower	part	
will	not	see	its	temperature	increase,	remaining	at	a	constant	value	of	20	°C.	
	
If	we	analyze	the	thermal	heat	flux,	we	can	observe	that	both	the	top	and	the	middle	of	
the	exterior	of	the	tank	reach	peaks	of	up	to	72	kW/m2,	which	could	be	considered	dangerous	
and	possibly	trigger	a	BLEVE	if	it	is	in	account	the	criteria	defined	by	US	law.		
	
If	 we	 analyze	 scenario	 2,	 the	 flames	 coming	 from	 the	 shrubs	 will	 be	 favored	 in	 the	
direction	of	the	tank,	so	the	contribution	of	heat	to	it	will	be	greater	and	the	view	factor	will	
favor	this	effect.	The	tank	will	receive	heat	by	by	convection	and	radiation	mechanisms	of	the	
fire	 itself	 (which	 in	 turn	 will	 be	 determined	 by	 the	 distance	 of	 the	 shrubs	 to	 the	 tank,	 as	
happened	in	the	previous	scenario).	Taking	into	account	this	factor	and	knowing	that	the	most	
exposed	part	to	this	vegetal	front	will	be	the	central	part	of	the	tank	(the	wind	speed	and	its	
direction	will	favor	the	incidence	in	this	part),	a	temperature	increase	will	be	seen	in	the	outer	
zone	of	 the	wall	up	 to	a	maximum	value	of	210-215	°C	 in	 the	 time	contemplated	during	 the	
simulation.	 The	 lower	 part	 of	 the	 tank	 will	 reach	 values	 close	 to	 70-80	 °C	 that	 may	 be	
potentially	dangerous.	
	
Due	to	the	thickness	of	the	wall,	the	temperature	measured	inside	will	be	very	similar	to	
that	provided	by	the	external	but	slightly	 lower	result,	with	values	close	to	200	°C,	while	the	
lower	part	will	not	see	its	temperature	increased,	remaining	at	a	constant	value	of	20-25	°C.	
	
In	this	scenario,	if	we	analyze	the	thermal	heat	flow,	we	can	observe	that	high	peaks,	with	
values	 of	 up	 to	 350	 kW/m2	 are	 reached	 in	 the	 upper,	 middle	 and	 lower	 faces	 of	 the	 tank	
exterior,	 which	would	 be	 considered	 dangerous	 and	would	 trigger	 a	 BLEVE	 if	 you	 take	 into	
account	the	criteria	defined	by	US	law.		
	
If	we	analyze	scenario	3,	the	flames	from	the	shrubs	will	be	favored	in	the	direction	of	the	
tank,	so	the	contribution	of	heat	to	it	will	be	greater,	as	it	happened	in	scenario	2.	The	tank	will	
also	receive	heat	by	convection	and	radiation	mechanisms	of	the	fire	itself	(and	which	in	turn	
will	 be	 determined	by	 the	 distance	 of	 the	 shrubs	 to	 the	 tank,	 as	 happened	 in	 the	 scenarios	
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above).	 Taking	 into	 account	 this	 factor	 and	 knowing	 that	 the	 most	 exposed	 part	 to	 this	
vegetation	mass	will	be	the	central	part	of	the	tank	a	temperature	increase	will	be	seen	in	the	
outer	zone	of	the	wall	up	to	a	maximum	value	of	160-170	°C	in	the	time	contemplated	during	
the	 simulation.	 The	 lower	 part	 of	 the	 tank	 will	 reach	 values	 close	 to	 80	 °C	 that	 may	 be	
potentially	 dangerous.	 In	 this	 case,	 a	 higher	wind	 velocity	 has	 favored	 the	 dispersion	 of	 the	
heat	of	the	flames	by	other	parts	of	the	tank	(especially	the	lower	one),	reducing	the	time	of	
contact	of	the	flame	with	the	own	surface	of	the	tank.	
	
Due	to	the	thickness	of	the	wall,	the	temperature	measured	inside	will	be	very	similar	to	
that	provided	by	the	external	result	but	slightly	 lower,	with	values	close	to	155	°C,	while	the	
lower	part	will	not	see	its	temperature	increased,	remaining	at	a	constant	value	of	20-25	°C,	as	
in	scenario	2.	
	
In	this	scenario,	 if	we	analyze	the	thermal	flow	of	heat,	we	can	observe	that	high	peaks,	
with	values	of	up	to	360	kW/m2,	can	be	observed	in	the	upper,	middle	and	lower	faces	of	the	
exterior	of	the	tank,	which	would	be	considered	dangerous	and	would	trigger	a	BLEVE	 if	you	
take	into	account	the	criteria	defined	by	US	law.		
	
At	this	point	in	the	analysis,	it	will	be	necessary	to	compare	the	results	obtained	from	the	
three	 simulations.	 In	 this	 case,	 given	 the	 results,	 scenario	 1	 (FS1)	 is	 discarded	 as	 dangerous	
since	the	increase	in	temperature,	because	the	parts	inside	wall	that	are	not	wet	remain	at	70	
°C	and	the	wet	parts	at	20	°C.	For	this	reason,	scenarios	2	(FS2)	and	3	(FS3)	will	be	considered	
most	virulent.	
 
Figure	56.	Outside	wall	temperature	comparison	scenarios	1,	2	and	3	
 
If	the	temperatures	reached	by	the	scenarios	2	(FS2)	and	3	(FS3)	inside	the	tank	wall	and	
outside	are	observed,	the	results	are	more	revealing	in	scenario	2:	the	temperature	increases	
to	very	high	values	close	to	220	as	shown	in	the	Figure	56.	The	values	reached	on	the	middle	
part	of	tank	corresponding	to	most	favor	view	factor	area	in	FS2	are	higher	than	FS3	in	a	value	
of	almost	80	°C.		
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If	 the	 thermal	 flux	variation	 is	observed,	 the	 results	will	be	very	 similar	and,	although	a	
larger	 peak	 is	 reached	 in	 scenario	 3,	 scenario	 2	will	 provide	 a	more	 damaging	 result	 due	 to	
reaching	similar	values	over	a	greater	range	of	weather.	
 
 
Figure	57.	Thermal	heat	flux	to	tank	scenarios	1,	2	and	3	
On	 this	 case,	both	 scenario	2	and	3	 could	 lead	 to	a	possible	BLEVE	event	according	 the	
criteria	 fixed	by	API	Standard.	The	most	 favor	values	are	also	on	the	middle	part	of	 the	tank	
reaching	high	values	in	a	very	short	period	of	time.	
	
	
6.6.2 Scenario	4	and	5	
	
If	 we	 analyze	 scenario	 4,	 the	 flames	 coming	 from	 the	 shrubs	 will	 be	 favored	 in	 the	
direction	of	the	tank,	so	that	the	contribution	of	the	thermal	energy	to	it	will	be	greater.	The	
tank	will	receive	heat	by	convection	and	radiation	mechanisms	of	the	fire	itself	(which	in	turn	
will	be	determined	by	the	distance	of	the	shrubs	to	the	tank,	in	this	case	0.75	m).	Taking	into	
account	 this	 factor	 and	 knowing	 that	 the	most	 exposed	 part	 to	 this	 plant	 front	 will	 be	 the	
central	part	of	the	tank	(the	wind	speed	and	its	direction	will	favor	the	incidence	in	this	part),	a	
temperature	increase	will	be	observed	in	the	outer	zone	of	the	wall	up	to	a	maximum	value	of	
240-250	°C	in	the	time	contemplated	during	the	simulation.	The	bottom	of	the	tank	will	reach	
values	close	to	115-120	°C	that	can	be	potentially	dangerous.	
	
Due	to	the	thickness	of	the	wall,	the	temperature	measured	inside	will	be	very	similar	to	
that	provided	by	the	external	result	but	slightly	 lower,	with	values	close	to	240	°C,	while	the	
lower	part	will	not	see	its	temperature	increased,	remaining	in	a	value	constant	from	20-25	°C.	
	
In	this	scenario,	if	we	analyze	the	thermal	flow	of	heat,	we	can	observe	that	the	upper	and	
middle	faces	of	the	exterior	of	the	tank	reach	high	peaks	with	values	up	to	420	kW/m2,	which	
would	 be	 considered	 dangerous	 and	would	 trigger	 a	 BLEVE	 if	 take	 into	 account	 the	 criteria	
defined	by	the	law	of	the	United	States	
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If	we	analyze	scenario	5,	knowing	that	 the	most	exposed	part	 to	 this	plant	 front	will	be	
the	central	part	of	 the	 tank	 (the	wind	speed	and	 its	direction	will	 favor	 the	 incidence	 in	 this	
part),	a	temperature	increase	will	be	observed	in	the	outer	zone	of	the	wall	up	to	a	maximum	
value	of	160	°C	 in	 the	time	contemplated	during	the	simulation.	The	bottom	of	 the	tank	will	
reach	values	close	to	55	°C	that	can	be	potentially	dangerous.	
	
Due	 to	 the	 thickness	of	 the	wall,	 the	 temperature	measured	 in	 the	 interior	will	 be	very	
similar	to	that	provided	by	the	external	result	but	slightly	 lower,	with	values	close	to	155	°C,	
whereas	the	lower	part	will	not	see	its	temperature	increased,	remaining	in	a	value	constant	
from	20-25	°C.	
	
In	this	scenario,	 if	we	analyze	the	thermal	heat	flux,	we	can	observe	that	the	upper	and	
middle	faces	of	the	exterior	of	the	tank	reach	high	peaks,	with	values	up	to	275	kW/m2,	which	
would	 be	 considered	 dangerous	 and	would	 trigger	 a	 BLEVE	 if	 take	 into	 account	 the	 criteria	
defined	by	the	law	of	the	United	States.		
 
When	evaluating	the	hazard	integrated	in	the	variable	distance,	we	can	conclude	that	this	
is	 a	 key	value	and	 the	 increase	or	decrease	 causes	 large	variations	 in	both	 temperature	and	
heat	 contributed	 to	 the	 tank	 itself.	As	 can	be	 seen	 in	Figure	58,	 the	 values	 are	 close	 to	half	
extending	a	difference	of	0.75	m	separation.		
	
Due	 to	 this,	 if	 the	 reduction	 factor	 continues	 to	 be	 gradual,	 in	 the	 legislation	 of	many	
countries	to	maintain	this	type	vegetation	mass	in	a	distance	of	3	m,	could	be	limiting	enough	
to	keep	these	risks	at	bay.	As	we	can	see,	increasing	the	distance	by	0.75	m,	there	has	been	a	
reduction	of	the	emitted	heat	of	approximately	37.5%,	thus	supporting	what	has	been	said	so	
far.	
	
 
Figure	58.	Heat	Flux	Wall	Surface	Scenario	4	(FS4)	and	5	(FS5)	
	
It	 is	very	 important,	when	evaluating	these	scenarios,	 to	understand	the	contribution	of	
heat	 flow	 (per	unit	 time)	and	 the	evolution	of	 temperatures	 in	 that	 time	 interval,	which	will	
trigger	or	not	trigger	a	BLEVE	scenario.	 	
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7. Sustainability	Study	
 
The	study	of	sustainability	of	this	project	 is	made	based	on	the	guidelines	set	out	 in	the	
Legislative	 Royal	 Decree	 1/2008	 of	 11	 January,	 which	 presents	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Law	 on	
Environmental	Impact	Assessment	Projects.	
	
7.1 Project	overview	
 
The	 objective	 of	 this	 project	 is	 the	 study	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 risks	 for	 LPG	 facilities	 in	
wildland-urban	 interfaces	 in	 case	 of	 fire.	 Therefore,	 the	 study	 of	 the	 sustainability	 of	 this	
project	is	subject	exclusively	to	this	task.	
	
7.2 Alternatives	Study	
 
Being	a	predominantly	theoretical	project,	 it	 is	considered	that	there	are	not	alternative	
solutions	for	their	realization.	
	
7.3 Environment	Description	
 
This	project	was	carried	out	 in	CERTEC	 facilities,	 located	 in	 the	Department	of	Chemical	
Engineering	 EEBE	 during	 about	 five	 months.	 It	 is	 considered	 that	 the	 application	 did	 not	
substantially	 change	 the	 quality	 levels	 of	 the	 environment,	 including	 the	 socio-economic	
context.	
	
7.4 Identification	and	Evaluation	of	Environmental	Impact	
 
This	 section	 analyzes	 the	 various	 potential	 impacts	 the	 project	 could	 have	 on	 the	
environment	and	may	be	due	to:	
	
• The	existence	of	the	project	
• The	use	of	natural	resources	
• The	 emission	 of	 pollutants	 (atmosphere,	 hydrosphere	 and	 lithosphere),	 the	
formation	of	harmful	substances	or	waste	treatment.	
 
7.4.1 Criteria	
 
Depending	on	the	type	of	effect:	
	
• Positive	 effect:	 the	 one	which	 is	 admitted	 by	 the	 scientific	 community	 and	 the	
general	 population	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 costs	 and	
benefits	of	generic	contingencies	external	of	contemplated	actions.	
• Negative	 effect:	 That	 which	 results	 in	 the	 loss	 of	 natural	 value,	 aesthetic	 and	
cultural	 landscape,	 ecological	 productivity	 or	 an	 increase	 in	 pollution	 damage	
arising	 from	erosion	and	other	environmental	hazards	 in	disagreement	with	 the	
eco-geographical	structure,	character	and	personality	of	a	given	location.	
 
Depending	on	the	impact	of	the	effect:	
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• Direct	 effect:	 the	 one	 which	 has	 an	 immediate	 impact	 on	 some	 aspect	 of	 the	
environment.	
• Indirect	or	secondary	effect:	 the	one	which	 is	an	 immediate	 impact	with	regard	
to	 interdependence	 or,	 in	 general,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 relationship	 of	
environmental	sector	to	another.	
	
Here	 there	 are	 included	 the	 different	 definitions	 of	 the	 assessment	 of	 potential	
environmental	impact	referring	the	character	of	environmental	compatibility:	
	
• Compatible	 EI:	 one	 in	which	 the	 recovery	 is	 immediate	 end	 of	 the	 activity	 and	
does	not	require	protective	measures.	
• Moderate	 EI:	 That	 where	 recovery	 does	 not	 require	 intensive	 corrective	 or	
protective	measures,	but	to	recover	the	initial	conditions	require	a	certain	time.	
• IA	 Sever:	 one	 in	 which	 the	 recovery	 of	 environmental	 conditions	 requires	 the	
adequacy	of	corrective	or	protective	measures,	plus	an	extended	period	of	time.	
• Critical	EI:	those	with	a	magnitude	greater	than	the	acceptable	limit,	resulting	in	a	
permanent	loss	of	the	quality	of	environmental	conditions,	without	the	possibility	
of	 recovery,	 even	 with	 the	 protective	 or	 corrective	 measures.	 In	 addition	 to	
assessing	 the	 impacts	 of	 different	 specific	 cause-effect	 relationships,	 must	 be	
evaluated	 regarding	 the	overall	 impact	of	 the	project.	 The	overall	magnitude	of	
the	 project	will	 be	 positive	 if	 the	 overall	 assessment	 is	 supported,	moderate	 or	
severe,	while	it	will	be	negative	if	the	overall	assessment	is	critical.	
 
7.4.2 Impact	identification	
 
There	are	some	phases	or	major	activities	when	the	impact	identification	is	done	and	they	
have	to	be	considered	in	the	construction,	implementation	and	decommissioning	activities.	In	
this	case,	because	it	is	a	theoretical	work,	only	makes	sense	to	analyze	the	stage	of	the	activity	
because	any	construction	or	decommissioning	is	done.	
	
The	 resources	 were	 needed	 to	 develop	 this	 activity	 are	 electricity	 consumption	 for	
computers	 and	 material	 consumption	 own	 office	 consumables	 such	 as	 paper,	 printer	
cartridges,	pens,	etc.	
 
7.4.3 Potential	Environmental	Impact	
 
This	section	analyzes	the	potential	impacts	on	the	environment	and	society	that	may	have	
caused	the	realization	of	this	project	as	they	were	mentioned	in	7.4.	
	
Impact	of	the	existence	of	the	project	
	
There	is	a	positive	impact	for	the	project.	The	simulation	validation	tool	could	reduce	the	
number	 of	 experiments	 required	 and,	 consequently,	 reduce	 the	 emission	 of	 pollutants	
resulting	from	combustion	of	real	scenarios	created	to	demonstrate	the	fire	situations	studied.	
Eventually,	all	bring	a	social	benefit	 in	terms	of	improved	efficiency	in	firefighting	since	it	will	
better	understand	and	predict	 fire	behavior	and	also	 it	could	help	 to	 improve	the	normative	
and	legislation	relating	safety	distances	from	LPG	facilities.	
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Impact	of	resource	use	
	
There	is	a	direct	impact	of	resource	use,	primarily	office	supplies	as	a	result	of	the	use	of	
computer	equipment,	refurbishment	of	the	office,	etc.	Waste	management	is	performed	as	set	
forth	in	Table	23	also	identifies	where	each	waste	generated	according	to	the	rules	required	by	
the	Catalan	Waste	Agency	[37].	
	
Table	23.	Residues	Management	[35]	
CODE	 GENERATED	RESIDUE	
PROCESS	
GENERATOR	 MANAGEMENT	
200101	 Paper	 Printing	and	noting	 Blue	bin	for	selective	collection	
080309	 Print	Ink	 Document	Printing	 Specific	recycle	point	
200199	 Office	material	 Project	development	 No	specific	recycle	point/bin	
	
 
Impact	of	emissions	
 
In	order	 to	 simplify	 the	 study	of	 the	emissions	 impact	 is	 considered	only	CO2	emissions	
because	it	is	the	majority	contaminant.	
	
The	 main	 consumption	 of	 resources	 with	 the	 consequent	 emission	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	
considers	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 indirect	 impact	 arising	 from	 the	 consumption	 of	 electricity	
resulting	 from	 the	 emission	 of	 combustion	 gases	 in	 power	 plants.	 The	main	 contaminant	 is	
then	the	CO2	responsible	for	the	greenhouse	effect.	Thus,	the	project	was	developed	over	six	
months.	Throughout	the	project	has	been	prepared	for	the	first	three	months	of	a	computer	
and	an	average	of	 four-six	 computers	 running	 the	 simulations	 in	parallel	during	 the	 last	 two	
months.	 They	 are	 on	 every	 day	 of	 the	 week	 and	 24	 hours	 per	 day,	 the	 average	 energy	
consumption	is	7,200	hours.	If	it	is	considered	that	the	computer	requires	an	average	power	of	
90	W	when	it	is	active	and	5	W	when	is	at	rest;	the	energy	consumed	throughout	the	project	
(with	 an	 average	 of	 5	 computers	 running	 simulations	 and	 the	 other	 doing	 the	 document)	 is	
207.12	kWh.	
	
Finally,	data	 from	CO2	emission	per	kWh	produced	published	by	Red	Eléctrica	Española,	
determines	that	emits	248	g	CO2	/	kWh	produced	[38].	If	a	character	approach,	considers	the	
unit	of	energy	produced	is	equivalent	to	the	unit	of	energy	consumed	and,	therefore,	there	is	
no	loss	in	transport,	the	mass	of	CO2	released	is	51.3	kg	CO2.	
	
7.5 Precautionary	Measures	
 
Corrective	 measures	 planned	 to	 minimize	 environmental	 impacts	 focus	 primarily	 on	
environmental	management	of	waste	(paper,	printer	cartridges,	etc.).	Also,	try	to	minimize	the	
consumption	of	sheets	of	paper	and	electronic	documents	not	using	printed	paper.	
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8. Economical	analysis		
 
The	 costs	 associated	 with	 the	 project	 will	 be	 divided	 between	 material	 and	 human	
resources.	
	
8.1 Human	resources	
 
This	 section	 analyzes	 costs	 associated	 with	 human	 resources,	 which	 are	 considered	
basically	 the	hours	of	a	person	 in	charge	of	 the	project,	as	well	as	 two	others	who	have	had	
participation.	
	
It	 is	 considered	 a	 supposed	 cost	 of	 €	 12/	 hour	 for	 junior	 engineer	 who	 has	 done	 the	
project,	devoting	18	hours	per	week	 for	 five	months.	The	direction	was	given	by	 two	PhD	 in	
Industrial	Engineering	with	a	commitment	of	three	hours	per	week	and	a	fee	estimated	€	40	/	
hour	 respectively.	 In	 this	 case,	 a	 PhD	 student	 has	 helped	 also	 in	 the	 part	 of	 environmental	
simulation,	 with	 an	 estimated	 fee	 of	 €	 20	 /	 hour.	 Table	 24	 shows	 the	 relationship	 of	 costs	
associated	with	human	resources:	
	
Table	24.	Human	Resources	Costs	
Personnel	 Cost	(€/h)	 Dedicated	Hours	 Total	cost	(€)	
Junior	Engineer	 12	 378	 4,356	
PhD	Student	 20	 30	 600	
2	PhD	Industrial	
Engineer	 40	 63	 5,040	
TOTAL	 62	 504	 9,996	
	
 
8.2 Material	resources	
 
Material	 resources	 consumed	during	 the	 realization	 of	 this	 project	 are	 related	 to	 office	
work:	this	costs	arising	from	consumption	of	office	supplies	(electricity).	Simulations	activities	
have	been	developed	on	the	CERTEC	(Center	for	Technological	Risk	Studies)and,	therefore,	 it	
has	 been	 used	 the	 computer	 equipment	 has	 this	 institution.	 Referring	 to	 this	 aspect,	 it	 is	
considered	the	amortization	of	equipment	owned	CERTEC.	Regarding	the	software	used,	 it	 is	
considered	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 licensing	 the	 operating	 system	 (Microsoft®	 Windows	 7	
Professional)	and	office	suite	 (Microsoft®	Office	2010)	are	 included	 in	 the	acquisition	cost	of	
the	 computer.	 However,	 regarding	 specific	 software	 licenses	 has	 been	 used	 (AutoCAD®	 and	
Pyrosim)	the	cost	was	zero	as	it	has	benefit	from	the	license	and	the	UPC	CERTEC.	Finally,	the	
simulator	used	to	carry	out	the	project	(FDS)	 is	 free	software	and	therefore	does	not	 involve	
any	cost	of	acquiring	the	license.	
	
Given	that	the	payback	horizon	is	five	years,	the	material	resources	costs	are	collected	on	
the	next	table:	
Table	25.	Material	Costs	
COST	 VALUE	(€)	
Office	Supplies	 300	
Computers	Payback	 550	
Office	Supplies	 70	
TOTAL	 920	
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8.3 Total	Costs	
 
The	total	costs	associated	to	the	Project	are:		
	
Table	26.	Total	Project	Cost	
COST	 VALUE	(€)	
Human	Cost	 9,996	
Material	Cost	 920	
Total	net	cost	 10,916	
unexpected	 15%	
TOTAL	COST	 12,553.4	
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9. Conclusions	
 
The	 work	 carried	 out	 here	 has	 tried	 to	 demonstrate	 and	 sketch	 a	 large	 amount	 of	
information	about	the	problem	of	risk	on	LPG	tanks	relating	fires	in	wildland-urban	interfaces	
and	the	problem	of	the	presence	of	shrubs	or	flammable	vegetable	substances	near	this	type	
of	installations.	
	
In	 the	 first	 place,	 there	 are	 a	 large	 number	 of	 variables	 that	 interfere	 with	 the	
characterization	 of	 the	 analytical	 substance:	 LPG.	 As	 it	 is	 a	mixture	 of	 propane	 and	 butane,	
with	different	physical	 and	 chemical	 properties	 (although	 similar),	 there	 is	 a	 variability	 in	 its	
behavior	 depending	 on	 the	 %	 defined	 in	 its	 composition,	 although	 this	 factor	 is	 not	
contemplated	 in	 this	 environment	 simulations	 and	 project.	 This	 factor	 would	 affect	 the	
response	of	the	system	in	case	of	a	fire	scenario	such	as	that	contemplated	here.	
	
Historical	events	and	accidents	show	that	LPG	is	a	dangerous	substance	involving	different	
types	of	accidents	(fires	and	explosions).	Thanks	to	these	experiences,	we	have	learned	many	
lessons	 related	 to	 the	capacity	and	velocity	of	action	 in	dangerous	 situations	 for	people	and	
the	environment,	as	well	as	the	intrinsic	risks	of	the	infrastructure	contemplated	in	this	work,	
that	are	present	all	over	the	world.	
	
Although	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 information	 is	 currently	 available	 and	 regulatory	 agencies	
have	a	standard	and	legislation	to	protect	individuals	and	reduce	the	risk	of	such	scenarios,	as	
we	have	seen,	there	is	a	great	difference	among	countries.	Spain,	as	an	example,	contemplates	
the	 possibility	 of	 having	 shrubs	 near	 flammable	materials	 such	 as	 an	 LPG	 installation,	while	
countries	 like	 Italy	 dedicate	 a	 specific	 section	 to	 talk	 about	 this	 problem.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	
believe	that	it	would	be	necessary	to	deal	more	closely	with	the	competent	bodies	in	order	to	
unify	the	criterion	within	the	same	legal	area	(for	example	the	European	Union)	and	to	apply	
the	same	criterion	in	this	way.	
	
Entering	 the	 field	of	experts	and	 reviewing	 the	state	of	 the	art	about	 this	problem,	 it	 is	
noteworthy	the	lack	of	available	information	or	the	few	contributions	made	on	the	subject,	but	
also	 important.	 There	 are	 many	 variables	 that	 can	 modify	 the	 results	 (wind,	 outdoor	
temperature,	 shrub	 height,	 distance	 to	 the	 tank,	 degree	 of	 filling	 of	 the	 tank,	 material	 of	
construction	 of	 the	 same,	 etc.)	 and	 that	 are	 very	 complicated	 to	 relate.	 In	 addition,	 no	
regulations,	 except	 for	 the	US,	 contain	 a	 numerical	 limit	 value	 that	 can	 trigger	 an	 explosion	
scenario	or	BLEVE.	
	
For	this	reason,	tanking	the	contributions	that	have	been	made	in	the	characterization	of	
the	system,	 the	value	of	maximum	heat	 flux	produced	by	a	BLEVE	used	as	a	criterion,	 is	not	
100%	 valid	 when	 evaluating	 the	 potential	 risk	 or	 danger	 of	 a	 scenario,	 since	 a	 very	 high	
thermal	 flux	 can	 be	 provided	 during	 instantaneous	 moments	 of	 time	 that	 do	 not	 affect	
practically	the	 internal	temperature	of	the	tank.	For	this	reason,	 it	 is	 interesting	to	study	the	
incidence	that	different	variables	can	have	within	a	scenario.	
	
In	 this	 case,	 the	main	 variables	 to	be	 studied	were	 the	wind	 velocity	 incident	on	 a	 LPG	
tank,	as	well	as	 the	distance	of	ornamental	shrubs	to	the	tank.	These	two	factors	have	been	
revealed	crucial.	
	
A	 wind	 of	 1	m/s	 for	 the	 scenario	 that	 has	 been	 designed,	 has	 been	 shown	 potentially	
more	dangerous	than	a	greater	wind,	providing	a	better	contact	with	the	tank	and	therefore	
giving	a	greater	amount	of	energy.	In	this	case,	by	varying	the	distances	of	the	vegetable	mass	
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and	simulating	the	same	scenario,	it	has	been	observed	that	the	values	of	heat	flux	have	been	
seen	in	the	middle	part	of	the	tank	with	a	small	variation	of	the	distances,	which	reveals	that	it	
is	 a	 determining	 factor	 to	 ensure	 the	 security	 in	 this	 type	 of	 environment.	 Furthermore,	
considering	the	temperature,	 this	 is	decisive	when	evaluating	a	possible	BLEVE	or	not,	which	
shows	that	the	criterion	taken	by	the	API	standard	is	insufficient	to	evaluate	a	risk	scenario	and	
guarantee	the	safety	of	the	population	subject	to	these	environments.	
	
Finally,	conclude	that	this	work	has	tried	to	raise	awareness	of	the	lack	of	information	on	
this	 subject	 that	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 real	 scenarios	 in	 day	 to	 day	 everyday	 events	 such	 as	 the	
development	of	a	 fire	 in	 the	wildland-urban	 interface.	Taking	appropriate	measures	 that	are	
guaranteed	by	law,	would	reduce	the	risk	inherent	in	this	type	of	substances	and	avoid	results	
such	as	those	that	have	occurred	historically	and	have	jeopardized	the	lives	of	many	people.	
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10. Planning	
 
This	project	has	been	developed	for	approximately	5	months,	which	have	started	with	a	
previous	review	and	literature	search.	Then,	I	continued	the	following	two	months	developing	
a	more	theoretical	part	in	which	the	problem	of	the	project	is	exposed	and	evaluated,	relating	
LPG	characterization,	legislation	about	LPG	facilities	and	a	review	of	the	state	of	the	art.	Next,	
the	project	is	continued	with	the	designing	of	the	scenarios	and	the	execution	of	the	programs	
with	the	objective	of	evaluating	the	associated	risks.	Finally,	the	results	are	discussed	and	the	
conclusions	drawn,	followed	by	an	environmental	and	cost	analysis.	
 
Table	27.	Planning	per	week	
PLANNING	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	 19	 20	 21	
1.	Literature	
revision	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
A.	LPG	
characterization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
B.	Legislation	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C.	Historical	
Incidents	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
D.	Problem	
characterization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
E.	State	of	the	art	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2.	LPG	
Characterization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3.	Legislation	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4.	Historical	
Incidents	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
5.	Problem	
Characterization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
6.	State	of	the	art	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
7.	Simulation	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
A.	Simulations	
design	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
B.	Simulations	
Running	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C.	Results	and	
discussion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
8.	Conclusions	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
9.	Environmental	
Analysis	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
10.	Economical	
Analysis	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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11. Annex	
 
11.1 Input	File	FDS	
 
The	following	is	the	txt.	used	for	scenario	1.	For	the	rest,	the	necessary	modifications	will	
be	made	that	will	define	the	environment.	
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